There is an undeclared war against Russia. Undeclared air war between the USSR and the USA (according to rgaspi) Everything that did not die ... burn
March 13th, 2015 01:30 am
“Russia is not a commercial or agricultural state, but a military state, and its calling is to be a thunderstorm of light”, - Russian Emperor Alexander III.
________________________________________ _____________________
Let's turn to the hysterical facts. But first, to the report of the Minister of War of Imperial Russia in 1898-1904, Alexei Nikolayevich Kuropatkin: commander of troops in Manchuria in the Russo-Japanese War, commander of the army in the First World War, and the Northern Front in 1916, Turkestan Governor-General in 1917, leader of the suppression Central Asian uprising, author of many military-historical and military-geographical works. Where he presented a memorandum to Tsar Nicholas II, in which he cited many facts that Russia was constantly at war! Despite the fact that the general did not touch the period from the first coup to the Horde and the founding of the Moscow principality, which became the progenitor of the Russian Empire, it is clear that the whole history of Russia consists of wars!
The minister realized that it was in the war that Russia's main role was, and with his report he wanted to push the emperor to adhere to a tougher state policy, following the example of his predecessors. What was in the report? We read: "Your Imperial Majesty! During the 18th and 19th centuries, Russia spent 128 years in wars, and only 72 years were peaceful." Of the 128 years of war, only five can be called defensive, and all the rest are exclusively aggressive campaigns.
The list of wars and (or) hostilities provides an opportunity to take a closer look at both the nature of military conflicts: internal, international, foreign internal, in which the state of Muscovy, the Russian Empire, the RSFSR, the USSR, the Russian Federation participated, and the time periods during which they participated in such conflicts.
I. A brief chronology of the wars waged by Muscovy, the Russian Empire, the RSFSR, the USSR, the Russian Federation :
1 Russo-Swedish war (1554-1557)- started by the Swedes, ended in victory
2 Livonian War (1558 - 1583)- launched by the Russians to lift the trade blockade from the Hansa, Sweden, Lithuania and Poland (R.P.) stood up for Livonia in succession, the result is extremely unsuccessful (the loss of almost the entire north-west and Belarusian lands)
3 Crimean campaign against Moscow(1571) - initiated by the Krymchaks, the result is deplorable
4 Battle of Molodi (1572)- initiated by the Krymchaks as the last blow (see line above), a decisive victory
added - Russo-Swedish War (1579-1583)- started by the Swedes as part of the Livonian war, military draw, territorial losses (Ivangorod, Koporye)
5 Russo-Swedish war (1590-1595)- started by Russians, successful, minor acquisitions of territories in Karelia
6 Russo-Polish war (1605-1618)- attempts by the Poles to crush the Kingdom of Russia during times of unrest, the main goal was not achieved, significant territorial losses (Smolensk, Chernigov, Seversk)
7 Russo-Swedish war (1614-1617)- started by the Swedes, military draw, territorial losses (Ingermlandia, Karela)
8 Smolensk War (1631-1634) - launched by the Russians against Poles for the return of Smolensk lands, military and political draw
9 Russo-Polish war 1654-1667- started by Russians for the return of western lands, successful, significant territorial acquisitions (Smolensk, left-bank Little Russia, Seversk, Kyiv)
10 Russo-Swedish war 1656-1658- started by the Swedes, at the same time the Russian-Polish conflict (see previous), military draw, minor territorial acquisitions (Marienburg, Derpt)
11 Russian-Turkish war (1676-1681)- started by the Turks, who sought to crush the Right Bank, a military and political draw.
12 Russian-Turkish war (1686-1700)- launched by the Russians as part of a pan-European military alliance against Turkey, was carried out incl. for obtaining access to the Black Sea, a military draw, territorial acquisitions that gave access to Azov
13 Northern War (1700-1721) - the war was started by the Russians for the return of the northwestern lands and access to the Baltic, military victory, significant territorial acquisitions (Izhora, Livonia, Estonia, southern Finland)
14 Russian-Turkish war (1710-1713)- launched by the Turks as part of the support of the Swedish side (see Northern War), military defeat, loss of the Azov territories
15 Persian campaign 1722-23- launched by the Russians, military victory, territorial acquisitions in the Caspian Sea (for a short time)
16 War of the Polish Succession 1733-1735- participation of Russian forces as part of the Russian-Austrian alliance in minor military operations against French troops in the territory of Poland and Silesia.
17 Russian-Turkish war 1735-1739- started by Russians, military and political draw
18 Russo-Swedish War 1741-1743- started by the Swedes, military victory, unknown territory acquisition
19 Seven Years' War 1756-1763- Russia's participation in the war within the framework of the political anti-Prussian alliance
20 Russian-Turkish war 1768-1774- launched by the Turks, crushing victory, significant territorial acquisitions (southern Ukraine, Crimea, North Caucasus)
21 Bar Confederation 1768-1776- civil war of the Polish gentry against King Poniatowski and the pro-Russian party in Poland, Russian troops support the Polish army in battles against the Confederates.
22 Russian-Turkish war 1787-1792- started by the Turks for the return of lands lost in the previous campaign, a crushing victory, terr.acquisitions in Transnistria.
23 Russo-Swedish War 1788-1790- started by the Swedes, military victory
24 Russo-Polish war of 1792- started by Russians, military victory, return of Western Russian lands (Pinsk, Polissya, Podolia, Volyn)
25 Kosciuszko Uprising (1794) - Russian suppression troops of the civil uprising in Poland
26 Russo-Persian War of 1796- started by the Russians in fulfillment of the obligations of the Treaty of St. George, as a response to the military actions of the Persians in Transcaucasia, a military victory.
27 Italian campaign of Suvorov (1799)- an episode of Russia's participation in the Anglo-Austro-Turkish-Neapolitan-Russian alliance against revolutionary France.
28 Russo-Persian War 1804-1813- launched by the Persians, in response to the expansion of the territory of Russia in Transcaucasia, military victory, territorial acquisitions (East Georgia, Imeretia, Mengrelia, Abkhazia, Azerbaijan)
29 War of the Third Coalition (1805)- see below
30 War of the Fourth Coalition 1806-1807- see below
31 Russo-Turkish War of 1806-1812- provoked by both sides by mutual violations of the treaty status of the Danube principalities, military victory, territorial acquisitions (Bessarabia, Transcaucasia)
32 Anglo-Russian war 1807-1812- a consequence of the defeat of Russia in the war of the fourth coalition, joining the continental blockade and declaring war on England, hostilities are insignificant, a draw.
33 Russo-Swedish War of 1808-1809- launched by the Russians as part of the Anglo-Russian war against the British allies, military victory, the annexation of Finland.
34 War of the Fifth Coalition (1809)- Russia's participation and support of its European allies in a number of anti-Napoleonic wars on the territory of Europe (see coalition wars above)
35 Patriotic War of 1812- launched by the French, united pan-European campaign against Russia under the command of Napoleon, victory.
36 Foreign campaign of the Russian army in 1813-14.- response to the attack of Napoleon's troops, see above
37 Capture of Paris (1814)- logical conclusion see above and above
38 Russo-Persian War (1826-1828)- started by the Persians, as a revenge for previous losses, a military victory, terr. acquisitions (Armenia, Caspian coast)
39 Russian-Turkish war (1828-1829)- started by the Russians, an episode of the wars for the independence of Greece, a military victory, territorial acquisitions (Moldova, the Danube Delta, Georgia, east of the Black Sea)
40 Polish Uprising of 1830 - Russian suppression troops of the uprising of the troops of the Polish kingdom.
41 War of Russia against the Khanate of Khiva 1835 - 1840 - counter-terrorist operation of the Russian expeditionary force on the right bank of the Caspian Sea, in response to the piratical actions of the Khivans and Kirghiz
42 Crimean War 1853-1856- started by the Turks, supported by England and France, military draw, loss of part of the Danube territories
43 Polish Uprising of 1863 - suppression by Russian troops civil uprising in the territory. Poland and Lithuania.
44 Russian war in Central Asia (Tashkent, Bukhara, Khiva) - 1865-1875- initial rationale - pacification of territories, from which there were attacks on the South Urals and the Caspian lands of Russia, a military victory, the gradual accession of Khiva, Kokand, Bukhara, Turkestan to the Empire.
45 Russo-Turkish War 1877-1878- launched by the Russians, in response to the cruelty of the Turks in the Balkans, military victory, the return of Bessarabia
46 Yihetuan uprising 1899-1901 - participation of Russian troops in the suppression of a civil uprising, during which they suffered, incl. Russian settlers in China, which grew into a full-scale war of the Anglo-Russian-Japanese-American coalition against China
47 Russo-Japanese War of 1905- started by Japan, defeat, loss of South Sakhalin, Liaodong Peninsula in China.
48 World War I 1914-1918- started by Germany, defeat, disastrous watered. and terr. losses
49 Russian Civil War (1917-1923)- no comments
added Intervention of foreign troops on the territory of Russia - 1918-1921- invading troops Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Poland, Japan, USA on the territory Sov. Russia during the years of the civil war, their gradual extrusion and evacuation as the Red Army strengthened.
50 Soviet-Polish war of 1919-1921- started by Poland with the aim of returning the kresovy lands, a military draw, establishing control over East Ukraine and East Belarus
51 World War II (1939-1945)- see below
52 Battles at Khalkhin Gol (1939)- started by the Japanese, the participation of Soviet troops on the side of Mongolia in the territorial dispute with Japan.
53 Soviet-Polish war of 1939- incorrectly, more precisely - occupation of the East. Poland by Soviet troops after the fall of the Polish Republic in the war with Germany and the flight of the Polish government-va abroad, military resistance as such from the Polish army in the absence of the latter owls. the troops were not met.
54 Soviet-Finnish war (1939-1940)- started by the USSR, in order to move the border of a hostile state from Leningrad (composed before the war 40 km), victory, territory acquisition (Karelia, South Finland)
55 Great Patriotic War (1941-1945)- started by Germany, victory, protectorate over Eastern Europe
56 Soviet-Japanese War (1945)- launched by the USSR in pursuance of an alliance agreement with the United States, victory, return of Sakhalin, acquisition of the Kuril Islands
57 Korean War (1950-1953)- unofficial participation of Soviet military advisers on the side of the communist Korean army in the war against the United States.
58 Vietnam War (1957-1975)- unofficial participation of Soviet military advisers on the side of the communist Vietnamese army in the war against the United States.
59 Suppression of the 1956 Hungarian uprising- b.c.
60 Suppression of the "Prague Spring" (1968)- b.c.
61 Arab-Israeli War (1967-1973)- USSR support for the Arab side with military equipment, and to a limited extent - with military specialists.
62 Angolan Civil War (1975-2002)- unofficial participation of owls. and ross. military advisers in order to fulfill the international, mother of his iti, duty.
63 Ogaden War (1977-1978)- participation in the Ethiopian-Somali war, mainly in the form of military-technical support for Ethiopia, as well as the limited presence of Soviet military advisers on the side of Ethiopia.
64 Afghan war (1979-1989)- started by the USSR with the aim of overthrowing the pro-American regime and, again, performing internationally, the children are his mother, duty, the war was useless and ended in political defeat.
65 First Chechen War (1994)- launched by federal Russian troops for the establishment of constitutional order in the Chechen Republic, defeat, de facto loss of territory
66 Second Chechen War (1999)- launched by the federal Russian troops in response to the invasion of Chechen fighters in Dagestan, the victory, the pacification of Chechnya and its preservation in comp. RF.
67 War in South Ossetia, Georgia (2008)- b.k., victory, political control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia
Of course, the list is far from complete. The participation of the Cossacks in the expansion of the possessions of the Empire to the Urals, South Siberia, the Amur region, the Far East, Kamchatka was not noted, as well as the conquest of Chukotka.
I I. The following list of wars and/or hostilities is organized by geographic and temporal criteria
LIST OF STATES, CITIES, TERRITORIES AND PERIODS OF COMBAT ACTIONS WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF CITIZENS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
1. The Great Patriotic War: from June 22, 1941 to May 9 (11), 1945.
2. Combat operations conducted wholly or mainly on the territory of the USSR (1918-1991) and the Russian Federation (1991-2008).
- Civil War: from February 23, 1918 to October 1922.
- Fighting to eliminate the Basmachi: from October 1922 to June 1931.
- Combat operations in the Chechen Republic and in the adjacent territories of the Russian Federation, classified as an armed conflict zone: from December 1994 to December 1996.
- Combat operations in the course of counter-terrorist operations on the territory of the North Caucasus region: since August 1999.
3. Combat operations conducted wholly or mainly outside the territory of the USSR (1918-1991) and the Russian Federation (1991-2008).
Fighting against Poland:
- Soviet-Polish war: March - October 1920;
- during the reunification of the USSR, Western Ukraine and Western Belarus: from September 17 to 28, 1939.
Fighting in Spain : 1936 - 1939.
War with Finland : from November 30, 1939 to March 13, 1940.
Fighting against Japan:
- fighting in the area of Lake Khasan: from July 29 to August 11, 1938;
- fighting on the Khalkhin Gol River: from May 11 to September 16, 1939;
- war with Japan: from August 9, 1945 to September 3, 1945.
Fighting in China and against China:
- from August 1924 to July 1927;
- October - November 1929;
- from July 1937 to September 1944;
- July - September 1945;
- from March 1946 to April 1949;
- March - May 1950 (for the personnel of the Air Defense Forces Group);
- from June 1950 to July 1953 (for the personnel of military units that took part in the hostilities in North Korea from the territory of China);
- in the area of Damansky Island: March 1969.
- the area of lake Zhalanashkol: August 1969.
Fighting in Hungary: 1956.
Fighting in Laos:
- from January 1960 to December 1963;
- from August 1964 to November 1968;
- from November 1969 to December 1970.
Fighting in Vietnam: January 1961 to December 1974 , including for the personnel of reconnaissance ships of the Pacific Fleet, which solved the tasks of combat service in the South China Sea.
Fighting in Algiers: 1962 - 1964.
Fighting in Egypt (United Arab Republic):
- June 1967;
- 1968;
- from March 1969 to July 1972;
- from October 1973 to March 1974;
- from June 1974 to February 1975 (for the personnel of the minesweepers of the Black Sea and Pacific fleets participating in the demining of the Suez Canal zone)
Fighting in Yemen Arab Republic:
- from October 1962 to March 1963;
- from November 1967 to December 1969.
Fighting in Syria:
- June 1967;
- March - July 1970;
- September - November 1972;
- October 1973.
Fighting in Mozambique:
- 1967 - 1969;
- from November 1975 to November 1979;
- from March 1984 to August 1988.
Fighting in Cambodia: April - December 1970.
Fighting in Bangladesh: 1972 - 1973 (for personnel of ships and auxiliary vessels of the USSR Navy).
Fighting in Angola: from November 1975 to November 1992.
Fighting in Ethiopia:
- from December 1977 to November 1990;
- from May 2000 to December 2000.
Combat operations in Afghanistan: from April 1978 to February 15, 1989.
Fighting in Syria and Lebanon: June 1982.
Combat operations in the Republic of Tajikistan:
- September - November 1992;
- from February 1993 to December 1997.
Fighting in Georgia: from 8 to 22 August 2008 (implementation of tasks to ensure the security and protection of citizens of the Russian Federation living in the territories of the Republic of South Ossetia and the Republic of Abkhazia).
Sources, p. I. →
Undeclared air war between the USSR and the USA (according to RGASPI materials)
The magazine "Istorik" publishes a memorandum by Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Nikolai Kuznetsov about the Soviet Il-12 transport aircraft shot down in 1953 by American fighters and other documents about air conflicts between the USSR and the USA during the Cold War.
Map showing the route and place of the crash of the Il-12 aircraft, published in the Pravda newspaper on August 2, 1953 - CREDIBLE RGASPI
On the morning of July 27, 1953, the Soviet Il-12 transport aircraft took off from the Port Arthur naval base and headed for Vladivostok. The flight route ran through the territory of China, there were 21 people on board the aircraft: 6 crew members and 15 officers and sergeants of the Air Force of the Pacific Fleet, who were on their way to Vladivostok on official business and on vacation. At 6:28 Moscow time (11:28 Beijing time) near the city of Huadian, which is 120 km from the Korean-Chinese border, an Il-12 was attacked by four American fighters and shot down.
All on board were killed. The destruction of the aircraft, which made a regular flight away from the combat zone (despite the fact that there were only a few hours left before the official end of the Korean War and the signing of a truce scheduled for July 27, the parties announced the day before), was rightly regarded by the Soviet authorities as a “crime” and a “pirate attack” ".
The Chinese statement of protest said that on July 27, 324 US military aircraft were recorded in the airspace of Northeast China, four of them were "for the purpose of reconnaissance and creating disturbance" in the area of the city of Huadian at the time of the death of the Il-12.
The Americans did not admit guilt, putting forward a version according to which the Soviet plane was shot down much to the south, in the sky over North Korea, eight miles from the Yalu River. And two days after the death of the Il-12 near Askold Island near Vladivostok, two MiG-15 aircraft stopped an attempt to violate the USSR border by a US Air Force RB-50 bomber. When approaching for identification, Soviet fighters were fired upon, after which they returned fire and destroyed an American aircraft. Of the 17 crew members of the RB-50, only one survived.
Thirty-seven dead as a result of two crashes that occurred two days apart, the list of shot down, dead and missing in that undeclared war that unfolded in the airspace of the Soviet Union and the territories adjacent to it is far from exhausted. The exact number of victims of this confrontation, which began even before the end of World War II, is unknown, but, apparently, we are talking about more than a hundred victims. The culmination was the story of an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft shot down over the Urals on May 1, 1960, which led to a high-profile diplomatic scandal and the disruption of the meeting of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Nikita Khrushchev with US President Dwight Eisenhower.
The causes of conflicts, as a rule, were violations of the state border of the USSR by American aircraft, which were collecting information about Soviet weapons, carrying out, according to the head of intelligence of the US Air Force S.P. Cabell, an aggressive "reconnaissance program in order to obtain maximum information about the electronic weapons of foreign states" . Aviation reconnaissance with violations of the Soviet border was carried out from all directions - from the Baltic states and Transcaucasia to the Arctic and the Kuril Islands.
However, Soviet pilots were not limited solely to the protection of the state border. So, on September 7, 1950, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approved a draft resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the issue of the death of the A-20Zh aircraft in the area of the Port Arthur naval base. This decree limited the zone for Soviet aviation flights in the region and reprimanded high-ranking military officers for "wrong and frivolous" ordering a Soviet aircraft to photograph an "unidentified destroyer" in the border zone, which provoked an attack by 11 American fighters and the death of the A-20Zh crew.
The peak of the air confrontation between the two superpowers of the post-war world came in the 1950s. After the incident with the U-2, spy flights by American aircraft over the USSR were sharply reduced, which was also affected by the emergence of more advanced reconnaissance equipment (spy satellites Korona, Samos, Midas).
The published documents of the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI) are taken from the personal fund of V.M. Molotov (F. 82); one document (No. 8) was taken from the inventory containing the minutes of the meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (F. 17. Op. 3). Documents are arranged in chronological order and reproduced with the preservation of the stylistic features of the sources. Geographical names, aircraft names and transcriptions of foreign names are given in the edition of documents, missing parts of words and endings are enclosed in square brackets.
No. 1. Reference "Noted correspondence on violation by American aircraft and submarines of the state border and territorial waters of the USSR in the Far East"
| Item No. |
Soviet notes to Americans |
Response Notes of the Americans |
|
I. Border Violation by American Aircraft |
||
| In Note No. 374 of December 1, 1947, the Foreign Ministry informed the US Embassy in Moscow about three cases of border violations, protested and expressed the hope that the US government would give the necessary instructions to prevent violations of the Soviet border in the future. | There was no answer. | |
| 2 | In Note No. 5 of January 5, 1948, the Foreign Ministry, informing the US Embassy in Moscow about one case of border violation, protested again and insisted that the US government take urgent measures to eliminate border violations in the future. | In Note No. 88 dated February 19, 1948, the US Embassy denied the violation of the border. |
| 3 | In Note No. 261 dated January 5, 1948, the USSR Embassy in the United States informed the State Department about one case of border violation and, on behalf of the USSR government, asked to investigate it and take measures to prevent such violations in the future. | In a note dated April 20, 1948, the State Department denied the violation and stated that American aircraft were under constant instructions to avoid any violation of the Soviet border. |
| 4 | In note No. 126 of July 8, 1948, the USSR Embassy in the United States confirmed the authenticity of the case of border violation cited in the embassy's note of January 5, 1948, reported another case of border violation and, on behalf of the USSR government, insisted on a thorough investigation and expressed the hope that the US government will take steps to prevent similar violations in the future. | In a note dated October 14, 1948, the State Department denied the said violation. |
|
II. Violation of the territorial waters of the USSR by American submarines |
||
| 1 | In Note No. 166 of November 2, 1948, the Foreign Ministry informed the US Embassy in Moscow about one case of violation of territorial waters and expressed the hope that the American authorities would take the necessary measures to prevent such violations in the future. | In Note No. 778, dated December 13, 1948, the US Embassy denied this violation. |
RGASPI. F. 82. Op. 2. D. 1316. L. 108.
Copy. Typescript
No. 2. Reference "Correspondence between the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the US Embassy in Moscow regarding violations by American aircraft of the freedom of merchant navigation (overflights by American aircraft of Soviet ships)"
| № |
Notes of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the US Embassy |
Reply Notes of the US Embassy |
| 1 | In Note No. 20 dated January 30, 1948 (about 13 overflights), the Foreign Ministry, on behalf of the USSR government, announced that it expected the US government to give the necessary instructions to the appropriate US military authorities to prevent future violations of the freedom of merchant navigation. |
In note No. 316 dated May 25, 1948, the US Embassy, in response to 3 notes from the Foreign Ministry, reported that the US government considers the actions of the American authorities as lawful measures arising from the duties of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan in accordance with the Moscow Agreement of December 27, 1945 and not violating the freedom of merchant navigation. |
| 2 | In Note No. 34 dated March 4, 1948 (about 8 cases of overflights), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on behalf of the USSR government, insisted that the US government immediately take measures to eliminate unacceptable violations by American aircraft of the freedom of merchant navigation. | |
| 3 | In note No. 44 of April 9, 1948 (about 34 overflights), the Foreign Ministry, on behalf of the USSR government, for the third time, drawing the attention of the US government to unacceptable violations of the freedom of merchant navigation by American aircraft, insisted on taking immediate measures to eliminate such violations. | |
| 4 | In Note No. 116 of July 7, 1948, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that the USSR government rejected as untenable the US government's reference to the Moscow Agreement, qualified the flights of American aircraft over Soviet ships as a clear arbitrariness, confirmed the protest of the Soviet government against violations of the freedom of merchant navigation by American aircraft, and insisted on the immediate cessation of these violations. |
No answer. |
| 5 | In Note No. 9 dated February 15, 1949 (about 22 overflights), the Foreign Ministry, on behalf of the USSR government, reaffirming its earlier statements regarding the inadmissibility of violations by American aircraft of the freedom of merchant navigation on the high seas, reported that it expected the US government to take appropriate measures to prevent the recurrence of such incidents in the future. |
No answer. |
RGASPI. F. 82. Op. 2. D. 1316. L. 109.
Copy. Typescript
No. 3. Memorandum of the head of the Main Directorate of the Northern Sea Route under the Council of Ministers of the USSR A.A. Kuznetsova V.M. Molotov about the flight of the P-38 aircraft in the Arctic
Deputy Chairman
Council of Ministers of the USSR
Comrade Molotov V.M.
I report:
The head of the Wellen polar station reported by telegram that on July 23, 1950, at 03:20 Moscow time, a P-38 type aircraft arrived at an altitude of 1,500 meters 5 kilometers from the station at an altitude of 1500 meters and left along the strait, heading southeast.
This type of aircraft is in service with the US Air Force.
RGASPI. F. 82. Op. 2. D. 622. L. 55.
No. 4. Memorandum of the head of the Main Directorate of the Northern Sea Route under the Council of Ministers of the USSR A.A. Kuznetsova V.M. Molotov about the flight of an American aircraft in the Arctic
Deputy Chairman
Council of Ministers of the USSR
Comrade Molotov V.M.
I report:
according to the report of the head of the polar station on Ratmanov Island in the Bering Strait on July 25 this year. At 04:00 Moscow time, a twin-engine American aircraft flew over the island heading northeast.
Head of the Main Northern Sea Route under the Council of Ministers of the USSR A. Kuznetsov
RGASPI. F. 82. Op. 2. D. 622. L. 56.
Script. Typewritten text, signed by A.A. Kuznetsova
No. 5. Memorandum of the Minister of War of the USSR A.M. Vasilevsky and Chief of the General Staff S.M. Shtemenko I.V. Stalin about the raid of American aircraft on the Dry River airfield in Primorye
Comrade Stalin
We are reporting on a raid by two American planes on our airfield in Primorye.
Today, October 8, at 4:17 p.m. local time, two American Shooting Star (F-80) jet fighters approached on a strafing flight from the sea to the airfield of the 5th Naval Fleet Dry River, located on the seashore 35 km southwest of Vladivostok and 100 km from the Soviet-Korean border, machine-gun fired our planes located at this airfield.
As a result of the shelling, one Aero-Cobra aircraft burned down and six aircraft of the same type were damaged. There are no human casualties.
The duty flight of aircraft of the 5 [th] Navy of the Aero-Cobra type, which rose three minutes after the signal, could not catch up with the American aircraft.
At the Dry River airfield, the duty unit of fighters of the 5 [th] Navy is constantly based, and at the time of the raid, at the airfield, in addition, there was a fighter regiment on Aero-Cobra aircraft of the 54 [th] Air Army of the Primorsky Military District, which on October 7 flew to this airfield from its permanent base to participate in corps exercises to be held in this area, according to the autumn combat training plan.
Most likely, American aircraft could carry out this raid from an aircraft carrier, since this type of aircraft has a flight radius of about 700 km with external tanks and cannot reach the Vladivostok area either from Japan or from Korea. The aircraft is armed with six machine guns of 12.7 mm caliber, its speed is about 900 km/h.
The weather in the Vladivostok region is bad, overcast with a height of 200 meters, fog.
Vasilevsky
Shtemenko
RGASPI. F. 82. Op. 2. D. 832. L. 13–14.
Certified copy. Typescript
Memorandum of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov to the Minister of Defense N.A. Bulganin about the Il-12 aircraft shot down by American fighters in July 1953 - PROVIDED BY RGASPI
No. 6. Memorandum of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A.Ya. Vyshinsky and Naval Minister of the USSR N.G. Kuznetsova I.V. Stalin on strengthening the intelligence activities of American aviation in the Far East
Top secret
Comrade Stalin I.V.
We report:
During the five months of 1952, the reconnaissance activity of American aviation in the Far East increased significantly.
During the five months of 1952, there were 42 cases of violations by American military aircraft of our state border, 31 of them in the region of the Kuril Islands.
Flights of American military aircraft along the Soviet coast, at a distance of 15-20 miles from the coastline on the approaches to Peter the Great Bay, in the areas of the Tatar Strait and the southern part of Sakhalin Island, have sharply become more frequent.
During this period, radio technical posts in these areas recorded 87 cases of flights by American military aircraft.
If in 1951 American military aircraft flew mainly in the central part of the Sea of Japan and, as a rule, single aircraft, then in the first half of 1952 they fly in groups of 2-4 aircraft in the northeastern part of the Sea of Japan and in the Tatar Strait.
The number of cases of flights by American military aircraft over the transports and ships of the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Fisheries Industry and the Department of the Navy increased especially sharply. During the five months of 1951 in the Yellow and Japanese Seas, American military aircraft inspected 113 transports, during the same period of 1952 they examined 328 transports, in May 1952 alone, 93 transports were examined by American aircraft.
When inspecting transports this year, the planes descended to a height of 40-60 meters above sea level, made circles above them, flew at a low level and, in some cases, defiantly swooped down on them.
Thus, in 1952, the Americans sharply increased the intensity of aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet coast, transport routes, and tightened control over the regime of our maritime transport in the Far East.
A. Vyshinsky
N. Kuznetsov
RGASPI. F. 82. Op. 2. D. 1318. L. 165–166.
Copy. Typewritten text, signatures - autographs of A.Ya. Vyshinsky, N.G. Kuznetsova
No. 7. Memorandum of the Minister of War of the USSR A.M. Vasilevsky and Chief of the General Staff V.D. Sokolovsky I.V. Stalin about the violation by an American plane of the state border of the USSR in the area of Yuriy Island
Top secret
Comrade Stalin
We report:
October 7 p. At 15:30 Khabarovsk time, in the southeastern part of the Lesser Kuril Ridge, two La-11 fighters of the 369th Fighter Aviation Regiment of Air Defense shot down an American B-29 aircraft, which violated our state border 12–15 km south of -west of Yuriy Island.
Aircraft B-29 at 14:31. was discovered by a radio technical post in the immediate vicinity of our state border, in connection with which an on-duty pair of fighters piloted by pilots Senior Lieutenant Zheryakov and Senior Lieutenant Lesnov was raised from the Yuzhno-Kurilsk airfield.
At 15:29, the B-29 plane violated the border and flew over the territorial waters of the USSR in the direction of Yuriy Island, where at 15:30 it was attacked by our fighters, and the intruder opened fire first.
As a result of the attack, the B-29 aircraft caught fire, crashed and sank in our territorial waters, three kilometers southeast of Yuriy Island.
Boats of the 114th Border Detachment in the area of the plane crash picked up a headless corpse with a loose parachute, a map of Hokkaido and the Kuril Islands, a fragment of an unknown document signed "James Smith is a captain intelligence officer of the US Armed Forces", four gas tanks and a torn inflatable boat .
Documents were found in the clothes of the corpse in the name of the senior lieutenant of the American army Bumkhen John Robertson.
During October 8, from dawn to noon, American F-84 fighters in groups of four to eight aircraft patrolled along our state border southwest of Yuriy Island, and individual aircraft from these groups violated the border three times at high speeds and passed over the area where the downed aircraft fell.
Measures have been taken to increase the combat readiness of the entire system of the Sakhalin-Kuril border air defense area.
Vasilevsky
Sokolovsky
RGASPI. F. 82. Op. 2. D. 1318. L. 182–183.
Copy. Typewritten text, signatures - autographs of A.M. Vasilevsky, V.D. Sokolovsky
Scheme of the flight of the American B-29 aircraft shot down by Soviet fighters near Yuriy Island in October 1952 - COURTED RGASPI
No. 8. Resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on a protest to the US government in connection with the violation of the state border of the USSR
From the minutes of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks No. 89.
p. 360 - On the protest to the US government in connection with the violation of the state border of the USSR.
Resolved:
Approve the draft note of protest submitted by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the US government in connection with the violation by an American military aircraft of the state border of the USSR in the area of Yuriy Island (attached).
Application
Protest Note of the Government of the USSR to the Government of the United States
The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics considers it necessary to inform the Government of the United States of America as follows.
According to a verified report from the competent Soviet authorities, on October 7 this year. At about 3:30 p.m. Vladivostok time, a B-29 four-engine bomber with US markings violated the USSR state border in the vicinity of Yuriy Island. The rising two Soviet fighters demanded that the American bomber follow them to land on the nearest airfield. Instead of complying with the legal requirement of the Soviet fighters, the intruder opened fire on them. After the return fire of Soviet fighters, the American bomber withdrew towards the sea.
The Soviet government expresses its strong protest against this new incident of violation of the state border of the USSR by an American military aircraft and insists that the US government take measures to prevent violations of the state border of the USSR by American aircraft.
RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1096. L. 75, 159.
Script. Typescript
No. 9. Memorandum of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov to the Minister of Defense of the USSR N.A. Bulganin about the downed Il-12 aircraft of the Pacific Fleet
Copy
Top secret
Minister of Defense of the USSR
Marshal of the Soviet Union
Comrade Bulganin N.A.
I report:
According to the report of the Commander of the Air Force of the Pacific Fleet, on July 27 at 06:28 Moscow time, four American fighters shot down an Il-12 transport aircraft of the Pacific Fleet on Chinese territory, 120 km from the Korean-Chinese border near the settlement Huadian (130 km southwest of Dunhua).
The plane, piloted by pilot Captain Glinyany, was returning from Port Arthur to Vladivostok along the route through Mukden, Dunhua, at an altitude of 2400 meters.
There were 21 people on the plane, of which 6 people were the crew of the aircraft and 15 officers and sergeants of the Air Force of the Pacific Fleet, who were on their way to Vladivostok on official business and on vacation.
Representatives of the Chinese administration at the scene found a burned-out plane and three corpses.
Through the General Staff, instructions were given to our military adviser in China to urgently investigate and report the circumstances of the incident, the condition of the aircraft and crew, and also take measures to provide assistance to the victims and protect the aircraft.
Application: List of persons who were on the Il-12 transport aircraft of the Pacific Fleet during the flight from Port Arthur to Vladivostok on July 27, 1953
Application
Top secret
List of persons who were on the Il-12 transport aircraft of the Pacific Fleet during the flight from Port Arthur to Vladivostok
Aircraft crew - 6 people
1. Pilot - Captain Clay.
2. The second pilot is senior lieutenant Ignatkin.
3. Navigator - Captain Munin.
4. Flight engineer - Captain Golovachev.
5. Radio operator - foreman Konovalov.
6. Flight mechanic - senior sergeant Vilinkok.
Officers and sergeants of the Air Force of the Pacific Fleet, who went to Vladivostok on official business and on vacation - 15 people
1. Lieutenant colonel of the medical service Larionov.
2. Lieutenant colonel of the medical service Subbotovsky.
3. Major of the medical service Drobnitsky.
4. Captain of the technical service Voloshin.
5. Senior Lieutenant Zhigulin.
6. Senior Lieutenant Frain.
7. Senior Lieutenant Sabinov.
8. Senior lieutenant of the technical service Lazarev.
9. Senior Lieutenant Lekah. The text of N.A.’s resolution is printed at the top of the document. Bulganin: “Send to the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 28/VII.1953”. To the Secretariat V.M. The Molotov note arrived on July 28. Autograph resolution by V.M. Molotov says: “Introduce [comrade] Comrade Gromyko.” Also on the copy received by V.M. Molotov, there are office notes I.I. Lapshova: “In business. 29.VII"; “A copy was sent to Comrade Gromyko for review. 29.VII"; "Hand over to the archive. 19.XI. On the back of the first page of the document is a list of persons to whom copies of N.G.'s memorandum were sent. Kuznetsova; in order: G.M. Malenkov (specimen No. 1), V.M. Molotov (surname underlined), K.E. Voroshilov, N.S. Khrushchev, L.M. Kaganovich, A.I. Mikoyan, M.Z. Saburov, M.G. Pervukhin (specimen No. 8).
Our government is between two fires: on the one hand, the discontented people, and on the other, the TDS. Government officials are bound hand and foot by the TBC network. Of two evils, they have to choose the lesser, each time more and more yielding to the enemies of their positions. All anti-people legislative projects of the government have foreign roots.
Undeclared war consists of two stages:
Secret, internal - incubation is to decompose all areas of the life of the state, to demoralize and divide the people, to subjugate state structures, to create the necessary public opinion through the means of mass fooling (CMO).
Explicit. Carrying out large-scale terrorist attacks and sabotage in Russian cities. And then the introduction of NATO troops and professional military mercenaries (without a fatherland) into a destroyed and exhausted country, possibly under the guise of international assistance.
Trial sabotage is already being carried out under the guise of natural disasters, reasons associated with technically obsolete equipment, “oversight”, and the activities of irresponsible (to put it mildly) citizens. For example, an analysis of the heat wave in the European part of Russia in 2010 in terms of the use of climate weapons .
The film “Global Flood, as a premonition” creates a public opinion like “reconcile, it's inevitable”. But in this film you can see that there is a conscious intervention. After all, it was possible to warn the population about many of these catastrophes in advance with modern scientific technologies and information communications. Nobody warned, and it was done on purpose. TDS seek to destroy the population of the Earth.
There is another moment in the film: houses in Yakutia, built on permafrost, are destroyed, as the soil melts under them and the foundation piles rot in the water. What a convenient phenomenon for laying explosives, and you will not find under the rubble why the building fell. But they have already reported this, as if staked out in advance the motivation of the cause.
Winter is the most convenient time for sabotage in Russia. Accidents at power plants and power lines will freeze cities in a few days. If we add to this an "accidental" anomalous phenomenon - ultra-high frosts in the northern regions of the country, the effect will be greater than a clear military invasion across the border.
Autumn is coming to an end, winter is already beginning in the vast territories of Russia. The first wet snow brings down power lines: "Central Russia was not ready for winter". No, this is not yet a terrorist act, but a fact of the state of our cities.
But this is already a small experiment of an “accidental accident” in order to test the consequences and reaction of state structures and the people: “They cut off the electricity”. « Last Saturday(30.10.10) at 17:07 local time, the lights went out at once in Kirensk and several settlements of the region. At about the same time, in the taiga, a twenty-seven-meter larch trembled and fell onto a power line wire. An unknown local resident, who, according to the preliminary version, wanted to replenish his supply of firewood before the cold weather, clearly did not expect that his concern for the household would have such an effect. Awkward movement of the saw - and without electricity were 19 thousand people." It will be interesting to find that irresponsible lumberjack and his inspirers, if they search? All power lines are carried out along wide clearings. In order to fill up a large (to reach the line) tree onto wires, you must be able to do it. The layman will not be able to do this and will never cut down a larger tree for his own safety. Not so stupid as we are told by the CMO (mass fooling), our villagers, not to know how and where to cut wood for firewood.
It has become completely transparent that terrorist acts are carried out not by wild representatives of the peoples of the Caucasus and the Middle East, but by specialists of the highest military-technical level, see “Terrorist acts in Russia over 10 years”and read books by Gracheva T.V.
How our country is gradually surrendering strategic bridgeheads, see, hidden in the middle of the material under the headingAnalytic note .
At present, we are already on the border between the first and second stages of an undeclared war. If we do not want that bloody mess to happen in our country, which is described in the books by Berkem al Atomi "Marauder", "Punisher", "Another Ural"We must act now before the onset of frost. It's real!
First, we need to draw people's attention to the situation in the country and in the world and help them find the necessary information on the Internet.
Secondly, we must unite at all levels. The division into warring factions undermines the already weak forces of the conscious citizens of Russia.
Political parties, if you really care about the fate of Russia, unite, find a common language and act on common practical projects for getting the people out of the internal war crisis.
Representatives of various religious teachings! Religions don't need TDS anymore, they have CMOs. Now CMOs will pit you against each other. God is one, although the paths to him are different, and we must go together in one direction. We also have one Earth and we need to survive on it, preserving our free will and consciousness. Unite and work together.
Conscious citizens of Russia! Unite in informal groups, educate yourself and inform the population. Create now voluntary people's squads to protect strategic facilities, maintain order in the city and provide first aid in case of disasters. The government has no one to rely on among the people, become such a support.
About what is happening, how to get out of the crisis of an undeclared war, and what to do next, can be found in the following links.
"Undeclared War" or how to conquer Russia without invading troops"
Appendices to "Undeclared War":
Materials of the foresight project “Childhood 2030″ ,
Juvenile justice
Draft laws on juvenile justice
Law on state budgetary self-financing
Law on Police
The bill "On ... garden, ... plots" (
Introduction of a single electronic document
Chipization ,
NATO Engagement Treaty
Terrorist acts in Russia for 10 years
Who owns the Central Bank?
Films: "Endgame: Project Global Enslavement", "Chipization. Project 666", "Zeitgeist"
Books Grachevoi T.V.: "Invisible Khazaria", "Holy Rus' against Khazaria", "When power is not from God",-
Project Russia
Positive: video by A.V. Trekhlebov answers to questions (In Contacts video: the best lecture by Trekhlebov "Laws of Rita").
Manifesto "Revival of Russia"
Appendices to the Manifesto:
About the Dallas Plan
Book G.A. Boreev "History of humanoid civilizations of the Earth"
Insider 3.
Psychotronic weapons.
Psychotropic weapons
Mental enslavement
climate weapon
Films "Zeitgeist", "Games of the Gods"
Positive School of Shchetininand all videos about the Shchetinin School
Despite the fact that the operational decision to send a limited contingent of Soviet troops to Afghanistan was made just 13 days before it began, individual units began to arrive there as early as December 1979. However, the purpose of this action was not explained.
To coordinate the activities of representatives of all Soviet departments in Afghanistan, the Soviet apparatus and troops, on December 13, 1979, an operational group of the USSR Ministry of Defense was formed, headed by the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army S.F. Akhromeev, who immediately left for Kabul. There, Soviet military representatives got acquainted with the situation in more detail and approved the entry plan.
His plan was to carry out the introduction of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan along two ground and one air routes, the rapid occupation of all vital regions of the country and the success of the next coup d'état.
Before the commander of the 40th Army, Lieutenant General Yu.V. Tukharinov, the plan for the introduction of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan was finalized on December 13 in the office of the commander of the Turkestan military district, Colonel-General Yu.P. Maksimov. By this time, the backbone of the administration and headquarters of the army was formed from the officers and generals of the headquarters and services of the Turkestan military district. Major General A.V. was appointed a member of the Military Council - the head of the political department of the association. Toskaev, Chief of Staff, Major General L.N. Lobanov, head of intelligence, Major General A.A. Korchagin. Wasting no time, they began intensive preparation of troops for the upcoming entry, which took place almost openly. The assigned staff was mobilized. At the training grounds, combat coordination of units was continuously going on: in the Temrez region, crossings across the Amu Darya were being prepared.
The general directive for mobilization and readiness was not given. The troops were put on alert by separate orders after receiving the appropriate oral instructions from the USSR Ministry of Defense. In total, about 100 formations, units and institutions were deployed and understaffed to full staff. For this, more than 50 thousand officers, sergeants and soldiers were called up from the reserve. First of all, combat formations and units were completed; the rear and repair units and bodies of the 40th army were mobilized last, some already during the beginning of the introduction of troops. For the Turkestan and Central Asian military districts, this was the largest mobilization deployment in all the post-war years. The time for crossing the state border by the Minister of Defense of the USSR was set at 15.00 Moscow time (16.30 Kabul time) on December 25, 1979.
By the appointed time, everything was ready. The day before, Marshal of the Soviet Union S.L., First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, arrived at the command post of the 40th Army from Moscow. Sokolov. The commander of the troops of the Turkestan military district, Colonel-General Yu.P. Maksimov. They gave the commander a signal about the beginning of the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan.
In the evening twilight, the vanguard battalion of a motorized rifle regiment on an infantry fighting vehicle of the 108th motorized rifle division (commander - Colonel V.I. Mironov) approached the crossings across the Amu Darya, which almost immediately overcame the pontoon bridge and deepened into the territory of the neighboring state. It was followed during the night by the main body of the division. Having made a march, by the end of December 27 they concentrated in the areas of Baghlan, Kunduz, Puli-Khurmi, Deshi. At this time, unexpectedly, the formation was given a new task - to change the route of movement and enter Kabul by 17.00 the next day. By air, the transfer of the main forces of the 103rd Guards Airborne Division under the command of I.F. Ryabchenko. A parachute regiment was sent to Bagram.
At 19.30, the paratroopers seized all the key political and military facilities in Kabul and on its outskirts, thus preventing the approach of troops loyal to Amin to the capital. The arriving Soviet troops strengthened the protection of important administrative facilities, airfields, radio and television centers. On the night of December 28, another, the 201st motorized rifle division, entered Afghanistan in the Herat direction, parts of which took control of the highway connecting the cities of Herat and Shindad, and subsequently its area of responsibility expanded to Kandahar.
By mid-January 1980, the entry of the main forces of the 40th Army was basically completed. Two motorized rifle and one airborne divisions, airborne assault brigades and two separate regiments were fully concentrated on the territory of Afghanistan. In their composition, there were approximately 52 thousand people. It was assumed that this amount would be enough to ensure the life of Afghanistan. It was believed that when entering and disposing, Soviet troops would not have to conduct hostilities, since the very presence of Soviet troops would have a sobering effect on the rebels. Soviet military assistance was then regarded as a moral factor in supporting the people's power.
The entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan served as a signal and ensured the successful implementation of the government coup. On December 27, Amin was overthrown and executed by a small group of conspirators. Babrak Karmal became the prime minister of the republic and the general secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA. The first step of the new government was the release of 15 thousand political prisoners from prisons and calls for refugees to return to their homeland. However, these measures did little to normalize the situation in the country, the majority of whose population did not enthusiastically accept the arrival of foreign troops. This was immediately taken advantage of by the opposition, which in the person of B. Karmal saw not only a political opponent, but also a protege of Moscow. Linking the two causes together, the oppositionists stepped up their activities throughout almost the entire territory of Afghanistan, soon bringing it to open armed uprisings, primarily against the Soviet troops.
According to the nature of the military-political tasks being solved and the peculiarities of the armed struggle, the combat operations of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan can be conditionally divided into four periods. The first period (December 1979 - February 1980) included the introduction of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, its placement in garrisons, the organization of protection and defense of permanent deployment points and the most important military and economic facilities, as well as the conduct of military operations to ensure solutions to these problems.
Already during the introduction and deployment of Soviet troops were forced to engage in hostilities with the enemy. A direct participant in those events, Lieutenant Colonel Mamykin Nikolai Ivanovich, recalls: “At the first stage of their stay in Afghanistan, Soviet troops were in garrisons and did not take part in hostilities. However, they were subjected to shelling by the opposition. Even without taking part in the hostilities, the units suffered losses and were forced to return fire. The Afghan servicemen believed that in the conditions of the presence of the Soviet Armed Forces in the country, all responsibility for the fate of the revolution should fall on them. Such sentiments were also expressed by B. Karmal, who from the very beginning asked the leadership of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense to involve Soviet troops in active hostilities, since he did not rely on his army. These requests have taken their toll. The command of the Soviet troops was ordered to start hostilities together with the Afghan units. It was believed that the main task in defeating the opposition should be solved by the Afghan army, and the Soviet troops should contribute to the fulfillment of this task.
The winter of 1980 was difficult for the Soviet soldiers. Hopes that the main tasks of the armed struggle against the opposition will be solved by the Afghan army have not justified themselves. Despite a number of measures to increase its combat readiness, the government army remained weak and incapacitated. Therefore, the Soviet troops bore the brunt of the fight against the armed opposition detachments. The rebel formations acted against the Soviet troops with relatively large forces and did not avoid direct confrontation with them. This made it possible to defeat large counter-revolutionary groups in the areas of Faizabad, Talikan, Takhar, Baghlan, Jalalabad and other cities.
The leaders of the Afghan opposition, faced with a powerful real force, quickly came to the conclusion that if large groups remain unchanged, they will be defeated. Abandoning the tactics of large forces, they divided all their formations into groups and detachments of 20 to 100 people and switched to partisan operations. In this regard, the questions of the use of forces and means in the fight against small, extremely mobile groups of dushmans who used maneuver tactics of action arose before the Soviet troops in a new way. Attempts by the command to organize an attack on the detachments of dushmans by large military formations according to the rules of classical warfare and the pursuit of their effect did not bring.
There were flaws in the preparation of Soviet troops on a number of issues. Own great experience in the fight against the Basmachi in Central Asia was completely forgotten. The later rich experience of fascist Germany during the 2nd World War and the armies of other countries in carrying out counter-guerrilla operations in local wars has hardly been studied. Therefore, the Soviet soldiers sent to Afghanistan were forced, through trial and error, to reshape the military art of fighting an enemy they were not used to. This reduced the effectiveness of military operations, led to unjustified losses. So, according to the memoirs of the former assistant to the operational department of the division, Nikolai Ivanovich Antonov, during the operation in February 1980, the enemy skillfully used the miscalculations made by the Soviet command. Thus, the absence of side guards on the march in the mountains when advancing to the place of the operation turned into significant losses. The enemy, having let the reconnaissance group and one of the companies of the battalion, which was moving behind the reconnaissance group, attack the company, which was in the center of the column. The shelling was carried out from two sides. According to the intensity of the fire, it was determined that the enemy grouping consisted of 60-80 people. The actions of the enemy were so unexpected that the commanders of all levels showed confusion and no command was given to open at least return fire. And then, when such a command was given, the enemy left his positions and left with impunity.
Nevertheless, in the first period, most of the forces and means of the Soviet troops were involved in solving problems related to the protection of sensitive zones and communications. This task was performed by up to 35% of OKSV. The next task was related to the protection and defense of objects of Soviet-Afghan economic cooperation, the protection of airfields and the wiring of columns. As we can see, all tasks were specific. The Soviet troops had neither the experience nor the knowledge to carry them out, since the performance of such functions was not and is not envisaged in the process of training officers. There are no recommendations in the statutes and manuals on these issues, so these tasks had to be solved practically by trial and error.
Great difficulties in solving various operational and tactical tasks arose in connection with the unsettled life of the Soviet troops. Due to the fact that the base for the deployment of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan was not prepared in advance, at the beginning of 1980 only a small part of the arriving units and subunits was able to settle in more or less comfortable military camps. Most of the troops remained in the field in tent cities. To prevent a surprise attack by the enemy, outposts were posted and mining was carried out in threatened directions.
Practical redeployment of troops from one area to another was practiced. At the same time, due to the fact that minefields were not always removed, there were cases when Soviet soldiers were blown up on their own mines.
The second period of the OKSV's stay in Afghanistan (March 1980 - April 1985) is characterized by the introduction of active large-scale hostilities, mainly on their own, as well as together with Afghan formations and units. It began with the fact that the 40th Army was reinforced by the 5th Guards. motorized rifle division and two separate regiments. The total number of Soviet troops reached 81.8 thousand people (including 61.8 thousand people in combat units of the ground forces and the Air Force). These forces included about 600 tanks, 1500 infantry fighting vehicles, 2900 armored personnel carriers, 500 aircraft and helicopters, 500 artillery pieces of various calibers.
The opposition, having suffered a number of major military defeats in the first period of the war, moved the main groupings of its troops to hard-to-reach mountainous regions, where it became practically impossible to use modern equipment. In addition, they skillfully began to hide among the local population. The rebels skillfully used various tactics. So, when meeting with superior forces of the Soviet troops, they, as a rule, evaded the battle. At the same time, the dushmans did not miss the opportunity to deliver a sudden blow, mainly using small forces. In fact, during this period, the detachments of the armed opposition abandoned the positional struggle and maneuver actions were widely used. And only in those cases when the situation forced them, battles were fought. This happened when defending bases and base areas, or when the rebels were blocked and they had no choice but to take the fight. In this case, the blockaded detachments went into close combat, which practically excluded the use of aviation and sharply narrowed the possibilities for using artillery, especially from closed firing positions.
Under these conditions, the Soviet troops were required to look for new forms and methods of defeating the enemy. It was determined that only the elimination of base areas could lead to certain results. The focus was on this issue. True, its implementation required a significant amount of manpower and resources. Considering that a large percentage of the troops were involved in other tasks, it was difficult to complete such a task with the forces of one formation. Most often, it was required to combine the efforts of several formations and create a single operational control link (army headquarters). This form of military action was called "combat operation", or, in a broader sense of the word, simply "operation".
The modern military-scientific interpretation of the term "operation" means a set of battles, battles and strikes, coordinated and interconnected in purpose, place and time, carried out in a theater of operations (theater of operations) or a strategic (operational) direction according to a single concept and plan for solving strategic and operational tasks. According to the experience of the Great Patriotic War, the minimum number of troops participating in the operation was 70-100 thousand people. In Afghanistan, "operation" was understood as somewhat different methods and forms of troop action. Depending on which formations the forces were involved in and who led their combat operations, operations were divided into army, divisional, and even regimental ones. To carry out an army operation, as a rule, the forces of one or two motorized rifle, as well as airborne, artillery, engineering and sapper units and subunits were involved - a total of 10-15 thousand people. It was planned by the headquarters of the army, and the leadership of the fighting was carried out by the army command. Divisional and regimental operations were carried out mainly by forces of formations and units under the leadership of their commanders. The fighting covered most of Afghanistan. They were especially active along the main highway and near the eastern Afghan-Pakistani border.
Transition from 1981–1982 mainly to raid maneuver operations as part of separate reinforced battalions with the widespread use of coverage and detours and landing by helicopters of air assault groups was evidence of the accumulated experience and increased combat skills of commanders and troops. But they often did not give the desired results. Major Petrov S.N., who repeatedly participated in such operations during this period, recalls that mobile small detachments of dushmans, who knew the area well and enjoyed support among the local population, as a rule, found ways and opportunities to get out of the blow in advance. So, for example, the commander of the parachute regiment was given the task of destroying a well-armed group of rebels numbering up to 40 people in the province of Parwan. The regiment commander decided to carry out this task with the forces of the 3rd paratrooper battalion. On the night of March 20, 1982, the battalion commander decided to covertly advance to the area of the village of Arkhalkheil and, blocking it with two paratrooper companies, combed the village with one company. It was planned to have one parachute company in the reserve. With the outset of the battle, the battalion supported an artillery battalion and two pairs of Mi-24 helicopters.
On the night of March 20, the battalion began to march along the route Bagram - Arkhalkheil. In front of him, at a distance of 300 m, a combat reconnaissance patrol advanced. The route passed along a wide straight road, along which a duval stretched on the left, and on the right a concrete canal 5 m wide and up to 2.5 m deep. the survivors seek salvation in the canal. From the house, located 150 meters from the ambush site, a machine gun opened fire along the canal. The battalion column stopped, and its commander called in artillery fire and helicopters. And only after the rebels ceased fire, was a maneuver carried out by units in order to cover the enemy, including the reserve. But the enemy, having opened hurricane fire, took advantage of the system of karezes and carried out a withdrawal. The pursuit and continuation of hostilities no longer made sense.
At this time, a number of shortcomings of heavy military equipment were identified, which turned out to be of little use in mountainous terrain. Tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and self-propelled artillery mounts were tied to the roads and had no operational space for their use. Modern high-speed jets were often unable to effectively support ground forces with air strikes. The use of combat helicopters, which at first became the most effective means of fighting dushmans in the mountains, was significantly limited with the advent of the latest Stinger man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems. All this was not long in affecting the effectiveness of operations and battles, which often did not achieve their intended goals.
For the Soviet command, it became more and more obvious that it would not be possible to completely defeat the rebels in a short time by the forces of the OKSV. The main reasons for military failures, the persistence and even a certain expansion of the scale of the guerrilla war of the Afghan Mujahideen lay not in the military sphere, but in the political one. The Parchamists who came to power, headed by Barbak Karmal, did not justify the hopes placed on them. Having rehabilitated those convicted by Amin, the new leadership itself embarked on the path of violence and oppression. Ill-considered and premature transformations in the countryside led to an increase in discontent. The Afghan army, despite its numerical increase and the saturation of units with Soviet military equipment and weapons, remained almost incapacitated in the conditions of political instability in the country. Therefore, the very logic of circumstances drew the Soviet troops deeper and deeper into the course of the civil war.
Having sent its troops into the territory of Afghanistan, the Soviet government and the Soviet military command did not take into account the national-historical factors of this country, its centuries-old history of struggle against various conquerors. The notion that any foreigner who enters the country with a weapon is a foreign occupier who must be fought is firmly entrenched in the mind of an Afghan. The military command made another mistake. Initially, among the fighters of the Soviet units introduced into Afghanistan, a large percentage were representatives of the Central Asian peoples. Obviously, the command proceeded from considerations that the soldiers of these nationalities would find greater understanding among the kindred inhabitants of Afghanistan. However, this actually had the opposite effect. The Pashtun tribes, which have become an active part of the anti-government movement, have historically always been at enmity with national minorities from the north. The appearance of Uzbeks, Tajiks and Turkmens was an additional irritating factor, which was skillfully used by agitators and propagandists of the counter-revolution. The forces of the armed opposition were growing. So, if in 1981-1983. On the territory of Afghanistan, the number of active armed formations of the Mujahideen was about 45 thousand people, then in 1985 it was already 150 thousand people. They controlled all the main agricultural areas of the country. The combined Afghan-Soviet armed forces operating in Afghanistan, numbering about 400 thousand people (of which about 100 thousand were Soviet troops), mainly controlled the cities and the highways connecting them.
The scale and intensity of the armed struggle of the opposition was constantly growing, which more and more often took the form of maneuverable offensive and defensive actions of large semi-regular formations. From the second half of 1984, attempts were made to create "Islamic regiments" consisting of 3-5 battalions on the basis of individual bands of the Mujahideen. The total strength of the regiment was 500–900 men. Regiments were sometimes combined into "fronts", in which there were from one to several thousand people. In service, in addition to small arms, there was mountain artillery, mortars, rockets. In the hard-to-reach mountainous terrain, the rebels created base areas with a well-organized multi-tiered system of fire and engineering barriers to accommodate their formations.
The main force of the rebels were regional groups and detachments. Their goals, organizational forms and tactics of warfare were determined by local tribal and religious authorities - "field commanders", and the zone of action was limited to the areas of residence of the Mujahideen. These formations, as a rule, did not have a permanent composition and organization. In case of danger, dushmans dissolved among the local residents, which made their identification almost impossible. The composition of detachments and groups in socio-ethnic terms was heterogeneous. Such formations included residents of one national-ethnic group. In most cases, their commanders did not have constant contact with foreign organizations of the Afghan counterrevolution, but the main advantage was the active support of the local population.
Semi-regular formations were usually created at the bases and in the camps of Pakistan and Iran from Afghan refugees. They had good military revenue and were sufficiently armed. The actions of these formations were not tied to one area and were highly maneuverable. Detachments and groups received specific tasks, after which, as a rule, they returned to their bases for understaffing, rearmament and rest. According to Western sources, their number was no more than 5-8% of the total number of forces of the Afghan opposition. These groups included many declassed elements, and the actions themselves were predominantly violent in relation to the local population (forced conscription, robberies, murders, etc.). By their actions, they erected a wall of a certain alienation between the opposition and the Afghan people. The formations of this category were emigrant opposition organizations of different class composition, political goals and platforms, torn apart by internal contradictions and ideological struggle, due to which their main weakness was the lack of coordination, and often even military confrontation among themselves. The terrorist groups operating in the cities were also an integral part of the armed formations of the counterrevolution. They possessed an extensive network of deeply hidden cells. Along with the implementation of terrorist acts, sabotage, sabotage, inspiring mass riots, the leaders of the underground had the task of infiltrating the party state apparatus, the army and special services in order to undermine state power from within.
During this period, one of the main tasks in the fight against the armed opposition was to deprive it of sources - replenishment by returning Afghan refugees to their homeland. But the resolution of this problem directly depended on the fidelity of the chosen general political course of the government. In practice, as a result of gross errors, the number of refugees not only did not decrease, but even increased and amounted to about 5 million people in the second period. All attempts made to block the entry of fresh Mujahideen into the territory of Afghanistan by military means did not give success.
The realization that the main means of combating the armed opposition should not be the military actions of regular troops, but the thoughtful socio-economic, political, organizational and propaganda measures of the authorities, led to a well-known modification of the tactics of the actions of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan - their refusal to conduct numerous "field "operations against individual detachments and groups of dushmans and focusing the main efforts on holding strategically important areas and providing communications, on which the issues of supplying the local population with necessary products and goods directly depended.
However, in practice, this policy did not always give the desired results, mainly due to the weakness of local government. The result of many operations of the Soviet and Afghan troops was the creation in the counties and volosts of state authorities, called orgyadry. They included representatives of the PDPA, ministries of state security, internal affairs, some other departments, as well as persons from among the leading employees of public organizations, representatives of the clergy who support the government of Afghanistan. To ensure the safety of the work of the organizational unit, it included an army unit (as a rule, up to a platoon). The trouble with such an organization was that it was small in number and did not have real power. Its leaders did not know how to conduct political work with the local population, they did not enjoy authority. The influence of the orgyadr was limited, as a rule, to the village in which it was located.
After the completion of the operation, the troops left the occupied area and returned to their places of permanent deployment or moved to other areas of combat operations. In their place, the surviving rebels returned, rebuilt their bases and drove out or destroyed the orgyadra. This was repeated many times. For example, in the valley of the Panjshir River in the second period, 6 military operations were carried out, but government power in this area was not consolidated. By the end of 1981, the activity and results of hostilities were to a certain extent affected by a large separation of personnel, about 40% of which was thrown into solving the tasks of protecting objects and normalizing the life and life of a limited contingent of Soviet troops. First of all, it was necessary to build and improve numerous military camps. This required a large amount of building materials and other equipment, which was mainly delivered from the territory of the USSR. The flow of goods has increased sharply. To cope with the tasks of ensuring the construction and replenishment of all necessary supplies for the OKSV, a large number of support battalions are deployed. So, by December 1, 1981, eight separate support battalions operated in the army, which were located in Bagram, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Surubi, Shindad, Kabul, Ghazni and Kunduz. But these forces, as practice has shown, were not enough. In March 1984, two separate support battalions were additionally formed in Kabul and Kunduz. Consequently, taking into account a separate support battalion located in Kabul, and an army material support brigade located in the city of Puli-Khurmi back in the first period, by the end of the second period these forces turned out to be sufficient to cope with the tasks assigned to them. This is eloquently evidenced by such facts as the arrangement of the garrisons of the location of the OKSV. In almost every garrison, conditions were created not only for normal rest, but also other issues of life were successfully resolved (washing facilities, libraries, clubs, etc. were deployed). The security system of the troops in the garrisons was improved. For this purpose, the approaches to the garrisons were covered with minefields, security guards were posted on the access roads, in addition, the protection of objects inside the garrisons was established.
During the third period of their stay in Afghanistan (April 1985 - January 1986), the troops of the 40th Army came out, having the most numerous composition. The grouping of their ground troops included four divisions, five separate brigades, four separate regiments and six separate battalions. As part of these forces, there were about 29 thousand units of military equipment, of which up to 6 thousand tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles.
To ensure the actions of troops from the air, the commander had four aviation and three helicopter regiments at his disposal. The total number of OKSV personnel reached 108.8 thousand people, including 73 thousand in combat units. It was the most combat-ready group for the entire period of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, but views on their use have changed significantly.
In connection with the change of leadership in the USSR, for the first time they spoke openly about the Afghan war as a harmful phenomenon imposed on the country and people by a small group of old politicians. In this regard, there has been a tendency towards the constant elimination of Soviet troops from active combat activities, a decrease in the frequency and scale of their operations and battles, and the narrowing of the boundaries of controlled areas. Frequent operations began to be carried out by Afghan units, and the Soviet side carried out their aviation, artillery and engineering support. Only in exceptional cases did the Soviet command go to large-scale operations. An example of this is the operation carried out in 1986 to defeat a well-equipped Mujahideen base in the Khost district.
During this period, the Afghan leadership began work on the creation of armed self-defense units through negotiations with local tribal leaders and elders. Where it was possible to achieve this, anti-government activity ceased and the inhabitants, tired to the limit from the fratricidal war, happily returned to peaceful work. The great political success of the government was the establishment of peace with a number of Pashtun tribes on the border with Pakistan. There were positive results in negotiations with local leaders and religious authorities in a number of other parts of the country, especially in the north.
Along with these measures, a lot of work continued to strengthen the armed forces. Measures were taken to strengthen military discipline, a decisive struggle against desertion began, and complete freedom of religion was proclaimed. The regular positions of mullahs were introduced in the army and courses for their training were opened.
The reaction of the government opposition to the reduction in the combat activity of the Soviet troops was ambiguous. On the one hand, they took advantage of this to expand their spheres of influence in the country, primarily by peaceful, ideological means. On the other hand, fearing a way out of the struggle of large masses of the peasantry, tired of the war and striving to return to peaceful life, the Dushman leaders were forced to constantly maintain tension in the country, fanning the flames of civil war. The main active groups were located in the province of Lagar, Nangarhar, Paktia. And in May 1986, under the leadership of the army commander, Major General V.P. Dubynin, a number of operations are being carried out in these provinces, in which Soviet and Afghan troops took part. In the same year, an operation was carried out in the Khost district to defeat the opposition's base area. This operation was planned to be carried out only by the forces of the Afghan troops with the support of Soviet aviation. Major General Nabi Azimi, Deputy Minister of Defense of the DRA, was appointed the head of the operation. During the operation, it became clear that, for a number of reasons, the Afghan troops would not be able to solve the problem on their own, and this would lead to a further decline in their morale and authority. And the Soviet troops took part in this operation, covering the flanks and rear of the Afghan group, supporting them with their own fire. When destroying small opposition groups, Afghan troops acted independently.
The main event of the third period of the war was the withdrawal from Afghanistan in the second half of 1986 of six regiments of the 40th Army (two motorized rifle, tank and three anti-aircraft missiles). As a result, the number of personnel decreased by 15 thousand people, tanks - by 53 units, infantry fighting vehicles (APC) - by 200 units.
The beginning of the fourth period was laid in December 1986 by the Extraordinary Plenum of the Central Committee of the PDPA, which proclaimed a course towards national reconciliation. By this time, it became clear to sensible people that there was no military solution to the Afghan problem. The adoption of the course of "national reconciliation" reflected the real situation in the country, when it was impossible to achieve an end to the war by military means. However, the implementation of the policy of reconciliation became possible only after the implementation, on the initiative of the Soviet Union, of a whole range of preliminary measures that created the necessary ground for this. The main and decisive step was the decision of the USSR government agreed with the Afghan leadership to begin the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, subject to the cessation of armed assistance to the Afghan rebels from Pakistan and other countries. The new political thinking, which provides for the rejection of military methods of resolving controversial international issues, which was put forward by the Soviet Union, brought the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan to the negotiating table in Geneva with the participation of the USSR and the USA. The result of these negotiations was the signing of the Geneva Accords on the political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan.
Beginning in January 1987, Soviet troops practically ceased offensive combat operations and fought only if they were attacked by rebels. The exception is the largest joint operation of the Soviet and Afghan troops "Magistral" in 1987 in the province of Paktia to deliver national economic goods from Gardez to Khost with the defeat of large rebel forces blocking the road, in which the forces of five divisions participated . Subsequently, the actions of the Soviet troops were reduced to control over the main vital sections of the roads, preparing and securing the exit from Afghanistan.
In 1988, the Najibullah government searched frantically for ways to implement the policy of national reconciliation. In party life, the main task was to strengthen and consolidate the ranks of the PDPA. In foreign policy, a course was taken to develop relations with all countries, non-alignment with any blocs. In the military field, measures were continued to turn the army into a force capable of independently protecting the existing power in the country. However, none of the measures taken in practice brought the end of the war closer.
The opposition to the calls of the government's policy of national reconciliation refused. Its leaders declared that they would continue the "jihad" until the last Soviet soldier left the territory of Afghanistan. They intensified their propaganda work among the local population, increased the intensity of the armed struggle, and carried out a series of terrorist acts.
A complex and intractable task in the policy of reconciliation and a ceasefire was the issue of relations with Shiite Iran and the armed detachments of its adherents and co-religionists in Afghanistan itself. Iran did not recognize the Four-Party Geneva Agreement, refusing to sign it as a fifth interested party. He did not succumb to the influence of international authorities and was not going to refuse military assistance to the opposition, as well as to liquidate centers for the training of the Mujahideen on his territory. Under these conditions, on April 7, 1988, the Soviet government decided on the complete withdrawal of a limited contingent of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The withdrawal was carried out in two stages. At the first (from May 15 to August 16, 1988), the number of troops was halved. Then, after a three-month break, necessary to solve a number of organizational problems, the second stage began, lasting three months (from November 15, 1988 to February 15, 1989).
The withdrawal of troops at both stages was planned and carried out as a large-scale army operation, in which a large number of forces and means participated. Thanks to this, the withdrawal of troops was carried out successfully. The armed formations of the opposition, preparing for a large-scale struggle for power within the country, did not prevent the formations and units of the 40th Army from leaving. On February 15, 1989, the last part left the territory of Afghanistan. Thus, another page in the history of the long-suffering Soviet people was turned, conceived and started by several politicians in the Kremlin, and written with the blood and sweat of many thousands of ordinary people on the land of Afghanistan.
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] think that undeclared war differs from a simple military intervention "in scope".
On the other hand, to undeclared wars often include non-combat actions:
- provocations at the border;
- show of force, other buildup of military presence, threat of force;
- support for separatist and nationalist movements.
Story
During the next discussion of the project of the tunnel under the English Channel in 1881-1882, the question arose in the British government about the military danger of an attack without warning. J. Maurice (English)Russian, who was commissioned to prepare a report on the subject, was surprised to find that "nations have sometimes ignored all the duties of declaring war and, in the midst of deep peace, have abused the gullibility of their neighbors." C. Eagleton Clyde Eagleton) in 1938 noted that in the time of Maurice, the purpose of waging an undeclared war was to use the advantage of surprise, but since then new, much more powerful factors have arisen: there has been a revolution in military affairs, the interdependence of states has become more complex, international organizations and related organizations have appeared obligation to declare and wage war. Eagleton therefore doubted that any future wars would be declared at all, because "some people look at the declaration of war as an anachronism that should be discarded."
USSR
- Arab-Israeli Wars
- Conflicts and wars in Africa
According to the team of authors led by G. F. Krivosheev, the losses of the USSR in undeclared wars and conflicts were: China (before and after World War II) - 1163; Korea - 315; Vietnam - 16; Cuba - 69; Middle East - 52; Algeria - 25; Angola - 11; Mozambique - 8; Ethiopia - 33.
USA
See also
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Notes
Literature
- . // Military Encyclopedic Dictionary. 2013.
- Brown, Philip Marshall. undeclared wars. // American Journal of International Law (1939): 538-541. (English)
- Kenneth B. Moss. Undeclared war and the future of U.S. foreign policy. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2008. 298 p. (English)
- Brien Hallett. The Lost Art of Declaring War. University of Illinois Press, 1998. (English)
- Eagleton, Clyde. . // The American Journal of International Law, 32 (1938): 19. (Eng.)
- John Frederick Maurice. . H.M. Stationery Office, 1883. (English)
An excerpt characterizing the Undeclared War
- Yes, at the end, to the big one, how can you not see! This is our house, - said Rostov, - after all, this is our house! Denisov! Denisov! We'll come now.Denisov raised his head, cleared his throat, and said nothing.
“Dmitry,” Rostov turned to the lackey in the box. “Is this our fire?”
- So exactly with and with daddy in the office glows.
- Haven't gone to bed yet? A? How do you think? Look, don’t forget, get me a new Hungarian at once, ”added Rostov, feeling his new mustache. “Come on, let’s go,” he shouted to the driver. “Wake up, Vasya,” he turned to Denisov, who lowered his head again. - Come on, let's go, three rubles for vodka, let's go! Rostov shouted when the sleigh was already three houses from the entrance. It seemed to him that the horses were not moving. Finally the sleigh was taken to the right to the entrance; above his head, Rostov saw a familiar cornice with broken plaster, a porch, a sidewalk pillar. He jumped out of the sleigh on the move and ran into the passage. The house also stood motionless, unfriendly, as if it didn't care who came to it. There was no one in the vestibule. "My God! is everything all right?" thought Rostov, stopping for a minute with a sinking heart, and at once starting to run further along the passage and the familiar, crooked steps. The same doorknob of the castle, for the uncleanliness of which the countess was angry, also weakly opened. A single tallow candle burned in the hallway.
Old man Mikhail was sleeping on the chest. Prokofy, the visiting lackey, the one who was so strong that he lifted the carriage by the back, sat and knitted bast shoes from the hems. He glanced at the open door, and his indifferent, sleepy expression suddenly changed into ecstatic fright.
- Fathers, lights! Count young! he exclaimed, recognizing the young master. – What is it? My dove! - And Prokofy, shaking with excitement, rushed to the door to the living room, probably in order to announce, but apparently again changed his mind, returned back and leaned on the shoulder of the young master.
– Healthy? Rostov asked, pulling his hand away from him.
- God bless! All thanks to God! just ate now! Let me see you, Your Excellency!
- Is everything all right?
- Thank God, thank God!
Rostov, completely forgetting about Denisov, not wanting to let anyone warn him, threw off his fur coat and ran on tiptoe into a dark, large hall. Everything is the same, the same card tables, the same chandelier in a case; but someone had already seen the young gentleman, and before he had time to run to the living room, something swiftly, like a storm, flew out of the side door and hugged and began to kiss him. Another, third, similar creature jumped out of another, third door; More hugs, more kisses, more cries, more tears of joy. He could not make out where and who is dad, who is Natasha, who is Petya. Everyone was screaming and talking and kissing him at the same time. Only his mother was not among them - he remembered that.
- But I didn’t know ... Nikolushka ... my friend!
- Here he is ... ours ... My friend, Kolya ... He has changed! No candles! Tea!
- Kiss me then!
- Darling ... but me.
Sonya, Natasha, Petya, Anna Mikhailovna, Vera, the old count, embraced him; and people and maids, having filled the rooms, sentenced and gasped.
Petya hung on his feet. - And then me! he shouted. Natasha, after she, bending him to her, kissed his whole face, jumped away from him and holding on to the floor of his Hungarian, jumped like a goat all in one place and squealed piercingly.
From all sides there were tears of joy shining with tears, loving eyes, from all sides there were lips looking for a kiss.
Sonya, red as red, also held on to his hand and beamed all over in a blissful look fixed on his eyes, which she was waiting for. Sonya was already 16 years old, and she was very beautiful, especially at this moment of happy, enthusiastic animation. She looked at him, not taking her eyes off, smiling and holding her breath. He looked at her gratefully; but still waiting and looking for someone. The old countess hasn't come out yet. And then there were footsteps at the door. The steps are so fast that they couldn't have been his mother's.
But it was she in a new dress, unfamiliar to him, sewn without him. Everyone left him and he ran to her. When they came together, she fell on his chest sobbing. She could not raise her face and only pressed him against the cold laces of his Hungarian coat. Denisov, not noticed by anyone, entered the room, stood right there and, looking at them, rubbed his eyes.
“Vasily Denisov, your son’s friend,” he said, introducing himself to the count, who looked at him inquiringly.
- Welcome. I know, I know,” said the count, kissing and hugging Denisov. - Nikolushka wrote ... Natasha, Vera, here he is Denisov.
The same happy, enthusiastic faces turned to the shaggy figure of Denisov and surrounded him.
- My dear, Denisov! - Natasha squealed, beside herself with delight, jumped up to him, hugged and kissed him. Everyone was embarrassed by Natasha's act. Denisov also blushed, but smiled and took Natasha's hand and kissed it.
Denisov was taken to the room prepared for him, and the Rostovs all gathered in the sofa near Nikolushka.
The old countess, without letting go of his hand, which she kissed every minute, sat next to him; the rest, crowding around them, caught his every movement, word, glance, and did not take their eyes off him with enthusiastic love. The brother and sisters argued and intercepted places from each other closer to him, and fought over who would bring him tea, a handkerchief, a pipe.
Rostov was very happy with the love he was shown; but the first minute of his meeting was so blissful that it seemed to him that his present happiness was not enough, and he kept waiting for something more, and more, and more.
The next morning the visitors slept off the road until 10 o'clock.
In the previous room, sabers, bags, carts, open suitcases, dirty boots were lying around. The cleaned two pairs with spurs had just been placed against the wall. Servants brought washstands, hot water for shaving, and washed dresses. It smelled of tobacco and men.
- Hey, G "bitch, t" ubku! shouted the hoarse voice of Vaska Denisov. - Rostov, get up!
Rostov, rubbing his eyes that were stuck together, lifted his tangled head from the hot pillow.
- What's late? “It’s late, 10 o’clock,” Natasha’s voice answered, and in the next room there was a rustling of starched dresses, a whisper and laughter of girlish voices, and something blue, ribbons, black hair and cheerful faces flashed through the slightly open door. It was Natasha with Sonya and Petya, who came to see if he got up.
- Nicholas, get up! Natasha's voice was heard again at the door.
- Now!
At this time, Petya, in the first room, seeing and grabbing sabers, and experiencing the delight that boys experience at the sight of a warlike older brother, and forgetting that it is indecent for sisters to see undressed men, opened the door.
- Is that your sword? he shouted. The girls jumped back. Denisov, with frightened eyes, hid his shaggy legs in a blanket, looking around for help at his comrade. The door let Petya through and closed again. There was laughter outside the door.
- Nikolenka, come out in a dressing gown, - Natasha's voice said.
- Is that your sword? Petya asked, “or is it yours?” - with obsequious respect he turned to the mustachioed, black Denisov.
Rostov hurriedly put on his shoes, put on a dressing gown and went out. Natasha put on one boot with a spur and climbed into the other. Sonya was spinning and just wanted to inflate her dress and sit down when he came out. Both were in the same, brand new, blue dresses - fresh, ruddy, cheerful. Sonya ran away, and Natasha, taking her brother by the arm, led him into the sofa room, and they started talking. They did not have time to ask each other and answer questions about thousands of little things that could interest only them alone. Natasha laughed at every word that he said and that she said, not because what they said was funny, but because she had fun and was unable to restrain her joy, expressed in laughter.
- Oh, how good, excellent! she said to everything. Rostov felt how, under the influence of the hot rays of love, for the first time in a year and a half, that childish smile blossomed in his soul and face, which he had never smiled since he left home.
“No, listen,” she said, “are you quite a man now? I'm awfully glad you're my brother. She touched his mustache. - I want to know what kind of men you are? Are they like us? No?
Why did Sonya run away? Rostov asked.
- Yes. That's another whole story! How will you talk to Sonya? You or you?
“How will it happen,” said Rostov.
Tell her, please, I'll tell you later.
- Yes, what?
- Well, I'll tell you now. You know that Sonya is my friend, such a friend that I would burn my hand for her. Here look. - She rolled up her muslin sleeve and showed on her long, thin and delicate handle under her shoulder, much higher than the elbow (in the place that is sometimes covered by ball gowns) a red mark.
“I burned this to prove my love to her. I just kindled the ruler on fire, and pressed it.
Sitting in his former classroom, on the sofa with pillows on the handles, and looking into Natasha's desperately animated eyes, Rostov again entered that family, children's world, which had no meaning for anyone except for him, but which gave him one of the best pleasures in life; and burning his hand with a ruler, to show love, seemed to him not useless: he understood and was not surprised at this.
– So what? only? - he asked.
- Well, so friendly, so friendly! Is this nonsense - a ruler; but we are forever friends. She will love someone, so forever; but I don't understand it, I'll forget it now.
