Pavel Chichagov. Pavel Vasilievich Chichagov
When they talk about Admiral P.V. Chichagov, they usually associate with his name the failure with the capture of Napoleon during his crossing of the Berezina and, as a result, the "failure" of the victorious end of the Patriotic War of 1812. The time has come to abandon the old stereotypes and understand the true reasons that prompted the admiral's contemporaries, as well as historians, including some modern ones, to treat him so biased. Why did this smart, capable, brilliantly educated person, who all his life strived to serve the Motherland with honor, finally find himself forced to leave its borders, and his name, in fact, was forgotten. The great-grandson of the admiral, Leonid Mikhailovich Chichagov, who put a lot of effort into restoring the good name of his famous ancestor, wrote that upon closer examination, "many personalities who have unjustly incurred the indignation or contempt of offspring will turn out to be not at all as dark and vile as we used to consider them according to hereditary traditions, and, on the contrary, personalities, especially exalted and beloved, far from deserving either sympathy or respect from offspring ".
Pavel Vasilyevich Chichagov was born in 1767 in the family of the captain of the Russian fleet Vasily Yakovlevich Chichagov, a native of the poor nobles of the Kostroma province, who became a famous naval commander during the reign of Catherine II. "I was born on June 27 - the day of the Battle of Poltava, which in itself was a good sign," he later wrote in his memoirs. The Chichagov family lived at that time in Kolomna, one of the swampy districts of St. Petersburg between the Moika and Fontanka rivers, where families of sailors and workers from shipyards, as well as bureaucrats with a small income, huddled.
The character of the young Paul was formed under the influence of his parents. Recalling them, he wrote: "My father's life was ... inseparably linked with mine for forty years: I not only lived with him almost constantly, but had the good fortune to serve under his command until the age of 30. Thus, I had before my eyes the finest example of civil virtues, noblest feelings, firmness and independence of character, so rare in some countries." "Mother was a sensible and reasonable woman, and, like a natural Saxon, she conveyed to me, as I think, the spirit of independence inherent in this tribe, which I have forever preserved in myself." As noted by L.M. Chichagov in the preface to the memoirs mentioned above, "the spirit of truth, honor and independence entered the flesh and blood of Pavel Vasilyevich from his very birth, and he grew with those firm convictions that, despite all the vicissitudes of fate, did not leave him until his death."
He grew up "alive by nature, receptive, impressionable", but at the same time "was less restrained than his father." He did not hide his superiority over less educated peers and sometimes allowed taunts and ridicule against them. The school program was completed by Pavel in two years instead of four. By the age of 14, he had already mastered all the sciences that were taught in Russian schools, and his father simply did not know what to do with him next. It was decided to continue his education at home with tutors. "A penchant for the exact sciences with their application to mechanics", an in-depth study of mathematics and navigation, as well as his father's stories about sea voyages, "the desire to follow the same field as his father, and the hope not to be separated from him" - all this decided Pavel's choice of the profession of a sailor.
When they talk about Admiral P.V. Chichagov today, sometimes they associate with his name the failure with the capture of Napoleon during his crossing of the Berezina and, as a result of this, the “failure” of the victorious end of the Patriotic War of 1812. In our opinion, it is high time to abandon the old stereotypes of thinking and understand the true reasons that prompted the admiral's contemporaries, as well as historiographers, including some modern ones, to be so biased towards Chichagov, blaming him for crossing Napoleon across the Berezina and "rewarding" him with insulting, if not offensive, epithets. Indeed, how could it happen that, as a result of the slander raised against him, this intelligent, amazingly capable and brilliantly educated person, who had striven all his life to serve his Motherland, Russia, with honor, in the end not only found himself forced to leave its borders, but even the mention of his name, in fact, disappeared from the pages of Russian history. |
Admiral Pavel Vasilyevich Chichagov 1767-1849 |
We have to take a fresh look on how the life and career of Pavel Vasilyevich developed, to recall the assessments of the personality of the admiral by his contemporaries who knew him well, and on the basis of these assessments, as well as reference to documentary sources of that time, make a judgment about his true role in the history of Russia. As never before, the words of the great-grandson of the admiral, Leonid Mikhailovich Chichagov, who put a lot of effort into restoring the good name of his famous ancestor, should be cited here more than ever: upon closer examination, “many personalities who unfairly incurred the indignation or contempt of offspring will turn out to be not at all as dark and vile as we used to consider them according to hereditary traditions, and, on the contrary, personalities, especially exalted and beloved, far from deserving of any sympathy nor respect for posterity” 1 .
I
| Pavel Vasilievich Chichagov was born in 1767 in the family of the captain of the Russian fleet Vasily Yakovlevich Chichagov, a native of the poor nobles of the Kostroma province, who later became a famous naval commander during the reign of Catherine II. “I was born on June 27 - the day of the Battle of Poltava, which in itself was a good sign,” as he later wrote in his memoirs 2 . The Chichagov family lived at that time in Kolomna, one of the swampy districts of St. Petersburg between the Moika and Fontanka rivers, where families of sailors and workers from shipyards, as well as bureaucrats with a small income, huddled. The character of the young Paul was formed under the influence of his parents. Speaking about his parents, he wrote: “My father’s life was ... inseparably connected with mine for forty years: I not only lived with him almost constantly, but had the good fortune to serve under his command up to 30 years. Thus, I had before my eyes the finest example of civil virtues, the noblest feelings, firmness and independence of character, so rare in some countries, and I can say with the poet: |
 Admiral V.Ya. Chtchagov |
And never taught to do baseness!". 3
“Mother was a sensible and sensible woman and, like a natural Saxon, she conveyed to me, as I think, that inherent in this tribe, the spirit of independence, which I have forever preserved in myself. As Leonid Mikhailovich Chichagov noted in the Preface to the memoirs mentioned above, “the spirit of truth, honor and independence entered the flesh and blood of Pavel Vasilyevich from his very birth, and he grew up with those firm convictions that, despite all the vicissitudes of fate, did not leave him until his death” 5. He grew up "alive by nature, receptive, impressionable", but at the same time "was less restrained than his father." He did not hide his superiority over less educated peers and sometimes allowed taunts and ridicule against them. The school program was completed by Pavel in two years instead of four. By the age of 14, he had already mastered all the sciences that were taught in Russian schools, and his father simply did not know what to do with him next. It was decided to continue his education at home with tutors. “A penchant for the exact sciences with their application to mechanics”, an in-depth study of mathematics and navigation, as well as his father’s stories about sea voyages, “the desire to follow the same field as his father, and the hope not to be separated from him” - all this decided Pavel's choice of the profession of a sailor. However, he began military service as a guard sergeant in 1779. In 1782 he was promoted to lieutenant. By this time, his father, appointed commander of a squadron heading to Livorno, considered him ready for the start of naval service. With the permission of the Empress, Admiral Chichagov enrolls his son Pavel in the staff of the squadron as an adjutant. During the voyage to Livorno and back, the ship "Tsar Constantine", on which Paul was, called at Copenhagen, the English port of Diehl and Lisbon. England made an indelible impression on him. According to Leonid Mikhailovich Chichagov, “on his first trip to foreign lands, he (Pavel Chichagov - V.Yu.) involuntarily noticed how little improvement there is in Russia, and especially in the navy. His pride, as a Russian person, suffered; he wanted to study at all costs and bring the necessary knowledge with him to the Fatherland. 6
| In 1783, Pavel Chichagov became adjutant general under Admiral Chichagov. By this time, he was already a recognized military officer and Knight of St. George, who distinguished himself in three major battles with the Swedes - Eland, Revel and Vyborg, where he happened to command the battleship Rostislav. His father Admiral V.Ya Chichagov, appointed by Empress Catherine as commander of the Baltic Fleet in place of the deceased S.K., was with his headquarters on the Rostislav. Greig. The old admiral completely trusted his son Pavel and, knowing about his personal qualities and professionalism, did not hesitate to put him in the most responsible areas in naval battles. Here is a typical example. On May 2, 1790, the Swedish fleet, consisting of 22 battleships and 4 frigates, attacked the Russian squadron in the Revel Bay, which was commanded by V.Ya. Chichagov. Having discovered the rapidly approaching Swedish fleet and realizing that there was no time to remove the anchors and deploy in battle formation, Admiral Chichagov made a decision that grossly violated the naval charter, but gave a chance to win. He ordered to stay at anchor. The Russian squadron was lined up in such a way that the Swedish ships, approaching the distance of artillery fire, had to pass along the Russian line, being exposed to the concentrated fire of all the ships of the Russian squadron. The central place in the ranks of Russian ships was occupied by the 100-gun Rostislav, commanded by Pavel Chichagov. |  Flagship battleship "Rostislav" |
The flagship "Rostislav" under the command of Pavel Chichagov he also became famous for his participation in the Battle of Vyborg in 1790. As you know, in May 1790, the Swedish king Gustav III with his galley fleet with a landing force on board broke into the Vyborg Bay, entered the Bjerke Sound strait in readiness to throw galleys to St. Petersburg and capture the capital of Russia. Trying to ensure the success of the zaduian operation, the Swedish fleet fought a fierce battle against the Kronstadt squadron near Krasnaya Gorka, but the Swedes could not overpower the Russians. Seeing the approaching Reval squadron of Admiral Chichagov, the Swedes decided to take refuge in the Vyborg Bay. Admiral Chichagov immediately blocked the entire Swedish fleet in the Vyborg Bay, constrained by skerries. After a tense confrontation, the Swedish king decided to break through between the Russian ships. And once again the gunners of the flagship Rostislav distinguished themselves, the actions of which were skillfully led by the young commander Pavel Chichagov. In this battle, Russian sailors destroyed a third of the Swedish fleet. The fleet of Admiral Chichagov had no losses in the ship's composition. The Vyborg naval battle finally convinced the Swedes of the naval power of Russia and the impossibility of Sweden to engage in single combat with Russia one on one.
| With a report to the empress about the brilliant victory, Admiral Chichagov sent his son Pavel. Empress Catherine granted him a golden sword with the inscription "For Courage". And for "the news delivered to the Empress about the victory over the Swedish fleet in the Vyborg Bay" in 1790, he was promoted to captain of the 1st rank. “He was then only 22 years old and, short in stature with an effeminate face, he seemed like a perfect boy,” wrote Leonid Mikhailovich Chichagov, while expressing one important consideration: “We will not enter into an analysis of the merits for which he was awarded: without a doubt, the Empress, wanting to please his father, awarded her son with a generous hand.” And further: “here for the first time the young man noticed that his comrades envied him, looked at him as a darling of happiness, slandered him and did not appreciate him at his true worth. The envy of the officers offended young Chichagov, and he noticed this vile feeling in A.S. Shishkov, who was an adjutant under Vasily Yakovlevich (Chichagov). 7 Pavel Chichagov told his father about Shishkov's attitude towards him, offering to send an envious person with the next report about the victory to the Empress in order to dispel Shishkov's hostility. So they did, but this step did not at all bring Shishkov to his senses, who, as we will see later, will play by no means the last role in the campaign of intrigues against Pavel Vasilyevich. |  Empress Catherine II |
In the meantime, Pavel Vasilyevich was more and more interested in the idea of getting directly acquainted with foreign advanced experience in maritime affairs. with the aim of introducing it into the practice of the Russian fleet and increasing its efficiency. Below we will give the reasoning of the young Chichagov on this subject: “... my passion for my craft has reached the highest degree. Having had the opportunity to see the imperfections of the Russian fleet up close, I was annoyed by them and ardently desired, after such a long study of theories, to put myself in the opportunity to see with my own eyes the practice of English sailors.
England, in addition to the recognized superiority of her fleet, had another attraction for me: I was interested in her form of government and was very glad to have the opportunity to study it. Therefore, I begged my father to allow me ... to visit this country. I also intended to go then to America and make other trips to gain experience. 8
In 1792, Admiral Chichagov decided to send Pavel to England. Agreeing with the arguments of his son, the old admiral, apparently, also considered it desirable to send him away from himself at least for a while because of rumors about his father's patronage to his son in the service. Having received the appropriate permission from the Empress, he equipped his two sons, Pavel and Vasily, on this trip, accompanied by their teacher, professor of mathematics from the Artillery Cadet Corps, former artillery officer S.E. Guriev. They were in England in 1792-1793. The purpose of the trip was a kind of internship "to complete practical marine notes." Not embarrassed by age and high rank, the brothers Chichagov and Guryev entered English schools. They studied at different schools in order to use time for studying and minimize communication between themselves. However, in the process of studying, they were deeply disappointed that “they did not find anything new in scientific books; it only proved .. that they had gone so far at home, studying from translated books. Pavel, with his characteristic frankness, told the Russian envoy in London, Count Semyon Romanovich Vorontsov, about this disappointment of his: “The last officer of our fleet, in my opinion, knows more than what I found in English books.” To this, Vorontsov replied that, in his opinion, "the last ensign of the English fleet knows more than the Russian admiral." Pavel took these words as an undeserved insult, because, firstly, Vorontsov knew that Pavel was the son of an admiral, and, secondly, Pavel considered that Vorontsov had humiliated the dignity of a Russian sailor. Offended, Pavel could not restrain himself from answering with harshness: “Maybe, Count, this is plausible in relation to practitioners, although this still needs to be verified.” 9 Vorontsov considered Paul's words to be insolence, which served as a pretext for his hostile attitude towards Paul. The case helped to dispel this hostility, which will be discussed below.
So that the trip to England would benefit them, the brothers Chichagov and Guryev began to study English diligently. They also tried to understand the intricacies of maritime affairs in England. For a practical acquaintance with the skills of the British in navigation, they sailed as simple sailors on an English warship to America. However, this journey was short-lived and they had to return to London. And then they went by land through Holland, where they got acquainted with the Dutch experience in maritime affairs, and went home to Russia.
In 1793 - 1794. Pavel commands the ship "Sophia Magdalene", plying as part of the squadron of Vice Admiral Musin-Pushkin in the Baltic. The experience gained during his service in the Navy and acquaintance with the organization of maritime affairs in England allowed Captain Chichagov to reorganize the order on his own ship "in the English way", making this ship one of the best in the fleet. This, unfortunately, also had negative consequences for Pavel Vasilievich: the number of his envious and ill-wishers who considered the young Chichagov an "Angloman", servility to everything foreign, increased noticeably. But the malice of enemies did not bother Pavel Vasilyevich, who was accustomed to telling the truth in the eye and resolutely advocating the use of progressive foreign experience to fight against ignorance, disrespect for juniors in rank, embezzlement, bribery, bureaucracy and routine in the navy. But let's return to the time when the qualities of Pavel Vasilyevich as a professional sailor, ready to stand up for the honor of his Fatherland, were fully manifested. Let's take one typical example.
The events associated with the French Revolution led to a rapprochement between Russia and England. In 1794, an auxiliary squadron of Vice Admiral P.I. was sent to England. Khanykov. P.V. Chichagov also participated in the campaign of this squadron with his ship. Upon the arrival of the Russian squadron in the English port of Dune, there was a "misunderstanding" related to the observance of the rules of the maritime protocol. Noticing a ship standing in the roadstead under the flag of English vice-admiral Pan, equal in rank, Khanykov ordered to salute with cannon shots, but in response the British saluted two shots less. The envoy Vorontsov was summoned to the port, who tried to settle the scandal that had arisen, presenting it as an unfortunate misunderstanding, and "began to support the Russians very sluggishly."
Pavel Vasilyevich, considering it impermissible for anyone to insult the honor of the Russian flag, began to reproach Vorontsov indignantly and suggested to Khanykov "to allow him to go with the ship or alone personally in order to force the English admiral to return two shots." These words of Pavel were perceived by Vorontsov ... with admiration. He realized that Pavel Vasilyevich was not only a true professional who knew maritime affairs to the intricacies (in particular, maritime protocol), but also a true patriot of his country, ready to defend its honor and flag. According to L.M. Chichagov, “from that moment on, S.R. Vorontsov fell in love with him with all his heart and subsequently became his most tender friend. Pavel Vasilievich never called him anything other than "my father" and Count Vorontsov called him "son". 10
It should be noted that the British drew attention to Pavel Vasilievich and when visiting his ship, they could not but respond with praise about the zeal with which he tried to adopt and implement on his ship all the best that he had learned from the British. English naval officers did not hide their admiration for the ease and speed with which Chichagov mastered the techniques of maneuvering his ship - an area in which the British had an indisputable advantage.
At that time, the British government proceeded from the expediency of working towards rapprochement with Russia, and the above-described episode with the observance of the rules of maritime protocol served as one of the reasons that prompted this government to send out to English officials an order that Russian ships should be treated exactly like their own. Since the British officials were not in a position to verify the validity of the demands of the Russian captains, the latter, as it seemed to Vice-Admiral Khanykov, could use such demands for their own enrichment. Chichagov, on the other hand, believed that Russian captains were impeccable. Khanykov, by way of reinsurance, informed the British officials, who were entrusted with satisfying the demands of the Russians, not to issue anything at the request of our sailors without the approval of Khanykov himself. In particular, this concerned the requirements for the issuance of cash loans. According to L.M. Chichagov, “all the captains silently endured this insult: one Pavel Vasilyevich considered it a duty of honor to write a letter to Khanykov .., in which he, among other things, says that, considering it a dishonor for himself to serve under his command, he will try, as far as possible, to bring the line that disgraces the Russian fleet so much to the attention of the government and thereby avenge the insult inflicted on him ... Khanykov did not answer this letter, but he never forgot him." eleven
| In the port of Chatam, where Chichagov's ship was converted to the English style(hull sheathing with copper, replacement of sails of an improved design), he met the head of the port, Captain Charles Proby *. Ch. Proby had a daughter, Elizabeth, whom Chichagov fell in love with, literally, at first sight, and invited her to marry him. However, the father of the bride, recognizing the dignity of the Russian sailor, did not give consent to this marriage, because. categorically objected to her conversion to the Orthodox faith. Empathizing with the feelings of his great-grandfather, Leonid Mikhailovich Chichagov wrote: “Grieved to the depths of his soul, Pavel Vasilyevich returned to Russia, taking with him an indelible memory of his first (and last) love and a gratifying hope for the realization of his cherished dream of being her husband.” eleven | * In 2000, the monograph “The daughter of a high-ranking official. The Story of Elizabeth Proby and Admiral Chichagov "(The Commissioner's Daughter. The Story of Elizabeth Proby and Admiral Chichagov). The author of this book, Joanna Woods, and the publisher of the book, Simon Heaviland, are descendants of the old English family of Proby. |
| In 1796, on the occasion of the accession to the Russian throne of Emperor Paul I P.V. Chichagov, like many other officers, is promoted. He was promoted to captain of the brigadier rank. In the summer of 1797, when Emperor Pavel led the training voyage, Chichagov commanded the Rostislav ship and was awarded a sword with the Order of St. Anna on the hilt for his diligence. However, it soon became clear that this did not bode well. The campaign launched by Paul I to expel those who faithfully served Empress Catherine directly affected Pavel Vasilyevich Chichagov. He was removed from service without a pension "for his youth" with an order to go to live with his father in the village. There he learned that the father of his English bride had died and nothing more prevented their marriage. But in order to go to England for marriage, it was necessary to obtain permission from the monarch. Pavel I refused P.V. Chichagov’s request for leave to travel to England in a frankly defiant manner: “The Emperor finds that there are so many girls in Russia that there is no need to go to England to look for them” 12 . Chichagov was rescued by his longtime friend Count Semyon Romanovich Vorontsov, the Russian envoy in London, who, through his connections in the ruling circles of England, managed to bring to the attention of Emperor Paul the desire of the London cabinet to see P.V. Chichagov as a representative of the Russian fleet in the allied naval forces. Persuading influential people in Russia of the expediency of letting Chichagov go to England for |  Emperor Paul I |
Paul I graciously agreed to the marriage of Chichagov with an Englishwoman, but he conditioned his consent to his immediate return to service with the award of Chichagov to the rear admirals and the appointment of a flagship in the Baltic Fleet. But the success of the flagship was prevented by the long-time ill-wisher of the Chichagovs and the master of court intrigue Kushalev, who was a midshipman with Vasily Yakovlevich Chichagov and became the head of the fleet under Paul I. He slandered P.V. The enraged emperor immediately deprived P.V. Chichagov's uniform and orders and ordered to take off his uniform and put him in the Peter and Paul Fortress. According to L.M. Chichagov, “the aide-de-camp rushed at the admiral like an animal and undressed him with extraordinary speed. Pavel Vasilievich did not lose his presence of mind and, realizing that the emperor might finally reach the last degree of punishment and send him to Siberia, he remembered that he would need money, and loudly, with dignity, turned to one of the aide-de-camp wing with a request to return to him the wallet left in his uniform. This composure so struck the obliging adjutants that they were dumbfounded and embarrassed; one of them only dared to answer that they would deliver him a wallet. While imprisoned in the Peter and Paul Fortress, Pavel Vasilievich fell ill with a fever and almost died. Only thanks to the intervention of the St. Petersburg Governor-General Count von der Pahlen, it was possible to reason with the emperor and Chichagov was released and reinstated in rank and all rights.
The decree of July 2, 1799 ordered the release of Pavel Vasilyevich from the fortress and he was ordered to come to Kushelev in Peterhof to be appointed commander of the squadron, which was tasked with landing Russian troops in Holland, expelling the French and restoring the dynasty of the princes of Orange there. August 28, 1799 squadron P.V. Chichagova went to the parallel of the island of Texel, where, by the joint actions of Russian soldiers and allies - the British, the island was liberated from the French. Chichagov's squadron was ordered to go to England to take on board
| an additional detachment of the British and land it on the Dutch coast to complete the joint Russian-English operation. For a successful landing operation, Pavel Vasilievich was awarded the Order of St. Anna, 1st degree. Emperor Pavel no longer objected to Chichagov's marriage to an Englishwoman. In November 1799, in England, he was married to Elizabeth Proby, later known in Russia as Elizaveta Karlovna Chichagova. The planted father at the marriage ceremony was Semyon Romanovich Vorontsov. On July 6, 1800, the young Chichagov couple set off from England to Russia aboard the Retvizan ship. Upon arrival in Russia, they settled in Kronstadt, where on September 24, 1800, their first daughter, Adelaide (Adel), was born. The second daughter Julia was born in 1802 in St. Petersburg. In the same place, in 1806, the third daughter Ekaterina was born. The Petersburg climate adversely affected the health of Elizaveta Karlovna, who suffered from asthma and had a hard time enduring periods of exacerbation of this disease inherited from her father. To the constant concern of Pavel Vasilyevich with the state of health of his beloved wife, all kinds of troubles were added, which were repaired by his ill-wishers and envious people. |
 Elizaveta Karlovna Chichagova (nee Probi), wife of P.V. Chichagov. (Unknown artist, ca. 1799). Private collection. |
II
| His son Alexander I, who replaced Emperor Paul on the throne, brought P.V. Chichagov, appreciating his professionalism, high education and fidelity This time the wheel of fortune lifted Pavel Vasilyevich to its highest point. The tsar introduced Chichagov to his retinue, appointed him head of the Military Office for the Fleet, which was soon transformed into the Ministry of Naval Forces. In November 1802 he was promoted to the rank of Vice Admiral, and in December of the same year he was appointed Deputy Minister of Naval Forces. With tripled energy, he took up the task entrusted to him. Soon, the then Minister of Naval Forces, N.S. Mordvinov, resigned, indignant at the fact that Chichagov was actually replacing him and in charge of all the affairs of the ministry. The emperor did not dare to appoint Chichagov as a minister, but instructed him to act as minister of naval forces. Chichagov developed a vigorous activity to transform the fleet, increase its combat capability in accordance with the requirements of that time. He fights against embezzlement and bribery, simplifies the bureaucratic reporting system in the fleet, improves shipbuilding, fortifies harbors, establishes the production of navigational instruments, etc. Here are some examples. In the spring of 1803, at the suggestion of Pavel Vasilyevich, the position of auditor was introduced on ships, which greatly eased the burden of household chores. |  Emperor Alexander I |
Among the most important tasks of the Ministry of Naval Forces, Chichagov saw the improvement of work on training personnel in the fleet, educating them in the spirit of the glorious traditions of the Russian fleet, loyalty to the Sovereign and the Fatherland. It introduces changes in the system of training cadets and midshipmen, providing for the possibility of their internships abroad to familiarize themselves with foreign experience. Under Pavel Vasilyevich, Russian sailors make the first trip around the world. Chichagov sought to strengthen discipline and order in the fleet, to limit the arbitrariness of officers in relation to their subordinates. It was forbidden to subject the navigator's assistants of non-commissioned officers to corporal punishment and to shackle sailors in shackles. At the suggestion of Chichagov, a new, more comfortable uniform for sailors was introduced. He demanded that only sailors wear naval uniforms. Daggers became the attributes of officer uniforms instead of swords. Everything that has been said above is just separately given examples of what Chichagov did for the benefit of the Russian fleet, for the benefit of his Fatherland, whose honor he always cherished as a true patriot. Assessing the contribution of P.V. Chichagov in the development of the Russian fleet, the great-grandson of Admiral Leonid Mikhailovich Chichagov wrote: “The Russian fleet was reborn under him; technology has developed and our strength has increased. The Ministry (of naval forces - V.Yu.); ports, boathouses were arranged, in a word, for several years it was impossible to recognize either the sailors or our ships. The theft has stopped; but, naturally, the number of enemies increased several times. According to P. Bertenev, who published in 1881 “Archive of Prince. Vorontsov", "Chichagov is an unusually curious person ... In the legends of our old sailors, his name is highly valued. They say that all the best has been introduced in our fleet by Chichagov." 16
He would probably do more. if he had not been distracted, as a statesman, by a series of wars - both at sea and on land - waged by Russia. 17 The Russian-Turkish war (1806-1812) was unleashed by Turkey in order to return its former possessions in the Northern Black Sea region and the Caucasus, as well as in connection with the growth of Russia's influence in the Balkans. P.V. Chichagov developed a plan of military operations, which provided for the breakthrough of the Black Sea Fleet into the Bosporus and the landing of troops there in the amount of 15-20 thousand soldiers. Further, it was planned by the forces of the squadron under the command of Vice Admiral D.N. Senyavin and, together with 5-6 ships of the English fleet, make a breakthrough to the Dardanelles with the subsequent capture of Constantinople. However, due to the inconsistency of joint actions with the British, the conceived plan could not be fully implemented, although the Turkish squadron was seriously damaged in the Dardanelles and Athos battles. The operations of the Black Sea Fleet also diverted the attention of the enemy in the Northern Black Sea region and thereby contributed to the success of the actions of the Danube army under the command of M.I. Kutuzov.
Russo-Swedish War 1808-1809 was waged by Russia to establish full control over the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Bothnia. With great difficulty, Russian troops managed to reach the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia, occupy Finland, capture the fortifications of Gangut and Sveaborg, cruise around the Aland Islands and attempt to land troops on the Swedish coast. The results of the Russian-Swedish war clearly confirmed the urgency of the measures taken by Chichagov to modernize the Russian fleet in the Baltic.
In 1807, Emperor Alexander awarded Chichagov the title of full admiral. and formally appointed him Minister of Naval Forces. Even earlier, in "1805" he became a member of the Senate and the State Council. The emperor attracted P.V. Chichagov to discuss important government issues. His horizons were not limited to concerns about strengthening the power of the Russian navy and its role in the world. He clearly understood that the reform of the state administration required that the newly established ministries should be headed by knowledgeable people, gifted with tact and consideration. However, in fact, it turned out that each minister constantly interfered in the affairs of other ministers, and as a result, clashes and confusion occurred. In such cases, the admiral reacted in a rather harsh manner, which could not but lead to an aggravation of his relations with almost all ministers. “They fear him because he insists on order, and they hate him because he does not allow people to steal in his department,” wrote Joseph de Maistre, representative of the Sardinian king, in his report from St. Petersburg to Italy. 18
A brief but very true characterization of P.V. Chichagov gave his former adjutant Count Fyodor Petrovich Tolstoy on the pages of Russian Antiquity: “Pavel Vasilyevich Chichagov was a very intelligent and educated person, being of a direct nature, he was surprisingly free and, like no other minister, easy to handle and talk with the sovereign and the royal family. Knowing his advantage over noble court flatterers, both in science, education, and in directness and firmness of character, Chichagov treated them with great inattention, and with others even with disdain, for which, of course, he was hated by almost the entire court world and all the empty, arrogant nobility; but Emperor Alexander Pavlovich and Empress Elizaveta Alekseevna loved him very much ... Chichagov treated his inferiors and his subordinates and petitioners, whom he always accepted without distinction of rank and rank, very affably and listened to the requests of the latter with great patience. 19
| It should be emphasized that the views of the admiral on the state structure of the Russian Empire, the specifics of the Russian state were surprisingly accurate and in some cases still retain their relevance*. The admiral belonged to the number of progressive-minded figures in Russia who understood the need for reforms in order to abolish serfdom. Being an opponent of serfdom, he was sympathetic to the law “On free ploughmen” adopted in 1803, which, in fact, was a harbinger of the 1861 reform on the abolition of serfdom in Russia. But Chichagov would never have joined the ranks of the secret societies of the Decembrists. His methods are reforms that involve reasonable transformations, the legislative eradication of ulcers and vices inherent in any society. “In truth,” Chichagov wrote, “how it would be possible to be useful to the dear fatherland, by becoming a reasonable landowner, putting in order the vast lands that belonged to us; how many joys would the heart of a man who set himself the goal of improving the life of poor peasants, helping them in their needs, being their friend, becoming a leader and enlightener of youth! How I wanted to experience the struggle against our slavery and give new life to the smoky huts of many thousands of our peasants. 20 As a practical step towards the liberation of peasants from serfdom, P.V. Chichagov "let for ransom" serfs in the villages, granted for his victories in naval battles. “For every male soul, except for women, I was given 150 rubles. The price was assigned to me by the government,” Chichagov wrote in one of his letters to Count S.R. Vorontsov. 21 | * Here is one example of his reasoning about the situation in Russia: “In a country where the population is so disproportionate to its length and is declining every day, they want to divert the workers engaged in rural labor and send them to work in manufactories. And at what kind of manufactories? On those for which they do not have such raw materials as good wool, dyes, cotton, etc. Errors and vices are inherent in everything and they cannot but lead in the end to ruin, no matter how large the resources of the state are. Violation of property rights, covetousness, monopoly, chicanery, all kinds of robbery are the components of our administration. The above quote is from a letter from P.V. Chichagov to Count S.R. Vorontsov dated September 15, 1813. And it sounds quite modern! |
“Condemning loudly in the company of Russian nobles tied to serfdom, Pavel Vasilievich acquired the name "Jacobin" and "liberal"" - Leonid Mikhailovich Chichagov noted in his Preface to the Admiral's Notes. Admiral Chichagov was also reminded by his ill-wishers that there was a bust of Napoleon on his desk, whose military genius and state talent Pavel Vasilievich admired, nevertheless remaining a truly Russian man. Leonid Mikhailovich saw the proof of the latter in the fact that the admiral “in conversations with foreigners scolded Russian laws, orders and customs, and this is certainly an inborn flaw of all Russian people!” 22 The accusation that Pavel Vasilievich “did not sufficiently appreciate the merits of his compatriots, preferring foreigners” was unfair and contradicted his own convictions. It is known, for example, that Chichagov in his memoirs “cruelly reproaches Peter the Great because he thought to develop his people with the help of foreigners and therefore only sent him on the wrong path and took away any self-esteem in Russians. He has a whole article about foreigners, in which he lists them by name and proves that, apart from harm, they brought nothing to Russia. For the acceptance of foreigners by Alexander I, he reproached the emperor in letters, which was sometimes not pleasant for the sovereign. 23 According to the great-grandson of the admiral, “his enemies even decided once to report him to the Sovereign ... They called Chichagov a revolutionary; but since the Emperor knew the thoughts of Pavel Vasilyevich before them and understood that his liberalism concerned only the liberation of the peasants, he answered the scammers: I know that he is an enemy of arbitrariness; maybe he's right about that!» 24
| Having asked the emperor for leave to treat his wife, Pavel Vasilyevich is taking her to Paris, but it was not possible to save Elizaveta Karlovna. She died in 1811*. It was difficult for the admiral to bear the weight of grief that had fallen on him. Trying to share the inconsolable grief of Pavel Vasilyevich and support his friend, Count S.R. Vorontsov wrote to him: “Despair, in the power of which you continue to come because of the misfortune - the loss of your wife, does not correspond to the character of a firm and sensible person, as I knew you. The loss that you have suffered is no doubt great, even irreparable, and it is precisely for this that you need to gather strength and be able to defeat yourself, reconcile, think about what your wife expected from you and fulfill her intention and her hope: since there is no doubt that, | * Elizaveta Karlovna Chichagova died in Paris on April 18, 1811. The admiral transported the embalmed body of his wife to St. Petersburg and buried it in the mausoleum at the Smolensk Lutheran cemetery. On the pediment of the mausoleum, it is carved in one line In this place on July 24, 1811, I buried my blessedness forever. P. Chichagov |
Feeling broken, the admiral asks the king for his resignation. But Alexander I had his own views on Chichagov. Having released him from the duties of a minister, the emperor first leaves the admiral with his person in the rank of permanent adjutant general on duty. The degree of trust with which the tsar treated Chichagov is evidenced by the fact that "every day at 11 o'clock in the morning the admiral came to the sovereign and His Majesty conferred with him on all matters of state administration." 26
In the face of the threat of a Napoleonic invasion looming from the West The tsar decides to strengthen Russia's position in the south by uniting the ground forces and the Black Sea Fleet under the unified command of Admiral Chichagov. In this case, the emperor, judging by the available data, pursued a far-reaching goal - to organize an attack on France "by a roundabout maneuver" from the south with the support of the Slavic peoples of the Balkans and Turkey. In his rescript addressed to Chichagov dated April 9, 1812, Alexander I wrote: “Having elected you as the Commander-in-Chief of the Danube Army, we entrust you uniformly and the Chief Command over the Black Sea Fleet. To the full power of the Commander-in-Chief, we add the Main Administration of the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, as well as all countries that can be occupied by land and sea forces entrusted to you. 27 Here is what the French historian A. Thiers wrote about the appointment of Chichagov as commander of the Danube Army and the Black Sea Fleet:
Alexander had with him a man whose convictions were almost liberal, his mind was brilliant and lively, he (the emperor) liked him and gave hope for great merits; it was Admiral Chichagov. The sovereign chose him for a very important assignment in the east, and the choice was very successful, since the admiral was really suitable both from a practical and ideal side for the role that he was supposed to play in these countries ... A brilliant imagination, an equally tireless energy of the admiral corresponded to those roles, so different and bold. 28
| In April 1812, Chichagov replaced M.I. Kutuzov, whom the king dismissed. The replacement of Kutuzov by Chichagov was prepared by the emperor in secret. But Kutuzov managed to find out about this and he hastened to take a preemptive step, forcing the signing of the Bucharest peace treaty with the Turks so that the laurels of this “diplomatic victory” would go to him, and not to Chichagov. The old commander, dissatisfied with his resignation, harbored a grudge against both the king and his successor. By the way, Kutuzov had long been set against Chichagov by his relative A.S. Shishkov, who, as mentioned above, even when he was Emperor Paul I, envied Chichagov and could not come to terms with the fact that Chichagov was older than him in rank. Count Nikolai Rumyantsev, who at one time held the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs, did not stand aside, who hated both Chichagov and Kutuzov. Rumyantsev was one of those who worked hard to quarrel Chichagov and Kutuzov. These circumstances, in particular, the hostility of Kutuzov, will play a fatal role in the future for the fate of the admiral. But back to Chichagov. After reviewing the state of affairs in the area entrusted to him, he found the Danubian principalities in a deplorable state, and discipline in the army was almost collapsed, which was the result of numerous abuses committed by Kutuzov and his entourage. “Passing through Moldova and Wallachia,” Chichagov wrote in his diary, “more than once I noticed abandoned dwellings and learned that their owners fled the country or took refuge in the forests to avoid requisitions by the authorities and harassment by soldiers. These resettlements took place mainly during the cantonment of troops. Discipline was so broken that looting began, and the military took everything they wanted from the merchants. I was forced to subject the soldiers of my honorary guard to severe punishments, since they took provisions directly from neighboring houses. But should we be surprised at the promiscuity of the soldiers, when General Kutuzov, preoccupied exclusively with his own pleasures, did not hesitate to kidnap and expel from the country a member of the Divan of Wallachia (local administrative body - V.Yu.), the husband of one of his mistresses? Generous in services to his mistresses, he provided their friends and proteges with exceptions to the rules at the Danube customs. The caravans that came from Andrianople made these customs houses a real source of wealth, which, however, was depleted by this legalized smuggling and embezzlement of officials who appropriated the rest. Thus, in these so fertile principalities, which together with Bessarabia and the Turkish possessions on the Romanian bank of the Danube (rayats) could give 20 million rubles of income, |  M. I. Kutuzov
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An important result of the measures taken was the establishment of relations with the local population, which began to treat the Russians with the same sympathy. At the same time, Chichagov did not lose sight of the task set by the emperor to seek Turkey's consent to conclude an "offensive and defensive alliance" with Russia against Napoleonic France and its allies, i.e. what Kutuzov did not do, hastening to sign the Bucharest peace treaty. A diplomatic demarche with the conclusion of an alliance with Turkey would allow, according to the calculations of Alexander I, to get the militias of the Serbs, Bosnians and other Christian peoples and strengthen the Danube army to deliver a "distracting blow" to the south of France. In the event of Turkey's refusal from the "offensive and defensive alliance" with Russia, the possibility of resuming hostilities against Turkey was allowed in order to force her to enter into such an alliance. Admiral Chichagov came up with the idea of a "diversionary strike", which was concretely embodied in a plan submitted to Emperor Alexander for consideration. The emperor knew that the person who prepared this plan and was about to carry it out always carefully calculated his actions, foreseeing everything and combining carefully calculated courage and unshakable stubbornness. He could be, according to the situation and necessity, a politician, an administrator, and a commander. The campaign he intended to undertake was to open the way to a very significant strengthening of Russia's position in the East. If Turkey allowed passage through its territory, then the campaign of the Danube army through the countries inhabited by Christian peoples would be an omen of their liberation for these peoples and would make it possible to establish close and lasting relations between the Slavs in the Balkans and the Russians, which would be of great importance for the future. The admiral managed to establish contacts with many of the Turkish pashas and agreed that they would not offer armed resistance and let the Russian troops through the territory they controlled. Realizing that the troops would have to overcome serious natural obstacles in mountainous terrain, the two divisions of the Army of the Danube were organized and equipped so that they could go anywhere. If the Turks would not agree to the passage of Russian troops through their territory, Admiral Chichagov was ready to force the Danube, attack them and move to Constantinople. The Black Sea Fleet was ready to carry out an amphibious landing in Constantinople. “The campaign against Constantinople, which made possible the creation of a new empire, could, by sowing confusion among Napoleon’s allies, interrupt his invasion deep into Russian lands. I was able to suddenly cross the Danube in less than eight days; I would have reached the approaches to the Balkans even before Divan in Bucharest would have known about my plans. And when the news about the beginning of the offensive reached the Austrian court or Napoleon, I would probably already be at the gates of Constantinople. Our enemies, who are waging a big war, would not be able to react quickly enough. In the meantime, I would form from the peoples of these countries not an army of forty or fifty thousand people, but a cloud of soldiers who could be used for a diversionary strike and for any other enterprise, ”wrote Chichagov. thirty
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The plan proposed by Chichagov was ahead of Napoleon's strategy, who hoped to deliver a swift blow to Russia, to force her to peace. And then, having demanded 100 thousand troops from Russia to strengthen the French army, Napoleon intended to turn south, conquer Turkey, taking Constantinople from her, which he wanted to make the capital of his Eastern Empire, and then unite the Eastern and Western empires under his rule. Napoleon's reserve troops, stationed in Italy, Illyria and the Ionian Islands, were planned to be sent to Egypt and restore Napoleon's power there. As for the main and auxiliary troops of Napoleon stationed in Constantinople, he wanted to use them to advance through Asia Minor to Bengal and strike at the "pearl of the English crown" - India. As you know, Napoleon's calculations did not materialize. In fairness, it should be noted that Chichagov allowed a certain amount of arrogance and had no doubt that the emperor would go along with his "diversionary strike" plan. The vanguard of the Danube army headed from Wallachia to Serbia under the command of Major General Count I.K. Orurka consisting of 17.250 infantrymen, 1.950 cavalrymen, 550 Cossacks, 12 battery and |
 Emperor Napoleon |
However, Emperor Alexander did not share the admiral's ambitions. He was most concerned about Napoleon's invasion of Russia in June 1812. In his letter to the admiral, he wrote: “Your plan is very extensive and very audacious, but who can vouch for its success? And in anticipation of the results, we lose the impact that our diversionary strike could have had on the enemy, and also for a long time we lose the ability to dispose of the troops under your command, sending them to Constantinople. Not to mention the general shocking impression that such a decision will make on our compatriots and allies - the British and Swedes, does this not add to our doubts ... ". 32
Alexander I ordered the Danube Army to go north, force the Dniester and be ready to strike at the flank of the Napoleonic army. The admiral hurried to fulfill the emperor's command. The vanguard of the Danube army had to be withdrawn from Serbia. Parts of the Danube army went on the road when they were ready. Chichagov intended to reorganize the army beyond the Dniester and expected to join the Third Army of General A.P. Tormasov on September 7th. So it was, as the admiral had planned.
III
At the first stage of the war under the onslaught of Napoleon's superior forces, the Russian armies were forced to retreat. Napoleon's attempt to defeat the main forces of the Russian troops during the battle near Smolensk ended in failure. Russian troops under the command of Barclay de Tolly continued to retreat inland. Napoleon was already near Gzhatsk, when, under pressure from Russian public opinion, dissatisfied with the tactics of retreat and demanding that the foreign commander-in-chief be replaced by a Russian general, Alexander I had (despite personal hostility) to appoint M.I. Kutuzov instead of Barclay de Tolly.In the Rescript of the Emperor sent to all the commanders of the armies(including Tormasov and Chichagov) said: “Various important inconveniences that occurred after the connection of the two armies impose on me the necessary duty to appoint a chief commander over all of them. I have chosen for this infantry general Prince Kutuzov, to whom I subordinate all four armies, as a result of which I order you, with the army entrusted to you, to be in his exact command. I am sure that your love for the Fatherland and zeal for service will also open the way for you to new merits, which I will be very pleased to distinguish with proper awards. 33
On September 7, 1812, the Battle of Borodino took place. during which the Russian troops, by stubborn defense and at the cost of the lives of 44 thousand Russian soldiers, thwarted the Napoleonic plan to defeat the Russian army in a general battle, bled Napoleon's troops, which predetermined the defeat of the French army. Acute pain in the heart of every patriot of Russia echoed the news of Napoleon's entry into Moscow, engulfed in fire.
Shortly before the entry of the French into Moscow Supreme Commander M.I. Kutuzov sent an order to the commander of the Third Army, General Tormasov, to stop offensive operations against the army of the Austrian General Schwarzenberg and go to save Moscow. In the "Notes" of Admiral Chichagov, there is the following entry on this subject:
... we were forty-five days from Moscow, and Napoleon stood at the gates of the capital, at that moment Kutuzov sent this order, which we received only eleven days after the French entered Moscow. On the other hand, Schwarzenberg and Reqnier, having learned about Tormasov's departure, would have returned to their previous tactics and would have forced me either into an unequal struggle, or into a retreat, giving into their hands two of the most fertile provinces of the empire. Therefore, Tormasov easily decided not to obey and not separate from me until Schwarzenberg was driven back beyond the Russian border, or at least expelled from Volhynia.. 34
Chichagov received a similar order from Kutuzov, who, for the same reasons as Tormasov, found it impossible to carry out this order. In the future, Kutuzov will present a claim to Chichagov that he allegedly does not consider it necessary to obey the orders of the supreme commander in chief. This was only the beginning of Kutuzov's line to "settle accounts" with Chichagov, his compromise as a commander. The key to understanding Kutuzov's dislike for Chichagov is that the latter "knew Kutuzov well", having detailed information that the future savior of Russia from Napoleon was not only not without sin, but was sometimes directly involved in the crimes that were happening in the Danube army.
But let us return to the stage of the Patriotic War, which preceded the start of the expulsion of the Napoleonic army from Russia. On August 30, 1812, Emperor Alexander sent Kutuzov with the adjutant wing, Colonel A.I. 1) to concentrate large forces in the rear; 2) drive his side corps out of Russia, namely: Prince Schwarzenberg and Reynier to Galicia and the Duchy of Warsaw, and MacDonald, Saint-Cyr and Oudinot to Prussia; 3) Napoleon with the main forces to eradicate to the last. Prince Kutuzov was supposed to hold Napoleon and defeat him from the front, while the troops stationed in the provinces of Vitebsk, Livonia, Volyn and Minsk were assigned to stand in the enemy's operational path. There were two ways for them to act: 1) from the north, across the Dvina, to the provinces of Vilna and Minsk, by the corps of Counts Wittgenstein and Steingel; 2) from the south, in the provinces of Grodno and Mitavskaya, by the armies of Chichagov and Tormasov.
The combined troops of these four generals were to break the side corps, left by Napoleon in his rear, move to his messages and block his way back from Russia ...
The main advantage of the operational plan was that the army of Chichagov and Tormasov and the corps of Counts Wittgenstein and Steingel ceased to operate separately and received one common, cumulative, concentrated direction. Each of these four divisions of the troops had to keep up with the appointed places at the appointed time, determined in the plan. 35 Having received the plan of the emperor, Kutuzov said that he "completely shares the opinion of his majesty, confesses the benefits and benefits that may result from the operational plan," but, unfortunately, the order sent by Kutuzov to Chichagov was "not in everything similar to the actions proposed in the plan." 36 Kutuzov considered it good to cancel his order to Chichagov and Tormazov and inform them of his decision by sending Chernyshev to them.
Transfer of the Russian army to the Kaluga road put her in the most advantageous position relative to the enemy, whose communications with their rears were open to attacks by Russian troops and partisans. The retreat of the Napoleonic army from Russia turned into a disorderly flight. According to the figurative expression of L.N. Tolstoy, "... the cudgel of the people's war rose with all its formidable and majestic strength and, without asking anyone's tastes and rules, with stupid simplicity, but with expediency, without analyzing anything, it rose, fell and nailed the French until the whole invasion died." 37
It should be emphasized that Emperor Alexander and Kutuzov had different approaches to the end of the Patriotic War of 1812. Having set himself the goal of expelling Napoleon from Russia, Kutuzov decided to end the war on the border. In the view of L.N. Tolstoy, Kutuzov’s strategy was reduced to the actions of a driver with a whip in his hands: “The Russian army had to act like a whip on a running animal. And an experienced driver knew that it was most beneficial to keep the whip raised, threatening them, and not to whip a running animal on the head. 38 The emperor, who dreamed of becoming the savior of Europe from Napoleon, wanted to capture him. The emperor ordered Chichagov to advance with his Danube Army to the Berezina River, where he would join the group of General P.Kh., advancing from the north. Wittgenstein, blocking the escape route for Napoleon and the remnants of his army. To help Chichagov, a part of the Third Army of General A.P. was given. Tormasov, who held back the onslaught of the Austrian general K. Schwarzenberg and the Saxon corps S. Reinier. “No one has ever experienced that lively joy that we experienced when we learned about the approach of the army of Admiral Chichagov. It must be admitted that the only rare merit of this general was the merit of coming to our aid with such amazing speed, without stopping in front of obstacles that he had to overcome, such as crossing rivers made dangerous by floods; in a short period of time he made the longest journey from Bucharest to Lukovo. We owe the successes of our army only to this rapid connection, perhaps the influence on the successes of the great army. In any case, it must be admitted that he saved the honor of our army by not allowing (to the Austrian Schwarzenberg - V.Yu.) to throw us back to Kyiv, and more importantly, all these excellent provinces did not fall into the hands of the enemy. 39 These words belonged to General E.I. Chaplits, who, according to L.M. Chichagov, was "one of the most valiant heroes of our 1812, and the bravest cavalry generals", "enjoyed general respect" and "was an extremely modest and conscientious person."
Let us leave for the time being the details of the joint actions of General Tormasov and Admiral Chichagov and return to the analysis of the plan to encircle Napoleon on the Berezina. How real was the possibility of its practical implementation? First of all, let us clarify that the idea of such an operation never belonged to Kutuzov, as some sources claim. Moreover, Kutuzov considered such a plan unrealistic in the conditions where and how it was proposed to implement it. The idea of surrounding and capturing Bonaparte belonged to the sovereign (and to be precise, it was suggested to Alexander I by Pfuel, one of his military advisers). L.N. Tolstoy proved in detail the impossibility of realizing such a plan.
The whole thoughtful plan of cutting off and catching Napoleon with the army was similar to the plan of a gardener who, driving the cattle that had trampled his ridges out of the garden, would run to the gate and start beating this cattle on the head. However, what could be said in justification of the gardener would be that he was very angry. But even this could not even be said about the compilers of the project, because it was not they who suffered from the trampled ridges.
But besides the fact that cutting off Napoleon with the army was pointless, it was impossible. It was impossible
Firstly, because, since experience shows that the movement of columns for five miles in one battle never coincides with the plans, the probability that Chichagov, Kutuzov and Wittgenstein converged on time at the appointed place was so negligible that it was equal to impossibility, as Kutuzov thought, even when he received the plan, he said that sabotage over long distances did not bring the desired results.
Secondly, it was impossible because, in order to paralyze the force of inertia with which Napoleon's army was moving back, it was necessary without comparison to have larger troops than those that the Russians had.
Third, it was impossible because the military word cut off does not make any sense. You can cut off a piece of bread, but not an army. It’s impossible to cut off the army, block its way, because there are always a lot of places around where you can get around, and there is a night during which nothing is visible, which military scientists could be convinced of even from the examples of Krasny and Berezina. It is impossible to take prisoner without the one being taken prisoner not agreeing to it, just as it is impossible to catch a swallow, although you can take it when it sits on your hand ...
Fourthly, and most importantly, this was impossible because never, since the existence of the world, there has been a war under those terrible conditions under which it took place in 1812, and the Russian troops, in the pursuit of the French, strained all their strength and could not do more without destroying themselves. 40
Tolstoy calls Chichagov "one of the most passionate cutters and overturners", those. supporter of the implementation of the plan of Emperor Alexander. A number of questions arise: Why did Chichagov undertake the implementation of the “encirclement plan” with such zeal? Wanted to please the emperor? Or did he not have enough wisdom and military experience to understand the disastrous nature of such a plan? Most likely, the admiral was a prisoner of illusions, mistakenly believing that all other participants in the proposed operation - both Kutuzov and Wittgenstein - would strictly observe the "rules of the game", ensure precise coordination and coordination of their actions and close the ring around Napoleon and his army on the Berezina. Of course, it was very clear to Chichagov that his army alone, even reinforced by Tormasov's army, would not be able to encircle Napoleon. In addition, it was necessary to guess in advance the direction of the retreating French, to know, finally, where Napoleon himself was, who, by deceptive maneuvers, tried to mislead the Russian command about his own movement and find a loophole in the positions of the Russians in order to slip out of the trap that was being prepared for him.
How did events unfold? after the unification of the troops of Chichagov and General Tormasov into the Third Army under the unified command of the admiral? It should be borne in mind that the command of the Russian armies solved a twofold task: on the one hand, to prevent the advance of the Austrians and Saxons to the area where they could provide direct support to the retreating army of Napoleon, and, on the other hand, to connect with the northern grouping of Count Wittgenstein and thereby block the French way to retreat from Russia. Napoleon repeatedly reminded Schwarzenberg that his main task was to monitor the movements of the armies under the command of Chichagov and try to "keep them in Lithuania."
On September 10, both Russian armies, numbering 60 thousand people, acted in the direction of Vladimir Volynsky in order to push the right wing of Schwarzenberg's troops away from the Bug and deprive him of direct communication with Warsaw, from where Schwarzenberg received reinforcements. Schwarzenberg, whose troops, together with the Saxon corps of Reinier, consisted of only 40 thousand people and were significantly inferior to the Russian armies in numbers, sought to evade the battle with the Russians. He retreated behind the Bug and headed for Brest. As a result, in this part of the theater of operations, the enemy was driven out of the Russian Empire.
Having occupied Brest, Chichagov was forced to stay there for a total of three weeks. despite the order he received from Kutuzov to go to Minsk. Summed up the delay in the delivery of food for the army. However, Chichagov did not waste his time and organized a number of successful operations. So, for example, the cavalry regiment under the command of the aide-de-camp Chernyshev made an eight-day raid on Warsaw, burned several enemy warehouses there, caused a panic that prompted Schwerzenberg to leave “watching Chichagov” for a while and go to defend Warsaw. Chernyshev managed to break away from the Austrians pursuing him, cross the Bug and return to Brest, bringing with him 200 prisoners. Another cavalry throw was carried out by General Chaplits, who suddenly appeared in Slonim, where a regiment was formed from the "rebellious Lithuanians" under the command of the Polish General J. Konopka. Konopka, 13 officers and 235 "lower ranks" were taken prisoner, the treasury (200,000 francs) was seized, and the regiment deprived of command fled.
Time hurried, and Chichagov was still standing in Brest because of the lack of food supplies and because of the fear that Schwarzenberg would follow the Russian army as soon as Chichagov left Brest. Under these conditions, Chichagov decided to divide the united army into two unequal parts: leave one part under the command of General Osten-Saken behind him as a barrier to contain the Austrians and Saxons, and with the other part, go on a campaign to Minsk and further to the Berezina.
This last part of Chichagov's army included two vanguards- Count Lambert and Chaplits and three corps under the command of Essen, Voinov and Sabaneev (the last two corps were directly subordinate to Count Langeron). Lieutenant General Osten-Sacken led the first group, consisting of two corps of Bulatov and Count Lieven, with the task of holding Schwarzenberg and Reynier and, if necessary, taking offensive actions against them. At the same time, Osten-Saken was supposed to cover the Volyn and Podolsk provinces. Ertel was ordered to go from Mozyr to the Hegumen and join the army there. The Leaders detachment, which returned from Serbia and was in the Volyn province, was ordered to head from Pinsk to Nesvizh, where to join the army. The marches were planned in such a way that before joining the army, Ertel and Leaders had to comb the space between the Berezina and Pripyat and clear it of the enemy troops stationed there. October 15 Chichagov was at Chernavchitsy. In the event of an attack by Schwarzenberg on Osten-Saken, located near Brest on the banks of the Bug, Chichagov was ready to return and help him. In Chernivtsi, Chichagov learned that Dyuryut's division from Augereau's corps had joined Schwarzenberg. The number of Schwarzenberg's troops increased to 50,000 against 18,000 at Osten-Sacken. Having sent the Essen corps to Osten-Saken, Chichagov had an army of 32,000 people, but with the addition of the Leaders detachment (3,500 people) and Ertel (15,000 people) to the army, his army would increase to 50,000 people.
October 20 Chichagov arrived in Pruzhany, from where he moved through Selets, Smolyanitsa and Ruzhany to Slonim, where he arrived on October 25th. Meanwhile, Schwarzenberg, ahead of Saken by two marches, appeared between Volkovisk and Zelve. Chichagov sent Chernyshev's adjutant wing with a Cossack regiment to impede the advance of Schwarzenberg by occupying Derechin and Zelva. In Zelva, Chernyshev learned that the Austrian General Mohr was going from Grodno to Mosty on the Neman, where he intended to organize a crossing and connect with Schwarzenberg. Chernyshov managed to prevent the crossing and destroy the bridges across the Zelva River, thereby hindering the advance of Schwarzenberg. Chichagov took advantage of this hitch, continuing to move towards Nesvizh.
Pursuing Chichagov's army, Schwarzenberg tried to fulfill Napoleon's repeated orders. about the need to "keep in Lithuania" the armies of Chichagov and Tormasov, in which Napoleon saw "the whole purpose of the actions" of Schwarzenberg. Having learned about the movement of Schwarzenberg and Reynier, Osten-Sacken overtook Reynier in Volkovisk and almost captured him. Osten-Saken managed to eventually retreat to Brest, dragging Reinier and Schwarzenberg, who came to his aid, with him. The task set by Chichagov to cover the rear of his army from the enemy grouping was performed brilliantly by Osten-Saken.
It should be noted that Chichagov tried to comply with the terms and routes of troop movement as much as possible, provided for by the St. Petersburg plan of joint action for the second period of the campaign of 1812. At the same time, he understood that the success of the implementation of this plan depended on the availability of reliable communication between the commanding officers of large formations of troops and the provision of interaction between them. That is why, while in Slonim, Chichagov instructed Chernyshev with a Cossack regiment to head through the territory occupied by the enemy to Wittgenstein, who was in Chashniki, and notify him of the Danube army moving to Borisov and Chichagov's further plans. Chernyshev managed to overcome the distance of 400 miles in four days and establish a direct connection between Chichagov and Wittgenstein.
On the march from Slonim to Nesvizh, Chichagov learned that a large enemy detachment appeared near Nesvizh and Novosvezhin, sent from Minsk by the French governor N. Bronnikovsky. This detachment, under the command of General F. Kossetsky and numbering 5,000 people, was formed from Lithuanian regiments and French marching battalions. Count K.O. was detached against Kossetsky. Lambert and in the course of successful operations, this detachment was defeated. The success of Count Lambert opened the way to Minsk.
On the way to the army, Chichagov was supposed to join F.F. Ertel’s corps stationed in Mozyr, which, however, did not follow Chichagov’s order and remained in Mozyr for various reasons, the main of which was epizootic (cattle death). In order to compensate for the absence of troops that did not come with Ertel, Chichagov ordered Osten-Saken to send P.K. Essen's corps to join the Danube army. Replacing Ertel with General S.A. Tuchkov, Chichagov ordered him, along with his corps, to go through Rogachev and Mogilev to join the Danube army. A detachment under the command of N.I. Leaders, who came from Serbia, also joined the Danube army. Thus, Chichagov vigorously created under his command a fairly strong grouping of troops, the basis of which was the Danube army.
On November 5, Chichagov arrived in Minsk. The French governor Bronnikovsky with the garrison fled from Minsk to Borisov. The enemy did not have time to destroy the stocks of bread, gunpowder, and lead accumulated in Minsk over three months. In the warehouses (“shops”) of Minsk, there were so many foodstuffs that it would have been enough for the Danube army for a month. The letter of Alexander I received by the admiral said: “You see how necessary it is for you to try to connect with Count Wittgenstein in the vicinity of Minsk or Borisov and meet Napoleon's army face to face, at a time when Prince Kutuzov is pursuing it. I present to your discretion the choice of the most convenient means to achieve the goal, so as not to let Napoleon out of our borders and destroy his army, placing it between you, Prince Kutuzov, Count Wittgenstein ... Calculate the distance and time ... you can keep up at the present time. 41 Without stopping in Minsk and trying to make up for the time spent on his forced “standing” in Brest, Chichagov marched on Borisov. Ahead of the Danube army, the vanguard of General Count K.O. Lambert, who approached Borisov on November 9 at dawn. Marching columns of enemy troops under the command of General Dombrovsky entered Borisov the night before and failed to take up defense when they were suddenly attacked by Count Lambert (Count Lambert was wounded during the night assault). With a bayonet attack and fire from the artillery that came to the rescue, Lambert's vanguard made its way to the bridge over the Berezina and captured Borisov. Dombrovsky was driven back to the Orsha road. On November 10, Chichagov and his headquarters arrived in Borisov, completing the crossing of the Danube army from the Bug to the Berezina and ahead of Napoleon, who at that moment was only crossing the Dnieper. So Chichagov followed the emperor's instructions, cutting, as it turned out, the main route that Napoleon planned to use to retreat from Russia. According to Lieutenant General A.I. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, author of the book “Patriotic War. Description of the war of 1812-1815”, “... Chichagov thought not only about blocking the road to the enemies. He stretched his views further, and, hoping, as it really seemed probable, to take Napoleon himself prisoner, gave the following order to all detachments and parties: Napoleonic army on the run; the culprit of the disasters of Europe - with her. We are on his way. It may be easy that the Almighty will be pleased to stop his anger by betraying it to us. Why do I wish that the signs of this man were known to all. He is small, dense, pale, with a short and thick neck, a large head, and black hair. For greater reliability, to catch and bring to me all the small ones. I am not talking about the reward for this captive: the well-known bounties of our Monarch are responsible for this". 42
Kutuzov, who commanded the main forces of the Russian army, crowding Napoleon's army, stopped in the city of Kopys, Mogilev province. Forced to wait for the delivery of food and the construction of a bridge in Kopys, Kutuzov could not soon cross the Dnieper. In addition, the main army, which marched non-stop from Tarutin itself and on the way withstood three bloody battles with the French near Maloyaroslavets, Vyazma and Krasny, needed rest and some reorganization, so that, in the words of Kutuzov, "there was something to come to the border." Having detached his vanguard under the command of M.A. Miloradovich in pursuit of the retreating army of Napoleon, to which the formations of M.I. Platov and A.P. Yermolov were attached, Kutuzov, according to some historians, was in no hurry to join Chichagov’s army. In addition, he held Wittgenstein, ordering him not to engage in battle and even retreat behind the Neman if he was attacked by superior enemy forces. Wittgenstein, however, was instructed to attack Victor's corps, and even then, only if it could be defeated.
Disorganization in the management of the Russian troops was also introduced by Emperor Alexander himself with his orders, given to Chichagov and Wittgenstein over Kutuzov's head. Kutuzov, on the other hand, pretended that he was obeying the orders of the emperor. In addition, Kutuzov could not forget past grievances and tried to take revenge on Alexander I in a rather sophisticated way, trying, in particular, to present the "emperor's favorite" Chichagov as an inept commander who did not follow the orders of the commander in chief. To this end, Kutuzov sent orders to Chichagov, marking them backdated, distorted or destroyed Chichagov's reports. In his own reports to the emperor, Kutuzov deliberately included deliberately false information, claiming that he, pursuing the enemy, had already reached the Berezina, while he still had to overcome 150 kilometers to the Berezina. The following fact, described by Chichagov himself in his memoirs ("Notes"), speaks quite eloquently about how Kutuzov "supported" the actions of Chichagov's army. It was necessary to capture the line along the Berezina without delay. We were forced to move by feel, because. the locals didn't want to give us information, and we didn't have accurate maps. The maps were indeed taken just before the war, but there was not enough time to make engravings on them, and Kutuzov, who had the manuscripts of the maps, despite my numerous requests, did not agree to either hand them over to me, or at least send me one of the officers who worked with them (the maps). He kept them in his headquarters, located seven passages from the theater of operations. 43 Such an attitude of Kutuzov to the admiral's repeated requests was more like sabotage, the result of which was unjustified losses in manpower and weapons of Chichagov's army. For example, performing the task of determining the location of the main enemy forces and forced to act at random in unfamiliar terrain, the division of the vanguard of the Chichagov army, commanded by General Palen, unexpectedly collided with the advanced column of the French army under the command of Oudinot. In the face of far superior enemy forces, the vanguard retreated to Borisov. During the retreat, the vanguard lost six hundred people and a lot of property, among which was a wagon with provisions and dishes of the admiral. Petersburg, it was reported that the avant-garde had been completely destroyed, lost four thousand killed and wounded, and the enemy had allegedly captured all the crews, the office and secret correspondence of the admiral. To whom and why it was necessary to send such disinformation is not difficult to guess. 44
| With all the merits of Kutuzov to the Fatherland one cannot fail to see that he was a great master of intrigue and compromising evidence against those whom he considered his "offenders." Speaking of Kutuzov, Chichagov, in one of his letters to Count S.R. Vorontsov bluntly declares: "As for intrigue, deceit and arrogance, he was the first general in Europe" 45 . In the end, Chichagov was actually framed by Kutuzov under the threat of destruction by a superior enemy. * At first glance, it may seem monstrous the very idea that Kutuzov, who had a reputation as a military leader who valued the lives of his soldiers, led the matter to what could turn into, if not death, then at least heavy losses for the Danube army. This turn of events could be interpreted as the result of Admiral Chichagov's "inability" to command the ground forces. And since Chichagov was the tsar’s nominee, then, by compromising the admiral, Kutuzov thereby “strike” Alexander I as well. This, apparently, was the essence of the intrigue conceived by Kutuzov. | * “... In a letter to Count S.R. Vorontsov dated September 15, 1813, P.V. Chichagov refers to the events that preceded Napoleon's crossing of the Berezina, noting the facts of deliberate distortion of reality in Kutuzov's reports to St. Petersburg. It is enough to re-read them, looking at the map, to be convinced of all the machinations and quackery of this person and others like him. Being more than 100 miles away on the flank of the enemy's tail at the moment when the latter crosses the Berezina, he writes with incredible impudence that he is chasing him, and they believe him. As for Wittgenstein, he goes in the opposite direction to the one he should have followed, and then boasts that he forced Bonaparte to cross the Berezina. So he fought with me, because I was on the other side to prevent the transition ... He set me up for destruction by the enemy surrounding me». |
| What really happened? As mentioned above, the admiral, trying to fulfill the orders of the emperor, went out to the Berezina alone. At that time, Wittgenstein was three days away, and Kutuzov was five days away from the Berezina. The plan of interaction between Chichagov, Wittgenstein and Kutuzov remained on paper. Kutuzov with the army set out from Kopys only on November 14, i.e. on the same day when Napoleon arrived from Borisov to the place where he decided to build his own crossing. Chichagov and his subordinate generals were unable to timely organize the collection of reliable intelligence information about the whereabouts of Napoleon himself, his tactical and strategic plans, and the deployment of his troops. They limited themselves only to sending separate cavalry patrols to the enemy's near rear and sometimes acted at random. Napoleon could not but take advantage of this blunder of the Russian command. With the help of a deceptive maneuver, he managed to mislead Chichagov about the true place of his crossing over the Berezina. Napoleon ordered his sappers to build a false crossing across the Berezina south of Borisov, and he secretly headed north with his guards and went to a narrow river bed near the village of Studenka. |  Encirclement of the French army near the Berezina. open large drawing |
Since the left bank of the Berezina from Veselov to Uholod was occupied by enemy troops, It was difficult for Chichagov to guess, firstly, where Napoleon planned to cross the Berezina - above Borisov or below, and, secondly, where he intended to retreat after the crossing - to Vilna or Minsk. Russian military historian A.I. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky rightly noted that “in such cases, it is accepted as a rule: keeping the troops in aggregate, stand in the central point and be at an equal distance from places where the enemy can arrange a crossing, move towards it at the first news of that, oppose possible obstacles to crossing the river, or, if this fails, attack with all your might on part of the troops that have already managed to cross. This is what Chichagov did at first. All November 12th, i.e. the day after, when, after the rearguard was defeated, he was forced to return to the right bank of the Berezina, he stood at the Borisov fortification, which was the central point of crossings on the Berezina, with detachments observing the space from Zemin to Usha and destroying rafts and materials on the river that could serve the enemy for building bridges. 46 Chichagov sent a detachment of Chaplitsa along the right bank of the Berezina north to Zembin, and a detachment of Count Orurka south to the town of Berezino.
Chichagov continued to stand with his army at Borisov, when he received an instruction from Kutuzov "to take precautionary measures in case Napoleon goes down the Berezina to the side of Bobruisk, so that, crossing there, he will turn to Igumen and Minsk" 47 . Leaving part of his army at Borisov, Chichagov with his main reserve set out on November 13 in a southerly direction to Zabashevichi, where the next day he received a report from Orurk about Napoleon's decision to prepare a crossing at Studenka. In Suvorov's swift march, Chichagov and his army returned to the bridgeheads near Borisov.
On the day when Napoleon was walking up the Berezina from Borisov to Studenka, Count Wittgenstein was in Kostritsy, where he learned very belatedly about the French choice of a place to cross the Berezina. The lack of accurate information about the enemy and ignorance of the terrain did not allow Wittgenstein to strike from the north at the Studenka crossing, which was not protected from the flank. The road to Studenka through Veselovo turned out to be impassable for Wittgenstein's artillery, and he decided to take a detour to Borisov, where he, using his numerical superiority, cut off L. Partuno's division and forced it to capitulate.
By order of Chichagov, a pontoon bridge was built across the Berezina to communicate with the Danube Army, Count Wittgenstein, who arrived in Borisov, and the troops of Generals M.I. Platov and A.P. Yermolov, detached by Kutuzov. Chichagov agreed with Count Wittgenstein on joint actions against the Napoleonic army crossing the Berezina. It was agreed that Chichagov would ensure the concentration of a grouping near Stakhov, consisting of half of the Danube army, the corps of General Platov and 14 battalions of General Yermolov, ready to attack the Napoleonic troops that could cross the Berezina. And Wittgenstein will pursue Napoleon's rear guard, commanded by Marshal K. Victor, to the crossing.
Looking ahead, let's say that despite the fierce fighting on both banks of the Berezina Chichagov and Wittgenstein failed to implement the agreement reached between them: on the right bank, Chichagov’s attempts to break the crossing units of the French did not give the desired results, and on the left bank, Wittgenstein, having spent a lot of time disarming Portuno’s division in Borisov, slowly increased pressure on the desperately resisting enemy, allowing Victor’s rearguard to avoid complete defeat.
From the high left bank, Napoleon watched the movements of Russian huntsmen and Cossacks across the river, which were located in a lowland near the swamp that separated them from the crossing, and had the ability to interfere with the movement of the French through the Berezina with fire. Napoleon ordered to equip positions for 40 large-caliber guns on a hill near Studenka to cover the crossing and start building bridges. The French did not have pontoons; they were burned during the retreat from Moscow. Therefore, Oudinot ordered to cut down the forest and dismantle the huts of the neighboring village. The building materials obtained in this way were intended for the construction of two bridges across the river.
| Even before the construction of bridges began, Napoleon ordered a detachment of cavalrymen to cross the Berezina, taking an infantryman to each. Ferries with infantry sailed with them. So the bridgehead was captured on the right bank near the crossing under construction. Oudinot's corps was the first to cross the constructed bridge, to which Napoleon ordered to gain a foothold on the bridgehead, capture the Zembinsky defile and check how good the bridges and gati on the road to Vilna were. After making sure that the road to Vilna was practically free, Napoleon decided that Ney would cross to the right bank, and he himself would follow him with his guard. Having occupied the Zanivki farm on November 15, Napoleon followed the crossing, along which the French units and convoys hurried, heading straight for the road to Vilna, in a continuous stream, crowding each other. |  Battle of the Berezina November 14-17, 1812 open large drawing |
The Russian corps located in Zembin was small in order to interfere with the crossing of the French or control the Zembinsky defile, without risking being destroyed. However, the miscalculation of the command of this corps was that it did not take care in advance of the need to disable the road to Vilna in the area of the Zembinsky defile, burning bridges and gati there. As one French author wrote, “If the Russians burned the Zembinsky bridges, then we would have no choice but to turn to Minsk, to the left, where Chichagov’s army was, because there were impassable swamps several leagues to the right ... Napoleon would not have had any means of salvation.” Even more expressive was the statement of another Frenchman: “If only some Cossack took fire from his pipe and set fire to the bridges, then all our efforts and crossing the Berezina would be in vain. Taken in a narrow space between the swamps and the river, without food and shelter, exposed to an unbearable snowstorm, the main army and its emperor would be forced to surrender without a fight.
French retreat on the road to Vilna gave Napoleon the only chance to avoid capture himself, to save the remnants of his army. But for this it was necessary to push back from the crossing Kornilov's detachment, reinforced by Chaplitsa's cavalrymen, and as far as possible to prevent the advance of the reserve created by Chichagov in the Stakhov region. The combined detachment of the French was commanded by M. Ney, who advanced infantry against the Russians with the support of cavalry and tried to push the detachments of Kornilov and Chaplits into the forest. Chichagov, who arrived in Stakhov, sent two divisions under the command of General Sabaneev to the rescue of the Russian detachments, who ordered "to scatter more than half of his two divisions into arrows", considering the loose formation the most useful battle formation in a battle in a wooded area. Sabaneev's decision turned out to be erroneous, because. the scattered Russian infantrymen turned out to be easy prey for the French cavalry that broke into our orders. Only thanks to the counterattack of the Pavlograd hussars under the command of Chaplits, it was possible to overturn the enemy cavalry and force the French to retreat. And the troops of the Chichagov reserve did not participate in the Stakhovsky battle. They stood still and waited in the wings, when it was necessary to pursue and finish off the enemy retreating along the Vilna road.
Meanwhile, Victor and his corps began to cross the Berezina, ruthlessly making a passage for himself through the crowd of refugees and heaps of dead bodies on the bridges.
On the morning of November 17, Napoleon ordered the bridges to be burned. Addressing General J.B. Eble, who led the destruction of bridges, Napoleon said: “Clean up the dead bodies and throw them into the water; The Russians must not see our losses." On the same morning, Napoleon left Zanivki for Kamen, where his army fled, which was supposed to go to Vilna through Molodechno, Smorgon and Oshmyany. On the evening of November 23, in Smorgon, Napoleon gathered the marshals, announced to them his departure and transferred command of the remnants of his army to I. Murat. That same evening, under the protection of a platoon of horse rangers, Napoleon left for Paris. Marquis Armand Caulaincourt, who relentlessly accompanied Napoleon during the entire Russian campaign, this time was with his overlord and tried to remember his assessment of the results of the war with Russia. “I left Paris with the firm intention of stopping in Poland,” said Napoleon. “However, circumstances tempted me to move on. Perhaps it was a mistake to go to Moscow. Maybe I didn't need to stay there too long. But you know that from the great to the ridiculous is just one step. Be that as it may, let the descendants judge us.” “And what did Kutuzov do?” Napoleon continued, referring to the battle on the Berezina. “He and Wittgenstein killed Chichagov. All other Russian generals are worth more than this majestic old lady.” Caulaincourt wrote about everything said above in his memoirs.
Despite the fact that Napoleon had to pay a heavy price for crossing the Berezina, numbering in the thousands killed, maimed and abandoned to the mercy of fate, not to mention the material losses and moral damage of Napoleonic France, the expectations of the Russian emperor were not realized, because the enemy was not blocked from retreat, the enemy army was not exterminated to the last man, as ordered by the sovereign, and Napoleon himself was not captured.
In our opinion, no one except the author of the landmark novel "War and Peace" was able to convey the very atmosphere of what happened on the Berezina, and what resonance this event caused in the circles of the military elite of Russia: "The crowd of the French fled with an ever-increasing force of speed, with all the energy aimed at achieving the goal. She fled like a wounded animal, and she could not stand on the road ... The farther the French fled, the more pitiful their remnants were, especially after the Berezina, on which, as a result of the St. It was believed that the failure of the Berezinsky Petersburg plan would be attributed to him, and therefore dissatisfaction with him, contempt for him and teasing him were expressed more and more ... Especially after the army of the brilliant admiral and hero of St. Petersburg Wittgenstein joined the army, this mood and staff gossip reached its highest limits ... An old man, as experienced in court affairs as in military affairs, that Kutuzov, who in August of that year was elected commander-in-chief who, against the will of the sovereign, the one who removed the heir and the Grand Duke from the army, the one who, by his own power, contrary to the will of the sovereign, signed the abandonment of Moscow, this Kutuzov now immediately realized that his time was over, that his role had been played and that he no longer had this imaginary power.
However, Mikhail Illarionovich was not so simple, to plead guilty to the failure of the plan to capture Napoleon on the Berezina. He considered that he had an opportunity to settle old scores with his "offender" Chichagov, declaring the latter the main culprit for the fact that Napoleon slipped away from the "Berezinsky trap". To this end, Kutuzov hastened to send the following report to Emperor Alexander: “This (Napoleonic - V.Yu.) the army, one might say, on November 12, 13 and 14 was surrounded on all sides. The Berezina River, representing a natural barrier, was dominated by the army of Admiral Chichagov, for it was enough to occupy a post at Zembin and Borisov (a space of 18 miles) to prevent any enemy crossing. Wittgenstein's army from Lepel leaned towards Borisov and prevented the enemy from coming out from this side. The main vanguard of Platov's army and my partisans pressed the enemy from the rear, while the main army went in the direction between Borisov and the town of Berezin in order to prevent the enemy if he wanted to go to Igumen. From this position of our armies in relation to the enemy one should assume the inevitable death of the enemy; the unoccupied post at Zembin and the empty march of Chichagov’s army to the Zabashevichs (carried out by order of Kutuzov - V.Yu.) gave the enemy the convenience to cross at Studenka. 50 Kutuzov's report presented in a distorted light the actions of Chichagov's army, which alone managed to inflict crushing damage on the French army at the Berezina crossing, after which the "Great Army" actually ceased to exist as an army formation.
On November 17, 1812, Admiral Chichagov presented his report to Emperor Alexander about what happened on the Berezina: “Now, Sovereign, I must think that I will be reproached for not taking Bonaparte and his army, that I could have done it if I had probably guessed where he would pass and if I had put up a corps to block his path. For my part, I am convinced that the corps that I could detach, for example, in Zembin would not have produced more action than the one that defended the place where he wanted to find shelter. The river can be forded in many places, and in a very short time enough men can be brought across to take possession of the opposite bank under the protection of a strong battery. I had only 16,000 to 17,000 infantry, which alone can be counted in such a case, because the cavalry is completely useless. The corps in Zembin, 30 versts from Borisov, which I also had to hold, like the entire distance to the Berezina, could not be strong enough to withstand Napoleon's 60-70 thousandth army, which wants to penetrate; he would have become a victim before I could think of coming to his aid, especially since the enemy crossed my path and even my entire army would not be enough to keep him even for a day. Only a natural barrier could do this; in any other case, he would still have passed, and I would have had one corps less. If one now uses activity and totality in pursuit, as well as in future actions, then one can also inflict much harm on him, but to seize a person surrounded only by his guard or to destroy his army at once - this seems to me a chimera. However, Sovereign, I did everything possible to realize my own dream, but I was very well aware of the insurmountable obstacles generated by practice, when it is alien to imaginary theories. 51
According to L.M. Chichagov,“the crossing of the Berezina has hitherto been known only from the reports of officers of the French army, who represent the view of only one side, and from the stories of Russian historians who were not eyewitnesses of the events and who, moreover, were not allowed to tell the truth” 52. In this regard, it is appropriate to recall the words from a letter kept in the archives of General Dubrovin: “I see that in St. Petersburg they do not do justice to Chichagov at all ... Berezina, one might say, finished the French ... All the French say that they were completely ruined by the meeting with the Moldavian army (Chichagova - V.Yu.) at the Berezina.
According to Leonid Mikhailovich Chichagov,“There is no doubt that it was precisely ... Chichagov’s closeness to the emperor and Kutuzov’s anger, for replacing him in the Danube army, that caused the fall that decided the matter under Berezina. Kutuzov's insidious actions regarding the admiral have already been exposed, but one cannot help but be surprised that it took many decades for this to happen. The mass of contemporaries and witnesses of the crossing then declared verbally and in writing about Chichagov's innocence and that, in any case, the responsibility for the crossing should fall on Kutuzov and Wittgenstein more than on the admiral, but these persons were clamped down on their mouths, and their notes were torn and hidden under a bushel. 54
Participants of the Patriotic War of 1812 spoke in defense of Chichagov
Denis Davydov, Lieutenant General M.R. Vorontsov, who fought under the admiral and later became a field marshal, generals A.P. Ermolov, Chaplits and many others.
| In my diary Denis Davydov wrote: “From three sides, Chichagov, Wittgenstein, Kutuzov and detachments of Platov, Yermolov, Miloradovich, Rosen and others hurried to the Berezina. Chichagov’s army, which Kutuzov believed to have a strength of sixty thousand people, contained only thirty thousand, of which about seven thousand cavalrymen ... Wittgenstein’s army also followed in the direction of the Berezina ... it advanced slowly and hesitantly ... Kutuzov, for his part, avoided meeting with Napoleon and his guards, not only did not persistently pursue the enemy, but, remaining almost in place, was all the time significantly behind. This did not prevent him, however, from informing Chichagov about the appearance of enemy troops on his tail. His prescriptions, indicated in hindsight, were therefore delivered late to the admiral ... The admiral, whose army was half as weak as that expected by Prince Kutuzov, it was impossible alone, without the assistance of the army of the prince and Wittgenstein, who was far behind to block the path of Napoleon. 55 General Fyodor Orlov- adjutant wing of Alexander I, wrote: “... If the expected reinforcements had approached Admiral Chichagov, then not a single Frenchman would have crossed the river. In fact, with 20 thousand people, of which only 15 thousand infantry, it was not easy to guard the entire crossing over the river, the banks of which are completely covered with forests and swamps and overgrown with mistletoe, especially when 40 thousand Austrians and Saxons threatened these 20 thousand from the rear.. 56 Considering that the Berezina is not a full-flowing river like the Danube, Oder or Elbe, but a river full of fords and narrow places convenient for crossing, one cannot but agree with the words of General Orlov that “Napoleon did not need either cunning or art to make the crossing. This happened on November 14 (according to the old style - V.Yu.)». General A.P. Ermolov with his usual decisiveness, he defended the admiral. In his memoirs he wrote: “Admiral Chichagov, at the first conversation with me, turned out to be an excellent mind, and I feel indignantly how powerless the justification of my accusations placed on him”. General Yermolov further recalls: “Walking with my detachment along the high road to Vilna, Prince unexpectedly arrived for the night. Kutuzov and settled down to rest. I immediately appeared to him and his questions were lengthy about the battle of the Berezina. I managed to explain to him that Admiral Chichagov was not so much to blame as many would like to represent him ... I could easily see to what extent his dislike for the admiral extended. He did not like that I dared to justify him. But in my rank it was embarrassing to resolutely neglect my testimony, and Prince. Kutuzov did not attempt to persuade me to understand differently what I saw with my own eyes. He pretended to be extremely pleased that he had learned the truth, and assured me (although he did not assure me) that he would look at the admiral with completely different eyes, but that until now he was ready to meet him in an unpleasant way. He ordered me to submit after a note on the actions at the Berezina, but so that no one knew about it.. 58 |
 D. V. Davydov
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In a letter to Count S.R. Vorontsov dated May 25, 1813, P.V. Chichagov gives the following explanation to whether, in fact, it was possible to consider Napoleon's crossing the Berezina at Studenka as a deceitful maneuver: “What was the deception? The crossings were occupied (by Russians - V.Yu.); in the place that he (Napoleon) chose, he met a division, under whose fire he built bridges. If the deception is that he could not be prevented from building bridges, it is because this division was not strong enough to destroy everything that the enemy could risk in this case. But since the Russian army numbered no more than 25 thousand people, and Napoleon 120 thousand and more than 300 guns, he could carry out the crossing without deceiving the enemy. However, he lost here more than 30 thousand killed ... It is not known how many drowned in the Berezina, but there were whole squadrons: people and horses ".
About what happened next, says Denis Davydov:“Yermolov, an eyewitness to the Berezinsky events, presented to his brightest (Kutuzov - V.Yu.) a note in which he sharply outlined the true, in his opinion, reasons for the successful retreat of Napoleon. He offered it during the arrival of the prince in Vilna, who said to him on this occasion: my dear, give it to me when I have no one. This note, handed over to the prince shortly after, and significantly justifying Chichagov, was probably deliberately lost by his Serene Highness. 59
In his note “Patriotic War. 1812", published in June 1886 in the Russkaya Starina magazine, General Chaplits expressed his conviction that “the admiral ... considered it unthinkable to completely destroy the French army, when inside Russia it was considered possible; but he wanted to inflict such damage on the enemy army as could be fatal to it, and subsequently bring it to complete disorder. I consider it my duty to add that the operational plan was so reasonably drawn up that, despite all the mistakes made, the French army, pushed back to the other side of the Berezina, already considered itself dead ... What follows from all this and what sentence will an impartial military man pronounce? That all this was the result of the extreme accuracy applied by the admiral to the execution of the orders of his sovereign, and the selflessness of the troops under his leadership.
Contrary to uninformed people, it has been proven that the crossing of the Berezina will never be erased from the memory of the French nation and, while our troops gained fame in it, for the enemy army it will only be a sad memory of the loss of such excellent officers and of the mourning in which all families were clothed after it. The crossing will also serve as a lesson for the military, as proof that the bravery of a soldier, the recognized courage of officers, the military talents of marshals and generals alone cannot support the army in a change of happiness, but only its moral side creates discipline, and not for the sake of appearance, in order to weigh on a person, but on the basis of the principle of honor, which elevates the soul above adversity, brings us together and binds us to fight and makes us observe the honor of the sovereign, the people, the army, and not individuals".
“The honest character of General Chaplits was fully expressed in his note- wrote L.M. Chichagov.- He rebelled against this vile direction of throwing mud at his boss, in order to justify his own mistakes, and only explains the very facts, how the circumstances developed that prompted the admiral and himself to take certain actions and decisions .... From Chaplits's letters to Chichagov it can be seen that the former wanted to write another note solely for the purpose of justifying the admiral, but, as we know, Chichagov always refused many such requests, convinced that time and history would give him full justice without that ".
IV
Public opinion and state propaganda brought down a stream of slander on Chichagov almost accused of treason. G.R. Derzhavin ridiculed him in an epigram. The Russian fabulist I.A. Krylov did not stand aside from this, who wrote the fable “The Pike and the Cat” in 1813, in one of the heroes of which the admiral was easily recognized. The moral of this fable: “The trouble is, if the shoemaker starts the pies, and the pieman makes the boots” directly hinted at the fact that the sailor Chichagov did not take up his job, fighting on land. All his services to the Fatherland tried to consign to oblivion. He was not even included in the number of participants in the war of 1812, whose portraits were supposed to be placed in the Military Gallery of the Winter Palace.Considering it beneath my dignity to enter into polemics with slanderers, Chichagov wrote to his friend Count S.R. Vorontsov on September 15, 1813: “The crowd is blind everywhere, but it is doubly blind with us, because it is less enlightened and does not have the habit of using the eyes of the mind at all, which means it is very easy to mislead, but what to think about those who, knowing the truth, tolerate lies and slander?” 62 In the same letter, he notes with irony: “... my biggest fault is that I came to the place indicated by the emperor; others who did not come there (i.e. Kutuzov and Wittgenstein - V.Yu.), everyone was right. Unfortunately, I was so positioned that during the whole campaign my army pursued and beat the enemy in front, which is completely contrary to our new tactics, which read: To win is to retreat».
In a letter to Count Vorontsov dated May 25, 1813, Chichagov wrote:“... you need to know that I left the army not at all because of excessive sensitivity, but so that the service would not suffer because of the nitpicking of me by Marshal Prince. K. (Kutuzova - V.Yu.). He sought to interfere with everything I did, even if it was for his own glory ... I am accused of my mistakes, but what are they? Nobody told me this. The main reproach is that I did not capture Napoleon, but did I promise to do this? Was I given such an order? Did I have such a task? Was it possible to do this?"
To the above, we add that during an audience with Emperor Alexander in Vilna, where Chichagov arrived for new instructions on further actions in Prussia, Pavel Vasilyevich was given "the most gracious and most cordial in appearance" reception. “I asked then,” Chichagov recalled, “if His Majesty had any claims against me and that in this case I would only like to have the opportunity to explain myself. He answered me that he knew everything and that he had no reproaches against me.
It is not clear why Chichagov did not insist on an objective trial everything that happened on the Berezina. In his letter to Chichagov, Count S.R. Vorontsov wrote about this: “I am sure that if, before leaving the army, you would go to the headquarters in Kalisz and ask for an audience with the Emperor, insisting that Kutuzov be present, and that there, setting out to them everything that you did, presenting messages and orders, adding that, as you know from the Petersburg letters, you are accused in the army of allowing Bonaparte to slip away, your honor is too dear to you not to demand, not to stand even at the convening of a council of war to judge you; I am deeply convinced that Kutuzov would have been forced to justify you and confess in the presence of the Emperor that it is impossible to reproach you for anything. After that, they would be forced to reward you for the good you have done, and the same people who tormented you would be forced to retract their words. Then you would be able to leave not as a person who fell out of favor with the Sovereign, but as a person who is disgusted by the intrigues that your noble character has always hated ... I am surprised that you did not choose the course of action that you had to choose and which was the only decision that your position required". 65
But the question remains unanswered about why Emperor Alexander, who believed that the reason for the failure of the plan to encircle Napoleon on the Berezina was the "sluggishness of actions" of Kutuzov, did not defend the admiral. Putting all the blame on Chichagov “turned out to be convenient for everyone: both Kutuzov, who did not want and did not consider it possible to capture Napoleon, but at the same time did not want to speak out in this sense directly and openly, and the emperor, who knew the truth better than anyone, but did not dare to openly blame the victorious field marshal, who framed Chichagov with his deliberate slowness. The subjects needed a culprit for the fact that Napoleon slipped away, and Alexander, as he did more than once during his reign, sacrificed one of his closest associates. According to L.M. Chichagov, Admiral “Chichagov left his field precisely in the era when the glory of Alexander I reached its climax and, according to the immutable law of fate, began to decline after that. In the last decade of the reign of the Blessed One, Chichagov would have been out of place in any area of state administration: in the spiritual sphere, Photius was a fool, Arakcheev was in charge of the military forces, and the lights of public education were in the hands of the Magnitskys and the Runichs ... ". After all, one word of the emperor would be enough to put an end to the slanderous campaign against P.V. Chichagov.
But the reproaches of Chichagov's enemies continued. Unable to withstand the gossip and rumors hovering around his name, P.V. Chichagov retired in February 1813, when he surrendered command of his army and left the service.
| In this difficult time for Pavel Vasilyevich, Count S.R. tried to support him. Vorontsov, his old and devoted friend. Bitterly regretting Chichagov's decision to leave the army, he wrote to Chichagov: “... I am annoyed ... for the service and for yourself, since you asked to be released from command of the army that was entrusted to you. I believe that you did it from an excess of sensitivity. You learned that there are people who blame you for allowing Bonaparte, who was four or five times stronger than you, to cross the Berezina. This accusation thrown by envious people and palace intriguers, and spread by idiots who usually repeat what the intrigue wants to spread, this accusation, I say, hurt you, and instead of neglecting it, you refuse command. You don't know that you are playing into the hands of your enemies who want it. They wanted to deprive you of command and, not hoping to achieve this from the Sovereign, they took it from the other side, knowing your irritable touchiness. They started blaming you, spreading rumors about your alleged mistakes; it pricked you and you asked to be relieved of your command. This is exactly what your enemies wanted. |
 Semyon Romanovich Vorontsov |
A similar interpretation of the factors complicating the position of the admiral in the highest circles of Russian society, gives our contemporary, historian V.V. Averyanov. In his opinion, “of no small importance in the then political struggle for Pavel Vasilyevich was the presence of two court parties - one of the Western persuasion (for example, Count N.P. Rumyantsev, Minister of Foreign Affairs, M.B. Barclay de Tolly, Minister of War, etc.), the second - the Russian party (leading in which was Count A.A. Arakcheev). Chichagov did not adjoin either one or the other; led his own policy, which consisted in faithful service to the Sovereign and the Fatherland, even, perhaps, more to the latter. Not having his own political team capable of providing him with leadership, understanding politics as a sincere, sincere service to the Motherland and the law, Chichagov was subjected to slanderous attacks from both parties. His influence on the Sovereign aroused natural envy. It cannot be ruled out that the appointment of Pavel Vasilyevich Chichagov, a naval sailor, and by no means a land commander, as commander of the Danube army was only dictated by the Sovereign, but was caused by the influence of court parties, perhaps even associated with some foreign circles. Since this decision was carried out in the year of the Patriotic War, during the struggle with Bonaparte, Chichagov did not consider it possible to refuse such an appointment, although it clearly went beyond the scope of his professional skills and acquired knowledge ... ".
V
Leaving Russia, Pavel Vasilyevich also took away the ashes of his wife Elizabeth, which he buried in the English town of Beddington next to the rural temple, where in 1799 the ceremony of his marriage to Elizabeth took place. He lived in England, then in France, then in Italy, then in Switzerland, then again in France. Throwing around the countries of Europe after leaving Russia, Pavel Vasilyevich, apparently, sought to drown out his longing for his abandoned homeland. Finally, he decided to settle in France, in the Parisian suburb of Sso, bought in 1822 a mansion, which is still well known to local residents as the "Admiral's House".
He didn't feel like a recluse. In addition to his daughters and grandchildren, his house was visited by friends - immigrants from Russia, in particular, Count Rostopchin. His brother Vasily, who died in Sso in 1826, also lived with him. Pavel Vasilyevich bought a plot in the cemetery in Sso, where he buried his brother, bequeathing to bury himself next to his brother, whom he loved very much. Since 1816, P.V. Chichagov wrote his “Notes” (diaries), which covered the period from 1726 to 1834. He lived on his pension and the salary of a member of the State Council, in which he was listed until 1834. In 1825, in connection with the accession to the throne of the new sovereign Nicholas I, Pavel Vasilyevich congratulated him in writing on this occasion and at the same time asked if anything would change in his position as a member of the State Council. Nicholas I replied that the will of the late brother was law for him and would be invariably observed in relation to the admiral. But in reality it was not so. The disgrace of Emperor Nicholas thickened over him every year. The king, as it were, was looking for a reason to infringe on the position of the admiral. This occasion was the royal decree issued in 1834, which obliged all Russian subjects living abroad to return to Russia. Considering his position resolved once and for all, Chichagov was in no hurry to fulfill the requirements of the highest decree. As a result, he turned out to be almost the only one to whom the sanctions promised in the decree were applied. Chichagov was deprived of his few estates and order pensions, as well as benefits associated with membership in the State Council, which was terminated. But the proud spirit of the old and sick admiral was not broken. Having declared invalid his oath to Nicholas I, he sent all his orders and correspondence with Alexander I to the emperor in Russia. Pavel Vasilyevich and his daughter Ekaterina Pavlovna accepted English citizenship. In 1842, he sold his mansion in Sso and until the end of his days lived with his daughter Ekaterina Pavlovna in Paris. The old age of Pavel Vasilievich, who went blind early, was sad. Being a deeply religious person, as a true Christian, shortly before his death, he forgave all his enemies. He wanted to burn the manuscript of his Notes. But Ekaterina Pavlovna persuaded her father not to do this. The admiral left her his entire archive with the condition not to hand it over to anyone. He died in Paris on August 20, 1849 at the age of 82 and was buried in a cemetery in the Parisian suburb of Sesso.
His name is engraved on the gravestone. And the same name is still carried by two atolls in the Pacific Ocean.
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VI
As mentioned above, after the death of Pavel Vasilievich Chichagov his “Notes” remained, the content of which revealed the true background of the events that forced him to leave forever Russia, of which he was a true patriot. As people familiar with these diaries testified, they contain a lot of valuable historical material about the eras of the reign of Catherine II, Paul I and Alexander I, well-aimed characteristics of the main statesmen and many details based on hitherto unknown documents and letters. Admiral's daughter Ekaterina Pavlovna understood how important the publication of his diaries was for the restoration of her father's good name, his rehabilitation before History. She began to sort out her father's diaries and prepare them for publication. Her cousin Charles du Buzet, cousin of her husband, Admiral Eugene du Buzet, volunteered to help her in this. But this "well-wisher" pursued his own, selfish goals. In those years when the erupted in 1853-1856 was brewing. armed conflict between England and France with Russia (Crimean War), the opponents of Russia did everything possible to present it in the form of an enemy, treacherous and insidious. The cousin of Ekaterina Pavlovna decided to make money on this business. And tendentiously picking up individual fragments from the diaries, he published this selection in Paris under the guise of a "genuine diary" of Admiral Chichagov. The year 1858 has come. Comte du Bouzet took even more "brave" actions. Since it was unthinkable to create anything whole from the fragments of the Admiral's Notes he had stolen, this "writer" added his own fabrications, attributing them to Chichagov, and fabricated an entire pamphlet with the sole political goal of discrediting Russia and its role in world affairs. Fearing failure in France, he retired to Berlin and published this pamphlet there under the title Memoires de l "amiral Tchitchagoff", and then repeated the first edition, which quickly sold out, in Leipzig.It is impossible to calculate how much harm these unworthy publications have brought. honest name of Pavel Vasilyevich. One can imagine what the daughter of the Russian admiral went through, bearing the same cross with him since Napoleon's ill-fated crossing of the Berezina!
The urgent intervention of Ekaterina Pavlovna was required, to take this publication out of circulation and protect her father's honor. She appealed to the Paris court and won the case. One can only imagine at what cost, at the expense of her own health, she was able to stop a new wave of slander against her father. But her health did not allow her to complete the publication of the diary in full. A lucky break helped. In 1881, a young artillery officer Leonid Mikhailovich Chichagov was on a business trip in Paris, who visited a paralyzed relative. Ekaterina Pavlovna gave him the diaries and took from L.M. Chichagov a promise to publish them in full. Ekaterina Pavlovna Chichagova or, as her contemporaries knew her, Countess Catherine du Bouzet, died in Paris on September 11, 1882 at the age of 75. Half English by birth, but Russian in spirit and character, she bequeathed to bury herself according to the Russian Orthodox rite and left 100 francs to the organist of the church where she was buried, with the condition that during the service he sing the Russian hymn "God Save the Tsar." She is buried in the family tomb next to the graves of her father, Admiral P.V. Chichagov and her uncle General V.P. Chichagov at the cemetery in the Paris suburb of Sso.
Meanwhile, Leonid Mikhailovich Chichagov personally edited the manuscript handed over to him.
| The work done by Leonid Mikhailovich in preparing the diaries for publication is truly enormous. He carefully studied the materials of the family archive, thoroughly familiarized himself with the documents of the Archives of the Naval Ministry and the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Leonid Mikhailovich used the documents and various information at his disposal in footnotes to the text. Some of Leonid Mikhailovich's comments are so organically included in the text that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish where the admiral's thoughts are and where his. Thus, Leonid Mikhailovich actually becomes a co-author of the diaries of P.V. Chichagov. Leonid Mikhailovich understood and shared the views of his great-grandfather. They both appear before us as great patriots of Russia, deeply convinced that only Russians can be its true defenders: “You can buy for money a loyal subject who balances personal interest with diligence, energy and a sense of self-preservation, but it is impossible to buy a loyal patriot who is animated by an idea and inspires his compatriots, sacrificing himself out of love for his homeland; You can find the first at your neighbor as much as you like, and the second - only at home. Finally, a Frenchman can be an Englishman, an American, and an Englishman an Italian, a Spaniard, even a Russian can turn into a person of any nationality, but neither a Frenchman, nor an Englishman, nor a German will ever become Russian.. |  Priest L.M. Chichagov. 1894 |
Leonid Mikhailovich Chichagov organized the publication of the manuscript of the admiral's diaries in Russia in the magazine "Russian Antiquity". "Notes of Admiral Chichagov Concluding What He Seen and What He Thinks He Knew" were published, unfortunately, not completely, but partially. This is explained, firstly, by the fact that, having published 14 chapters of the Notes, the editors of Russkaya Starina stopped publishing them. Secondly (and this, apparently, the main thing) in the life and career of Leonid Mikhailovich Chichagov himself there was a sharp turn. The main business of his life was not a brilliant military career, but the service of the Russian Orthodox Church, to which he devoted himself without a trace, ascending to the highest positions in the church hierarchy,
| accepted a martyr's death for Vera at the NKVD training ground in Butovo near Moscow in 1937. The Russian Orthodox Church, having appreciated the feat of Metropolitan Seraphim Chichagov, elevated him to the rank of Holy New Martyr. Nowadays, an attempt to fully publish the "Diaries" of Admiral undertaken by the granddaughter of L.M. Chichagova Abbess Seraphim, abbess of the Moscow Mother of God-Smolensk Novodevichy Convent (in the world Varvara Vasilievna Chernaya). Through the efforts of Mother Seraphim, with the assistance of the Russian Foundation for Culture and the studio "TRITE" N.S. Chichagov. This publication covers the period from 1725 to 1801. A search and publication of the second part of the Notes, which cover the period from 1802 to 1834, is pending. This is done by the Charitable Foundation of the Noble Family of the Chichagovs, which was established in 1999 on the initiative of the late Mother Seraphim. |
 Abbess Seraphim. |
* * *
In the introductory article preceding the “Notes of P.V. Chichagov, Leonid Mikhailovich Chichagov noted that the nature of the admiral was not fully understood not only by his contemporaries, but also by descendants, historians. In the “Archives of Prince. Vorontsov”, its author P. Bertenev wrote: “Chichagov is an unusually curious person and will long be the subject of study not only historical, but also mental ... He belongs to the mournful list of Russian people who have done for the Fatherland incomparably less than what they were capable of and what they were called to” 71“Admiral Chichagov was ruined by the directness of his character,” noted Leonid Mikhailovich Chichagov. “Always young at heart, he thought that with such rules one could achieve truth in this world. He loved the Motherland more than anything in the world and loved honestly and sacredly, but he expressed his feelings, perhaps too peculiarly and loudly, which depended on his views and the very meaning he attached to the word. love for the fatherlands at". 72 As his motto, he adopted the well-known saying Etre et non paraitre (Be, not seem to be), which he carved into his signet and always carried with him.
This was Admiral Pavel Vasilyevich Chichagov, a man of amazing character and extraordinary fate, a skilled naval commander and a talented reformer of the Russian fleet, a prominent statesman and military strategist, an active participant in the Patriotic War of 1812. At the same time, nothing human was alien to him. He could also make a mistake, as was the case, for example, in the episode with the crossing of the Borisov bridge in the hope of speeding up the connection of the Danube army with the Wittgenstein group. But, as General Chaplits, who personally knew Chichagov, testifies, this was a mistake, “which had such unimportant consequences and turned out to be all the more excusable because the admiral preferred to prescribe it rather to himself than to allow anyone else to be blamed.”
The circumstances of his life and work were such that that this true patriot of his Fatherland turned out to be slandered and was forced to leave Russia forever, whose faithful son he had always been. May the reader forgive us for the numerous and lengthy quotations from various documents, but without this it is impossible to objectively and convincingly overthrow the stereotypes of the old thinking, the relapses of which are still found in the judgments of some modern authors about Admiral P.V. It's time to put an end to these rehashes, which have long set the teeth on edge with knowledgeable people. Let us recall how during the Great Patriotic War, at the most critical moment for our Motherland, our people were called upon to be inspired in the fight against Nazi fascism by appealing to the images of our great ancestors. Among the names of this cohort, the name of Admiral P.V. Chichagov, the same Chichagov, whose army on the Berezina inflicted irreparable damage to Napoleon, the damage after which the Napoleonic army ceased to exist as a military formation and turned into a fleeing crowd, could rightfully be named. It was the victorious crown of the Patriotic War of 1812. The contribution of Admiral Chichagov to this Victory is indisputable. And now, from a height of almost two hundred years that have passed since the Patriotic War of 1812, one cannot help but be surprised at the injustice with which we still treat the memory of the admiral in Russia. Go to the St. Petersburg Hermitage and there in the gallery of portraits of participants in the Patriotic War of 1812 you will not find a portrait of P.V. Chichagov, although in this war he commanded the most combat-ready army, sometimes fighting not by numbers, but by skill. In all of Russia, there was no place to erect a monument to this true patriot of Russia, true to the principles, ideals and traditions that make up the concept of the Code of Honor of a Citizen and Defender of his Fatherland. Two atolls in the Godforsaken region of the World Ocean and a gravestone with his name in a cemetery in the Parisian suburb of Sso only remind of Chichagov. To recreate the truth about the role and place in the history of Russia of such outstanding figures as Pavel Vasilyevich Chichagov was is the honorable duty of the current generation to the memory of our great ancestors.
read historical stories about the life and deeds of other famous Chichagovs can be found on this page.
Sources
1 P.V. Chichagov. "Notes". Russian Cultural Foundation. Studio "Trite" Nikita Mikhalkov. "Russian Archive". M. 2002, p. 7.
2 Ibid., p. 38.
3 Ibid. With. 92.
4 Ibid., p. 37.
5 "Archive of Admiral P.V. Chichagov". Issue One. SPb. 1885, p.8.
6 Ibid., p. 9.
7 Ibid., p. 8-9.
8 P.V. Chichagov. "Notes". Russian Cultural Foundation. Studio "Trite" Nikita Mikhalkov. "Russian Archive". M. 2002, p.545.
9 Ibid., p. 546-547.
10 "Archive of Admiral P.V. Chichagov". Issue One. SPb. 1885., p.12.
11 Ibid., p. 13.
12 Ibid., p. 16
13 "Russian Antiquities". SPb. Volume XXXVIII, 1883, June, p. 500.
14 Ibid., p. 493-494.
15 "Archive of Admiral P.V. Chichagov". Issue One. SPb. 1885., p.20.
16 Ibid., p. 7.
17 See N.V. Skritsky. "The most famous naval commanders of Russia". M. "Veche". 2000, p. 237-238.
18 "Archive of Admiral P.V. Chichagov". Issue One. SPb. 1885, p.27.
19 "Russian Antiquity". SPb. 1873, Volume VII, January. With. 44-45.
20 "Archive of Admiral P.V. Chichagov". Issue One. SPb. 1885, pp. 15-16.
21 Op. according to the publication "Great Russians". Issue Two. Appendix to the Almanac "Secret". M. Association of the Soviet. writers 1992, p.8.
22 "Archive of Admiral P.V. Chichagov". Issue One. SPb. 1885, p.29.
23 Ibid., p. 22.
24 Ibid., p.30.
25 From a letter from Count S.R. Vorontsov to Admiral P.V. Chichagov dated March 3, 1813.
26 "Archive of Admiral P.V. Chichagov". Issue One. SPb.1885, p.30.
27 Rescript of Emperor Alexander the First to Admiral P.V. Chichagov dated April 9, 1812.
28 Op. according to "Histoire de Consulat et de l" Empire. Vol. III. p. 492.
29 From the "Notes" of Admiral P.V. Chichagov (quoted by "Russian Archive", 1870, No. 9. Translation from French: pp. 15-16).
30 Ibid., p. 34.
31 A.I. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky. "Patriotic War. Description of the War of 1812-1815". Edition A.A. Kaspari. SPb. 1899, p. 107.
32 From the "Notes" of Admiral P.V. Chichagov (quoted by "Russian Archive", 1870, No. 9. Translated from French, p. 35).
33 A.I. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky. "Patriotic War. Description of the War of 1812-1815". Edition A.A. Kaspari. SPb. 1899, p. 192.
34 From the "Notes" of Admiral P.V. Chichagov (cited by "Russian Archive". 1870 G12. No. 9. Translated from French. p. 41).
35 A.I.Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky. "Patriotic War. Description of the War of 1812-1815". Edition A.A. Kaspari. St. Petersburg, 1899, pp. 288-289.
36 Ibid., p. 290.
37 L.N. Tolstoy. Collected Works, Volume 7. "State Publishing House of Fiction".M. 1958, ("War and Peace". Volume 4, part 3, ch. 1, p. 131.)
38 Ibid. ("War and Peace", Volume 4, part 3, ch. XIX, p. 182.).
39 "Patriotic War of 1812. In the story of General Chaplits". "Russian Antiquity". St. Petersburg, 1886, volume 1, June, pp. 499-500.
40 L.N. Tolstoy. Collected Works, Volume 7. "State Publishing House of Fiction".M. 1958, Volume 7 ("War and Peace", Volume 4, Part 3, Chapter XIX, pp. 180-181.
41 A.I. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky. "Patriotic War. Description of the War of 1812-1815". Edition A.A. Kaspari. SPb. 1899, p. 440-441.
42 Ibid. p.444.
43 From the "Notes" of Admiral P.V. Chichagov ("Russian Archive". 1870 No. 9 Translated from French: pp. 56-57).
44 Ibid., p. 61-62.
45 From a letter from Admiral P.V. Chichagov to Count S.R. Vorontsov dated September 27, 1813.
46 A.I. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky. "Patriotic War. Description of the War of 1812-1815". Edition A.A. Kaspari. SPb. 1899, p.450.
47 Ibid., p. 451.
48 Ibid., p. 464.
49 L.N. Tolstoy. Collected works, volume 7. "State Publishing House of Fiction". M. 1958, ("War and Peace". Volume 4, part 4, ch. X, p. 210-212.).
50 Cit. N.V. Skritsky. "The most famous naval commanders of Russia". M. "Veche". 2000, p.24
51 From a letter from Admiral P.V. Chichagov to Emperor Alexander 1 of November 17, 1812. "Collection of the Russian Historical Society". Volume six. SPg. 1871, pp. 56-57.
52 From the "Notes" of Admiral P.V. Chichagov (quoted by "Russian Archive", 1869 No. 7, 8 Translated from French: pp. 56-57).
53 Ibid., pp.61-62.
54 Foreword by L.M. Chichagov for the publication of the note "Patriotic War of 1812. In the story of General Chaplits". "Russian Antiquity". SPb.1886 Volume 1, June. With. 490.
55 A.A. Abrahamyan. "Chichagovs". (as a manuscript). M. 1999, p. 20-21.
56 From the "Notes" of Admiral P.V. Chichagov. (quoted by "Russian Archive" 1869. Translated from French: p.59).
57 "Russian Antiquities". SPb.1886, v.1, June, p.491.
58 Ibid. p.490.
59 Ibid., p.491.
60 Ibid., p.516
61 Ibid., p.492.
62 From a letter from Admiral P.V. Chichagov to Count S.R. Vorontsov dated September 15, 1813.
63 From a letter from Admiral P.V. Chichagov to Count S.R. Vorontsov dated May 25, 1813.
64 From a letter from Admiral P.V. Chichagov to Count S.R. Vorontsov dated September 15, 1813.
65 From a letter from Count S.R. Vorontsov to Admiral P.V. Chichagov dated August 1, 1813.
66 "Bear". 1996, No. 3, p. 89
67 "Archive of Admiral P.V. Chichagov". Issue One. SPb. 1885, p. 32.
68 From a letter from Admiral P.V. Chichagov to Count S.R. Vorontsov dated March 3, 1813.
69 V.V. Averyanov. Version of the Preface to the publication of "Notes" by Admiral P.V. Chichagova (From the archive of the abbess of the Moscow Mother of God-Smolensk Novodevichy Convent Abbess Seraphim"), p.7.
70 "Bear".M. 1996, No. 3, p. 89.
71 "Archive of Admiral P.V. Chichagov". Issue One. SPb. 1885, p. 15.
72 Ibid., p.32
73 "Russian Antiquities". SPb. 1886, v.1, June, p. 506.
Public opinion does not accept difficult circumstances, just as it does not accept failures on the battlefield, no matter how strong the enemy is. It learns well only the simple truth of victories.
Pavel Vasilievich Chichagov is a talented naval commander, naval minister of the Russian Empire and a not very successful commander, on whom the court community blamed the failure on the Berezina. In fact, public opinion put an end to the career of Pavel Vasilyevich after 1812, which was unlikely to benefit state affairs.
Pavel Vasilyevich Chichagov was born on July 8, 1767 in the family of a naval officer Vasily Chichagov. Soon, the family moved to Kronstadt - at the place of service of his father, and in 1776 returned to St. Petersburg, where Pavel Vasilyevich was educated at the German School of St. Peter.
In 1779, Chichagov was enrolled in military service as a sergeant of the Life Guards of the Preobrazhensky Regiment. January 1782 was marked by the first sea campaign of Pavel Vasilyevich. He was assigned to the 1st Naval Battalion, adjutant to his father, then Vice Admiral, and under his command went from Kronstadt to Livorno and back.
In 1783, Pavel Chichagov was promoted to lieutenant of the fleet, and after 4 years he received the rank of senior officer on the ship Ezekiel, which, as part of a detachment under the command of Admiral T.G. Kozlyaninova participates in the raid to the island of Bornoholm. After, he receives an appointment to his father in St. Petersburg.
The Russian-Swedish war in 1788-1789 required the return of talented officers to the fleet.
In April 1789, Pavel Vasilyevich was promoted to captain of the 2nd rank and received command of the flagship battleship Rostislav.
In this rank, he was in battles near the island of Elanda in July 1789, and in the spring and summer of the following year near Vyborg and Revel. Under Revel, the battleship Chichagov was in the center of the battle line and took the brunt of the Swedish squadron. For this battle, Pavel Vasilyevich was awarded the Order of St. George IV degree. In the battle near Vyborg, Chichagov also showed himself to be an excellent commander, for which he was promoted to captain of the 1st rank by Empress Catherine II herself, and he was also awarded a golden sword with the inscription "For Courage".
After the end of the war, Chichagov Jr., for 8 years of service, having assessed the depth of the problems of the Russian fleet, asks his father for permission to improve his education abroad. The latter forwards the request to the empress and she gives her consent. Peter and Pavel Chichagov, under the guidance of the famous mathematician Guryev, go to England. There, thanks to the Russian envoy in London, Semyon Romanovich Vorontsov, they enter the English naval school and intensively study English and ship sciences. After some time, Chichagov even tried to get to the New World with an English ship, but for some reason the ship returned to Albion.
After staying in England for about a year and having enriched himself with knowledge of shipbuilding and the modern organization of the fleet of the most powerful maritime power in the world, Pavel Vasilyevich returned to Russia. In 1793 he was assigned to the captured ship, Sophia-Magdalena, in 1794 he was transferred to the command of the ship Retvizan, which, in the squadron of Vice Admiral Khanykov, cruises along the coast of England. During this trip, he meets the family of his future wife, Elizabeth.
In 1796, Pavel Chichagov was promoted to the rank of captain of the brigadier rank. In the same year, Emperor Paul I comes to power, and for Chichagov, who managed to make many enemies with wit and neglect of secular idlers, hard times come.
In 1797, Chichagov was dismissed, later, not satisfied with this, Paul I refused Chichagov to leave for England for a bride. Then, at the slander of Count Kushelev, in 1799 the emperor deprives Chichagov of the St. George Cross and sends him to the Peter and Paul Fortress, however, thanks to the intervention of the Governor-General Count von der Palen, the monarch changes his mind and returns Chichagov to the service, allowing him to marry Elizabeth. Soon, Pavel Vasilyevich, in the rank of rear admiral, was in command of an expedition to the skeleton of Texel. For success in landing, he receives the Order of St. Anna 1st degree.
The reformist spirit that "captured" Russia from the accession of Alexander I did not allow Chichagov to get lost. In 1802, Pavel Vasilievich took an active part in the work of the committees of the Naval Ministry, and in 1807 he received the post of minister and the rank of admiral. Rapid career growth intensified the already unfriendly attitude of the courtiers. In this position, according to contemporaries, he did a great job of reorganizing the management of the fleet and port cities. The system created by Chichagov, with minor changes, will work until the twentieth century.
In 1809, due to constant conflicts with other ministers and officials within the department, Chichagov took a vacation abroad and, from that moment on, did not actually lead the ministry. Officially, he was relieved of his post only in 1811.
Even before Napoleon crossed the Neman, Alexander I sent Chichagov to command the Danube Army, the Black Sea Fleet, and at the same time appointed him to the post of Governor-General of Moldavia and Wallachia. The Emperor of Russia was not pleased with the slowness of Kutuzov and had his own plan. Chichagov arrived in Iasi already on May 11, but the slow Kutuzov had already made peace with Porta by that time, the emperor's plan remained a plan. The new commander-in-chief had nothing to do on the banks of the Danube.
The case was found with the beginning of the Patriotic War, when it became clear that the forces of the 3rd Army under the command of Tormasov would not be enough to defeat or force the combined forces of the battered corps of Rainier and the Austrians of Schwarzenberg to retreat. Tormasov's corps joined the Danube army in the town of Lutsk, bringing the total number of Russian troops in the south to 60 thousand. The command of the combined forces passed to Chichagov. After a series of maneuvers, Schwarzenberg retreated beyond the borders of the Russian Empire, and Chichagov's troops were freed up to act against the main forces of Napoleon, who were already retreating along the old Smolensk road.
According to the original plan, 160,000 Russian troops were to gather at the Berezina: Chichagov's army from the south, Wittgenstein's corps from the north, and Kutuzov's main forces pursuing the French. Chichagov was entrusted with the task of occupying the city of Borisov and creating a fortified camp on the side of the Beaver River. In fact, it turned out to be extremely difficult to follow these instructions, not only because of the lack of experience - Chichagov never commanded the land army, but also because of the departure of experienced and talented tactical commanders (Lambert, for example). Langeron, who took his place, did not conduct any tolerable reconnaissance. Sent for reconnaissance, Palen was ambushed by the French and, having lost 600 people, retreated, leaving the convoy. Court intriguers inflated this figure to 2000, in this form the data came from St. Petersburg.
Reproduction of "Napoleon's Crossing the Berezina River" by Peter von Hess
As a result, approaching the Berezina, Napoleon had a strength of 45 thousand with 250 guns versus 20-24 thousand with 36 guns from the Russians, who at the same time were stretched between the Berezina River and the village of Veseloe.
In addition, at a critical moment, Chichagov was not supported by General Wittgenstein, which ultimately played a decisive role. The question remains unanswered about the reasons for Wittgenstein's delay, who was distinguished by his decisiveness in the battles in the northern direction, having won several brilliant victories over Oudinot, Saint-Cyr and Victor.
On the other hand, the obvious strategic miscalculations of Chichagov himself cannot but be evident, among which, as Kutuzov noted, were: the wrong choice of tactical position, insufficient reconnaissance of the area, poor attention to guard duty and lack of initiative, manifested in the formal observance of the orders of the commander-in-chief, despite the changing situation.
Be that as it may, success under the Berezina cost Napoleon dearly: 56,000 killed, including 21,000 combat-ready soldiers, against 6,000 Russian losses.
But the court community was not interested in such subtleties. They were also not interested in the fact that it was Chichagov who, with a swift march, captured Minsk, an important stronghold of the French, the loss of which forced Napoleon to decide to cross the river in 10 degree frost.
Recognizing his mistakes, Pavel Vasilyevich surrenders command to Barclay de Tolly at the first opportunity.
In 1814, Chichagov left for emigration, from which he would never return, even at the invitation of Nicholas I in 1834. The end of the Napoleonic wars did not lead to the beginning of reforms, Alexander I felt a taste of absolute power and brought one of the most prominent conservatives, General Arakcheev, closer to him, hammering the last nail into the coffin of hopes for reforms.
The rest of his life, Pavel Vasilyevich will live in Italy and France, mainly in the town of So, not far from Paris.
Pavel Vasilyevich died on August 20, 1849, before his death he sent letters from Alexander I and all his awards to Emperor Nicholas.
Pavel Vasilyevich Chichagov was born on June 27, 1765 in St. Petersburg in the family of Admiral Vasily Yakovlevich Chichagov, famous for his naval victories at Eland, Reval and Vyborg. Promoted to the command and administrative field, and not at court, Admiral V. Ya. Chichagov raised his children as worthy people. Due to his father's distrust of the Naval Corps, son Pavel did not receive a systematic maritime education. When V. Ya. Chichagov was transferred from the post of chief commander of the Kronstadt port to the Admiralty College, Pavel studied with various teachers, then at St. Peter's School, and from 1779 he left school and took private lessons in mathematics, in which he made some progress.
In 1779, young Pavel, at the age of 14, was enrolled in the military service of the guard as a sergeant (non-commissioned officer) in the Life Guards of the Preobrazhensky Regiment, which gave him the opportunity to receive the rank of naval officer, bypassing the Naval Cadet Corps.
In 1782, Pavel received the rank of lieutenant of the army, and when his father was appointed head of the squadron leaving for the Mediterranean, young Pavel began to convince his father to take him with him. The latter agreed, and his son was assigned to him, then vice admiral, as adjutant. When his father was promoted to admiral (1782), Pavel became his adjutant general.
Swimming served as a good school, and the example of Father V. Ya. Chichagov showed him how a commander should act at sea. What he saw abroad served as food for the mind of the future naval minister.
In 1787, Pavel Vasilyevich, on the ship "Ezekiel", participated in the campaign of the detachment of Rear Admiral T. G. Kozlyaninov to Bornholm and then was appointed to be with his father in St. Petersburg.
The Russo-Swedish war of 1788-1790 interrupted peaceful activities. On April 3, 1789, P. Chichagov was promoted to captain of the 2nd rank. Being the commander of his father's flagship battleship "Rostislav", during the campaign of 1789, Pavel cruised with the fleet and participated in the battle near the island of Elanda (15.07 O.S.).
In the spring and summer of the following year, 1790, P. Chichagov commanded the same ship in naval battles near Revel and Vyborg. Near Reval, the battleship "Rostislav" stood in the center of the battle line, which received the blow of the Swedes, for which its commander P. Chichagov received the Order of St. George 4th class
In the Vyborg battle "Rostislav" was among the advanced ships that drove the enemy to Sveaborg. Captain 2nd rank P.V. Chichagov, who delivered the joyful news of the victory in the battle of Vyborg, Empress Catherine II promoted to the rank of captain 1st rank. P. Chichagov also received a golden sword with the inscription "For Courage" and 1,000 chervonets.
The 8-year naval service clearly showed the future Minister of the Navy the shortcomings of our fleet and aroused in him the desire to eliminate them. Therefore, he began to ask his father to let him go abroad to replenish his education.
Chichagov the father asked permission from Empress Catherine II and sent his two sons, Peter and Paul, to England, giving them the well-known mathematician Guryev as their leader and providing them with a letter of recommendation to the Russian envoy in London, Count S. R. Vorontsov.
Arriving in England, both Chichagovs entered the naval school and began to intensively study English. After some time, they went to America aboard an English training ship, but for various reasons the ship returned back before reaching the New World. After staying in England for about a year, P. Chichagov returned to Russia, where he specially studied shipbuilding.
In 1793, Pavel was appointed captain of the captured Swedish ship Sophia-Magdalena and, as part of his father's squadron, he went to Denmark.
In 1794, P. Chichagov, in the squadron of Vice Admiral P. I. Khanykov, commanded the Retvizan ship and cruised off the English coast, and on November 13, 1796, he received the rank of captain of the brigadier rank. Sailing on the Retvisan, P. Chichagov in Chatham (a fortress and a first-class military shipyard, a naval arsenal - the first in size in England) met the head of the local port, Captain Proby and his family, fell in love with his daughter Elizabeth and left for Russia already her fiancé.
Meanwhile, on November 6, 1796, Catherine II died and Paul I ascended the Russian throne. The accession to the throne of Paul I did not initially affect the fate of P. V. Chichagov. But a supporter of broad reforms, sharp, frank and witty, P. Chichagov made many enemies among the close associates of the new Emperor.
The future admiral and minister of public education A. S. Shishkov, the Gatchina favorite of Paul I, Count G. G. Kushelev, Mordvinov and others looked at P. Chichagov very unfriendly, seeing in him only the admiral's son, who had come to the fore thanks to the patronage of his father. The first clash took place in the summer of 1797 after large fleet maneuvers near Krasnaya Gorka, when P. Chichagov, commanding the battleship Retvizan, was making a campaign under the standard of the Sovereign Emperor. His ship turned out to be one of the best, and Paul I awarded Pavel Vasilyevich the Order of St. Anna of the 3rd degree and the rank of colonel, but the envelope in which the production order was sent was addressed to him as a lieutenant colonel. Not understanding how to relate to this kind of royal favor, P. Chichagov requested a letter from c. GG Kushelev, whether he should consider himself a colonel or not. The latter answered him: “Of course not, because you should see that you are marked on the envelope as a lieutenant colonel”
. P. Chichagov immediately resigned and was dismissed from service without a pension "by youth"
.
This was the first official trouble of the future emigrant. It was followed by another, much larger one. After retiring, P. Chichagov wanted to settle in the countryside, take care of the household and improve the situation of his peasants, but at that time Captain Proby died, and P. Chichagov received a letter from his bride that she was waiting for him. P. Chichagov turned to the sovereign with a request to allow him to travel abroad in order to marry a foreigner. Pavel I sent a refusal through Prince Bezborodko, which stated that “There are so many girls in Russia that there is no need to go to England to look for them”
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At the same time, the sovereign ordered P. Chichagov to be accepted back into service in the fleet with his promotion to rear admiral and with the appointment to command a squadron sent to England to act against Holland.
At the same time, Count G. G. Kushelev presented to Paul I the whole matter of P. Chichagov's marriage in such a way that the young admiral wants to take advantage of this plausible pretext in order to subsequently transfer to the English service. Of course, the sovereign was very angry after listening to the report of G. Kushelev, and demanded P. Chichagov to his office. Here Paul I accused him of treason, scolded him and ordered him to be imprisoned in the Peter and Paul Fortress. The young Rear Admiral began to object. Referring to the privilege of the Order of St. George, he sharply protested against the imprisonment in the fortress. Infuriated, the emperor ordered the St. George Cross to be torn off from him, and the adjutant wing on duty, Count Uvarov, carried out this order. Outraged by the heavy insult, P. Chichagov threw off his uniform in response to this and was escorted to the fortress in one vest.
This happened on June 21, 1799. On the same day he was dismissed from service without a petition, uniform and pension, and the Sovereign sent a handwritten decree to the St. Petersburg military governor, which read: “The Jacobin rules and the responses of Chichagov sent to you, contrary to the authorities, forced me to order him to be locked in a ravelin under your supervision”
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It is difficult to say how this whole story could have ended if, fortunately for P. Chichagov, the Governor-General of St. Petersburg, Count von der Pahlen, had not intervened in it, who reported to the sovereign that P. Chichagov repented and petitioned for his forgiveness. Paul I took into account the petition of Palen and ordered the release of P. Chichagov, who fell ill in the ravelin, to return his awards and titles, allowing him to marry, and on July 2 of the same year Pavel Vasilyevich was again accepted into service, with the appointment of the commander of the same expedition.
P. Chichagov spent a week in prison in the Peter and Paul Fortress. "Let's forget what happened and remain friends"
- Paul I then said.
Soon, the newly appointed rear admiral left Kronstadt with the squadron entrusted to him and landing troops and headed for the island of Texel (at that time there was a war against France). For the organization of the landing, P. Chichagov received the Order of St. Anna, I degree. In 1800, the Rear Admiral returned with his young wife. In the same year, he was supposed to again go with a squadron to England, but the emperor canceled the expedition, because Russian-English relations deteriorated.
The benevolence of Paul I did not guarantee peace. Opala touched the entire Chichagov family. Following Pavel, the brothers left the fleet. Later, in his Notes, P. V. Chichagov mentioned that the emperor deprived the chamberlain key and sent his younger brother to the estate, ordered the deportation of the blind father of Admiral V. Ya. Chichagov from the capital, who came to St. Petersburg without permission to meet with his son and daughter-in-law.
With the accession to the throne of Emperor Alexander I, who had received a liberal education in childhood, he needed people who looked at the state of affairs in Russia in the same way as him and were ready to sincerely and energetically work in the direction indicated by the Sovereign.
Naturally, the educated and intelligent P. Chichagov could not get lost in the new reign. Therefore, it is not surprising that the new emperor immediately brought him closer to himself, appointing P. V. Chichagov to his retinue on May 12, 1801.
Emperor Alexander I, at the very beginning of his reign, drew attention to the weak side of the higher state administration and came to the conclusion that it was necessary to create in our country, on the model of Western Europe, a system of ministerial administration, based on the centralization of power and the unity of its actions.
The manifesto of September 8, 1802 announced: “... following the great spirit of the Transformer of Russia, Peter the Great, who left us traces of his wise intentions, along which his worthy successors tried to follow, We decided to divide state affairs into equal parts, according to their natural connection among themselves, and for the most successful course entrust them to the conduct of the ministers we have chosen, setting them the main rules by which they have to be guided in the execution of everything that the position will require from them, and what we expect from their fidelity, activity and zeal to the common good ... "
. By virtue of this manifesto, collegiate administration was replaced by the establishment of eight ministers, and among them the Ministry of Naval Forces. At the same time, the colleges were left: military, naval and foreign affairs, but they were also subordinate to the ministers and, therefore, deprived of their former independence. At the same time, a committee of ministers was also established.
Although, according to the original plan, the ministers were formally subordinate to the supreme supervision of the Senate, which was obliged to consider their deeds in all parts of government, and all ministers had to submit written reports on their management through the Senate, but in reality such subordination was not carried out, and not only the Senate, but soon the newly established Committee of Ministers faded into the background, due to the royal confidence in the appointed ministers.
In the same year, the collegial management of the fleet was replaced by the Russian Ministry of Naval Forces. On September 9, 1802, Vice-President of the Admiralty College Admiral Nikolai Semenovich Mordvinov, later a count, became the first minister, but on December 28 he resigned, because he was outraged that the fleet was actually controlled by P. V. Chichagov. In addition, he did not agree with the view that prevailed at that time on the need, in the development of the reform outlined only by the manifesto, to radically transform the entire maritime administration.
Indeed, since the manifesto of 1802 gave only a general idea for the transformation of state institutions, the Ministry of Naval Forces, along with other ministries, had to work out the details in order to achieve its complete structure, according to the plans of Emperor Alexander I.
In these types, in the same 1802, the Military Office for the Fleet and the Department of the Minister of Naval Forces were established, and then, the Highest appointed Committee for the formation of the fleet, which reorganized the Ministry on new principles.
The following were appointed to the Committee: Senator, Count Alexander Romanovich Vorontsov, chairman, and admirals V. P. Fondezin, I. P. Balle, M. K. Makarov, Vice Admiral P. K. Kartsov and Rear Admiral P. V. Chichagov were appointed members. In addition, Alexander I appointed P. Chichagov as a rapporteur for the committee. The opinion of P. Chichagov acquired decisive importance for the tsar regarding maritime affairs. The firmness of his character, mind and education were noticed by Emperor Alexander I even when he was his heir to the throne, and therefore P. Chichagov was close to the young emperor, immediately after his accession and played a leading role in the Committee, and, knowing the bad state of both the fleet and its administrative procedures, he did not a little, through the Committee, contributed to improvements in the maritime department.
On December 31, P. V. Chichagov took over the administration of the ministry with the title of Comrade Minister of Naval Forces, and only in July 1807 did Alexander I grant him the rank of admiral with the appointment of minister of the sea.
Such a rapid promotion of the young vice-admiral was the reason for the dislike that he enjoyed from the courtiers. Perhaps his sympathy for the English order and the sharp censure with which he treated the Russian nobility, ridiculing them wherever possible, and defending the idea of emancipating the peasants, played a role here.
Be that as it may, P. Chichagov enjoyed the great trust and love of Emperor Alexander I. Subsequently, a correspondence even began between them.
According to a contemporary, P. Chichagov almost independently managed the ministry, all cases came to the emperor only through him. Thanks to this, he introduced a lot of new and necessary for the fleet.
In the spring of 1803, at his suggestion, the position of an auditor appeared on the ships, which greatly facilitated the economic concerns of the commanders. Addressing the Minister of the Interior on September 22, 1803, he proposed to unite the leadership of order in the port cities in the hands of the chief commander, to whom the police were also subordinate. Naval commanders were appointed, rules for their activities were established. The result was a management system for port cities that, with only a few changes, lasted until the 20th century.
In October 1803, the head of the maritime department proposed that, in order to speed up shipbuilding work in Arkhangelsk, shipbuilders should be instructed to develop a type of ship that would combine modern achievements with a shallow draft that would allow it to be transferred through the bar of the Northern Dvina without significant delays. He also paid considerable attention to the copper plating of ship hulls.
P. Chichagov perfectly understood the need to take care of people in the fleet. On November 25, 1803, he proposed to place doctors and create small pharmacies in the buildings where naval officials and servants lived.
On June 7, 1803, he reported on the need to pay the workers of the Okhtenskaya Sloboda on an equal basis with the free ones.
On July 20, 1803, land provisions (at that time more nutritious than sea food) for low-paid naval servants followed.
On December 9, 1803, the Admiralty Board listened to P. Chichagov's report on the creation of a naval department fund, which would make it easier to receive funds for urgent expenses. The Vice Admiral sought to both simplify supply issues and save money in every possible way.
On May 25, 1804, a report on improving the organization of the fleet and minimizing the number of papers circulating on the ship was approved by the highest.
On July 14, 1804, the collegium listened to the highest order on the report of P. Chichagov on the prohibition of corporal punishment of navigational assistants of non-commissioned officers. The vice admiral failed to achieve a greater limitation of the arbitrariness of officers in imposing punishments. Only half a century later, the shame of corporal punishment was expelled from the Russian fleet. P. Chichagov perfectly understood the importance of maritime trade both for the country and for the development of the fleet, which needed trained personnel. On November 29, 1804, he agreed with the proposal of the Minister of Commerce Rumyantsev to issue bonuses to encourage the merchants. But the fleet needed special conditions for basing and secrecy of movements. Apparently, this explains why On February 29, 1804, the Admiralty Board heard a decree on the transformation of Sevastopol into the main military port on the Black Sea;
On July 13, P. Chichagov informed the members of the board about the termination of trade in the port of Sevastopol.
Pavel Vasilievich tried to educate young people and at the same time preserve the marine spirit in educational institutions. The Naval Cadet Corps under the direction of P.K. Kartsov and his assistants trained sailors, some of whom had the opportunity to polish their abilities in the first ocean voyages and on foreign ships. Young men were taught mainly maritime affairs. Only in 1811, when P. V. Chichagov was replaced as minister by I. I. de Traverse, did the transfer of the fleet to army drill begin.
Under P. Chichagov, navigational and shipbuilding schools were developed. It can be considered as an initiative of P. Chichagov the highest orders on the publication of translated books on shipbuilding and artillery at public expense and awards for translators. On May 27, 1803, he proposed to separate the instrumental workshop from the naval printing house, and on October 8 he informed the Admiralty College of the highest approved report on the state content of the latter. For many years, the marine printing house served the cause of education and upbringing of the ranks of the maritime department. It was on its basis that the journal "Sea Collection" arose, which could hardly exist without state support.
In 1804, on the proposal of P. Chichagov, new, more comfortable clothing for sailors was approved; instead of swords introduced daggers, which for a long time became an attribute of the uniform of Russian sailors.
In 1807, P. Chichagov received the rank of admiral and was appointed naval minister. He began to work energetically on streamlining the affairs of the ministry: he reduced, as much as possible, all kinds of theft, so common for that time, increased the fleet, built boathouses, constantly followed the development of technology and introduced improvements in maritime practice. Opinions and notes submitted by P. Chichagov to the State Council serve as the best proof of his tireless activity. A member of the State Council and the Committee of Ministers, he had constant clashes with his comrades, and these clashes finally led to the fact that in 1809 he took a vacation abroad. Two years later, at the request, he was dismissed from the rank of Minister of Naval Forces and, upon his return from abroad, was appointed to be with the person of the Sovereign Emperor, that is, every day, at 11 am, to come to the palace and express his opinion on current issues.
Many contemporaries considered P. Chichagov to be a capable and active person, on whom the Russian maritime department was based. Above is a far from complete list of cases of Comrade Naval Minister. Shipbuilding and ports, personnel and much more were a heavy burden even for a sea-hardened person.
Collisions on business with other ministers and the fight against abuse did not add health, and it is quite clear that P. Chichagov was thinking about rest. But since 1804 a constant period of wars began. The Russian fleets had to engage in battle in all naval theaters, and P. Chichagov could not leave his post in such an environment.
The war with Sweden, launched under the pressure of Napoleon, required considerable effort. P. Chichagov did a lot to ensure that the Russian fleets and flotillas successfully repulsed the onslaught from all sides. However, the apparent failure of the actions of the Baltic Fleet against the Swedes worsened the admiral's reputation in society. He spoiled relations with the heads of departments by sending naval officers to check the information of other ministers. Within his own ministry, P. Chichagov acquired enemies, not allowing officials to profit from the treasury. The only support of Pavel Vasilyevich was the Emperor, on whom he had influence.
In 1809, Pavel Vasilievich and his wife left for France. There is reason to believe that he was a confidant of Alexander I under Napoleon. The admiral returned from Paris with the remains of his wife, who had died of a chronic illness, disappointed in the French emperor. Shortly before leaving, he buried his father. The emperor understood the difficult position of P. Chichagov and granted his request for resignation from the post of naval minister, but left him to be with his person as an adviser until the time came for the next responsible assignment.
In 1812, Alexander I, dissatisfied with the slowness of the actions of M. Kutuzov, developed his own plan of action and, having appointed P. Chichagov the commander-in-chief of the Danube army, the Black Sea Fleet and the governor-general of Moldavia and Wallachia, instructing him to bring this plan into execution. Releasing P. Chichagov to the south, the sovereign said to him a phrase characteristic of the former naval minister: “I don’t give you advice, knowing that you are the worst enemy of arbitrariness”
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P. Chichagov left St. Petersburg on May 2 and was already in Iasi on the 11th, but even before his arrival M. Kutuzov made peace with the Ottoman Porte, and the new commander-in-chief had nothing to do on the banks of the Danube. The Emperor's plan remained unfulfilled.
During the Patriotic War of 1812-1814. P. Chichagov acquired for himself that notorious notoriety that made P. Bartenev, in his preface to the 19th volume of the Archive of Prince Vorontsov, say about the émigré minister: “Chichagov belongs to the mournful list of Russian people who have done for the fatherland incomparably less than what they were capable of and what they were called to”.
How true this opinion is, it is difficult to say definitely. There is no doubt, however, that P. Chichagov is not so guilty of the unfortunate outcome of the crossing of the Berezina for us than is commonly assumed. The former naval minister was at one time the subject of all kinds of ridicule, jokes and epigrams; I. A. Krylov wrote a well-known fable about the Berezinsky battle, exposing P. Chichagov in a very unfavorable light, there were even voices accusing the ill-fated admiral of treason. The latter, of course, is out of the question: the question boils down to how much, if any, the lack of command and control of the chief commander of the Danube army, if any, influenced the outcome of the battle.
Arriving in the city of Borisov, P. Chichagov found the state of affairs extremely sad. General Lambert, whom he trusted and to whom he wanted to entrust the command of the vanguard, was wounded and therefore could not take part in the battle.
Langeron did not bother to inspect and study the terrain, which was generally largely unfavorable for battle; there was very little time left for engineering work, since the enemy could be expected from day to day; the ground froze to a considerable depth, there was only one engineering officer in the army who was able to supervise the construction of the fortification, in a word, the circumstances, as if on purpose, developed in such a way that it was extremely difficult, if not completely impossible, for P. Chichagov to follow the instructions given to him.
According to this instruction, he was obliged to arrange a fortified camp in Borisov and fortifications from the side of Beaver, which was intended to stop the French army. P. Chichagov, weighing the state of affairs, abandoned this plan and sent a vanguard division under the command of Palen, who took the place of Lambert, to study the area.
As soon as Palen moved away from Borisov, he quite unexpectedly stumbled upon the troops of the French Marshal Oudinot and was forced to retreat, losing up to 600 people killed and wounded and leaving almost the entire convoy in the hands of the enemy. Borisov was occupied by the French. This avant-garde battle, which ended so sadly, was inflated by the French in their reports into a major victory; the Russians increased the loss of Palen to 2,000 people.
In this form, the news of this battle reached St. Petersburg. From this began the notoriety of P. Chichagov.
According to the original plan of Alexander I, on the right bank of the Berezina, the combined forces of M. Kutuzov, Wittgenstein and P. Chichagov, with a total number of 160,000 people, were to gather, and the first was to push the French from the rear. Thus, Napoleon, according to the disposition, had to be between two fires.
This plan did not materialize. The troops of M. Kutuzov did not take part in the battle at all, while Wittgenstein was late and launched an attack four hours later than P. Chichagov; in addition, he brought only 1/3 of his army into action, did not agree to reinforce the ill-fated admiral with two divisions that he asked for, and allowed the Frenchman Victor to hold his position all day.
Thus, instead of the supposed huge force of 160,000 people, the battle was started and almost independently fought by 20,000 people of P. Chichagov’s army, stretched between Veselov and Berezina, having Napoleon’s army in front of them, which then counted up to 45,000 people fit for battle, and behind them the Saxons of Schwarzenberg.
There is nothing surprising that, under such conditions, the French crossed the Berezina; perhaps the commander-in-chief of the Danube army was also to blame for this, who did not show sufficient diligence, but the main fault, nevertheless, falls on the unfortunate circumstances.
P. Chichagov handed over the command to Marshal Barclay da Tolli and, as soon as the opportunity presented itself, went abroad. He was offended by society's accusations. Influence on Alexander I Arakcheev ruled out the possibility of liberal reforms.
P. Chichagov went abroad in 1814. In the summer of 1816, a member of the long-distance voyage on the Suvorov ship, Lieutenant S. Ya. Unkovsky, found the admiral in London and talked to him for 3 hours. It is possible that the admiral was also visited by other sailors of ships calling in England. In any case, the Navy remembered him.
In 1831 Rear Admiral M.P. Lazarev wrote to A.A. Shestakov: “... I will tell you that there is a committee chaired by Admiral Greig to improve some parts of the fleet, but things are not going very well. The more I look at everything, the more I am convinced that the fleet will not reach the degree of perfection in which it was under Chichagov. Do not listen to those tales that we now have many ships, but meanwhile there is neither the spirit nor the ambition that we had then ... "
.
Abroad, in 1815, P. V. Chichagov began to write "Notes of Admiral Chichagov Concluding What He Seen and What He Thinks He Knew"
. When the admiral went blind, he used a special device. In the notes, Pavel Vasilyevich not only recalled his and his father's life path, but also expressed interesting opinions that make it possible to understand the inner world of this complex person. The exile also wanted to clarify something unclear and justify himself to his descendants.
The notes are interesting in many respects. Here are episodes of historical events in which the Chichagovs participated, and the genealogical tree of the family, and the author's reasoning on many issues. P. Chichagov paid much attention in his "Notes" to Catherine II, whose reign he considered an example.
P. Chichagov finally parted with his homeland in 1834, when he refused the invitation of Nicholas I to return.
The admiral spent the last 14 years in Italy and France, mainly in Paris and the town of So near Paris, with his daughter Catherine du Buzet.
He died on August 20, 1849. Before his death, in order to finally break with the mortal world, P. Chichagov sent letters from Alexander I and his awards to Nicholas I.
He wanted to burn the notes, but his youngest daughter Ekaterina begged him not to do so. The admiral left his daughter's archive with a ban on transferring it to other family members. However, a distant relative of Catherine's husband, Count de Buse, in 1855 published in Paris several sheets stolen by him from Chichagov's notes about 1812. Despite the protests and denials of Ekaterina Pavlovna, the count did not calm down. In 1758, already in Berlin, he published Admiral Chichagov's Memoirs, compiled from various works; the fake memoirs were later republished in Leipzig.
Catherine initiated and won a case against a relative, but, nevertheless, his pamphlet caused a lot of talk in Europe. Catherine herself, paralyzed from unrest, did not get out of bed for 25 years and died on August 31, 1882. She handed P. Chichagov's notes to L. M. Chichagov, thanks to whom some of them have survived to this day in the publication of Russkaya Starina.
Ironically, the ardent patriot, who raised his daughter in the same spirit, spent half his life in exile.
Count F.P. Tolstoy wrote about him: “Pavel Vasilievich Chichagov was a very intelligent and educated person. Being direct in nature, he was surprisingly free and, like no other minister, easy to handle and talk with the sovereign and the royal family. Knowing his advantage over court flatterers, both in science, education, and in directness and firmness of character, Chichagov treated them with great inattention, and with others even with disdain, for which, of course, he was hated by almost the entire court world and all the empty, arrogant nobility; Chichagov treated his subordinates and petitioners (whom he always accepted without the slightest distinction of rank and rank) very affably and listened to the latter with great patience.
.
The Chichagovs belonged to an old Russian noble family dating back to the 16th century. The coat of arms of this genus is included in the VI part of the General Armorial.
The names of the Chichagovs were repeatedly imprinted on geographical maps, on the sides of ships. The sailors remembered both the minister-reformer and his father, a naval commander.
Our generation should also pay tribute to a patriotic man like Pavel Vasilyevich Chichagov.
SIRY S.P.
Chairman of the military-historical section of the House of Scientists of the Russian Academy of Sciences,
chairman of the history section of the Russian fleet and historiographer of the St. Petersburg MS,
Honored Worker of the Higher School of Russia,
professor, captain of the 1st rank of the reserve
CHICHAGOV PAVEL VASILIEVICH
Chichagov (Pavel Vasilievich, 1765 - 1849) - Admiral, son of Vasily Yakovlevich Chichagov. Fourteen years old, enrolled in military service, Chichagov visited the Mediterranean with his father's squadron, and then took part in battles against the Swedes. In 1792 - 1793, accompanied by his teacher, the well-known mathematician Guryev at that time, he lived in England, learning English and practically getting acquainted with maritime affairs. With the accession of Emperor Paul, who put Kushelev at the head of the fleet, who was shortly before that midshipman with Vasily Yakovlevich Chichagov, Chichagov began to think about retiring, which Kushelev accelerated, slandering him before the emperor in unwillingness to serve on the instructions of the latter. Pavel immediately deprived Chichagov of his uniform and orders and ordered him to be put in the Peter and Paul Fortress, in the department of the state prison. Having visited Chichagov in prison, the emperor found his premises too clean and bright and ordered him to be transferred to a casemate. In July 1799, Paul I released him and greeted him with the words: "Let's forget what happened and remain friends." Following this, Chichagov was sent to Revel to take command of the squadron that was leaving for England, and then he was entrusted with the defense of Kronstadt. Alexander I brought Chichagov closer to him, made him Minister of the Navy and a member of the State Council and the Committee of Ministers, and after he left the post of minister, he left him with his person, in the rank of permanent adjutant general on duty. This created many enemies and envious people for Chichagov, especially when he began to ardently support the idea of Alexander I about the liberation of the peasants. The time of management of his naval ministry was marked by wide transformations and improvements in the Russian fleet. In 1811, the emperor appointed Chichagov commander-in-chief of Moldavia, Wallachia and the Black Sea Fleet, and the following year he instructed him to pursue the retreating troops of Napoleon I, who, due to some slowness of the pursuers, managed to safely cross the Berezina. This was the reason for accusing Chichagov of almost treason both on the part of his contemporaries and on the part of many historians of the Patriotic War. In 1814, he went on an indefinite leave abroad and never returned to Russia from there, having lived all the time in Italy and France; 14 years before his death, he went blind and lived with his youngest daughter, Countess Catherine du Buzet. From 1816, Chichagov began to write his "Notes", now in Italian, then in French and English, starting from the year of his father's birth (1726) and finishing up to 1834. when blind. In them, he reports a lot of valuable historical material for the era of the reign of Catherine II, Paul I and Alexander the Blessed, makes accurate descriptions of the main statesmen and provides many details based on hitherto unknown documents and letters. While L.M. Chichagov, only part of the "Notes", under the title: "Notes of Admiral Chichagov, Concluding What He Seen and What, in His Opinion, He Knew" (in "Russian Antiquity", for 1886 volumes 50, 51 and 52, for 1887 volume 55 and for 1888 volumes 58, 59 and 60). Earlier, the first issue of the Archive of Admiral P.V. Chichagov was published separately (St. Petersburg, 1885). Chichagov's "notes" were preserved and put in order by the above-mentioned daughter of Chichagov, whose husband, using several fragments of them, printed in 1858 a pamphlet that made a lot of noise: "Memoires de l" amiral Tehitchagoff ", where Chichagov is exposed as a detractor of Russia. She managed to clear her father of this slander only by court. Several letters to Chichagov of Emperor Alexander I were published in Russkaya Starina" (1902, ¦ 2). According to many contemporaries, Chichagov was an intelligent and brilliantly educated person, honest and "direct character"; "he treated court noble flatterers with great inattention, and others even with disdain"; he was affable with inferiors and subordinates. - See I. Glebov "Paul I and Chichagov" ("Historical Bulletin", 1883, ¦ 1); A. Popov "Patriotic War" ("Russian Antiquity", 1877, volume XX); L.M. Chichagov "Pavel Vasilievich Chichagov" ("Russian Antiquity", 1886, ¦ 5).
Brief biographical encyclopedia. 2012
See also interpretations, synonyms, meanings of the word and what is CHICHAGOV PAVEL VASILIEVICH in Russian in dictionaries, encyclopedias and reference books:
- CHICHAGOV, PAVEL VASILIEVICH
(1765-1849) - Admiral, son of Vasily Yakovlevich Ch. Fourteen years old, enrolled in military service, Ch. visited with his father's squadron ... - CHICHAGOV, PAVEL VASILIEVICH in the Encyclopedia of Brockhaus and Efron:
(1765-1849) ? admiral, son of Vasily Yakovlevich Ch. Fourteen years old, enrolled in military service, Ch. visited with his father's squadron ... - CHICHAGOV PAVEL VASILIEVICH
(1767-1849) Russian admiral (1807). Son of V. Ya. Chichagov. In 1802-11 Minister of Naval Forces. During the Patriotic War of 1812, the commander of the army operating ... - CHICHAGOV PAVEL VASILIEVICH in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia, TSB:
Pavel Vasilievich, Russian military commander, admiral (1807), son of V. Ya. Chichagov. In the Navy since 1782, was ... - PAUL in the Newest Philosophical Dictionary:
(Paulus) Apostle (original name Saul or Saul) (d. 66/67) - Christian preacher. Preaching among the pagans, he sought to overcome national disunity and ... - PAUL
Paul - in Christian church history with this name are known: 1) P., a resident of Ptolemais (died in 273), at the entrance ... - PAUL in the Big Encyclopedic Dictionary:
VI (Paulus) (1897-1978) Pope since 1963. Supported the preservation of the world. The first of the Roman popes, who, breaking the tradition of reclusive popes ... - CHICHAGOV in the Encyclopedic Dictionary of Brockhaus and Euphron:
(Vasily Yakovlevich, 1726-1809) - Admiral. After completing his studies in England, Ch. entered the naval service in 1742; assigned to... - PAUL in the Encyclopedic Dictionary of Brockhaus and Euphron:
Pavel Petrovich - Emperor of All Russia, son of the imp. Peter III and Empress Catherine II, b. 20 Sept. 1754, ascended the throne, after ... - PAUL in the Modern Encyclopedic Dictionary:
- PAUL in the Encyclopedic Dictionary:
(Jewish Saul, Saul), in the New Testament one of the apostles. He was born in the Asia Minor city of Tarsus (in Cilicia) into a Jewish Pharisee family. … - CHICHAGOV
CHICHAOV Pav. You. (1767-1849), admiral (1807). Son V.Ya. Chichagov. In 1802-11 min. sea forces. In Fatherland. war of 1812 commands. army, ... - CHICHAGOV in the Big Russian Encyclopedic Dictionary:
CHICHAOV You. Yak. (1726-1809), naval commander and navigator, admiral (1782). In 1764-66, the beginning. grew up expeditions to find the sea. way from Arkhangelsk ... - PAUL in the Big Russian Encyclopedic Dictionary:
PAUL OF SAMOSATSKY (3rd century), Bishop of Antioch in the 260s. The teachings of P.S., which denied deities. nature of Jesus Christ, was condemned as heresy... - PAUL in the Big Russian Encyclopedic Dictionary:
PAUL THE DEACON (Raulus Diaconus) (c. 720-799), author of the History of the Lombards (before 744). From a noble Lombard ... - PAUL in the Big Russian Encyclopedic Dictionary:
PAUL VI (Raulus) (1897-1978), Pope of Rome since 1963. He advocated the rapprochement of churches. Breaking the tradition of seclusion of popes who have not left the Vatican since ... - PAUL in the Big Russian Encyclopedic Dictionary:
PAUL I (1901-64), King of Greece since 1947. From the Glücksburg dynasty, brother of the Greek. King George II. Member of the Greek tour. wars 1919-22. WITH … - PAUL in the Big Russian Encyclopedic Dictionary:
PAUL I (1754-1801), grew up. Emperor since 1796, son of Emperor Peter III and Catherine II. Having ascended the throne, he sought to oppose the "pernicious" ... - PAUL in the Big Russian Encyclopedic Dictionary:
PAUL (Heb. Saul, Saul), in the New Testament, one of the apostles. Genus. in the Asia Minor city of Tarsus (in Cilicia) in Heb. Pharisees... - PAUL in the Big Russian Encyclopedic Dictionary:
PAUL (Raulus) Julius, Roman. 3rd century lawyer In 426 writings P. was given the obligation. legal force. Extracts from the works of P. ... - PAUL
Pestel, Bure, ... - PAUL in the Dictionary for solving and compiling scanwords:
Male… - PAUL in the dictionary of Synonyms of the Russian language:
apostle, name, saul, ... - PAUL in the Complete Spelling Dictionary of the Russian Language:
Pavel, (Pavlovich, ... - PAUL in the Dahl Dictionary:
arch.-whom. … - CHICHAGOV
Vasily Yakovlevich (1726-1809), Russian naval commander and navigator, admiral (1782). In 1764-66 he was the head of an expedition to find a sea route from Arkhangelsk ... - PAUL in the Modern Explanatory Dictionary, TSB:
(Heb. Saul, Saul), in the New Testament one of the apostles. Born in the Asia Minor city of Tarsus (in Cilicia) into a Jewish Pharisee family. … - IVAN VASILIEVICH CHANGES PROFESSION in Wiki Quote.
- CHICHAGOV NIKOLAI MIKHAILOVICH
Open Orthodox Encyclopedia "TREE". Chichagov Nikolai Mikhailovich (1852 - 1910), brother of the schmch. Serafima (Chichagova), lieutenant general, head of the Zaamursky ... - CHICHAGOV MIKHAIL NIKIFOROVICH in the Orthodox Encyclopedia Tree:
Open Orthodox Encyclopedia "TREE". Chichagov Mikhail Nikiforovich (1819 - 1866), father of the schmch. Seraphim (Chichagova), belonged to one ... - FELITSYN SERGEY VASILIEVICH in the Orthodox Encyclopedia Tree:
Open Orthodox Encyclopedia "TREE". Felitsyn Sergei Vasilievich (1883 - 1937), priest, holy martyr. Commemorated December 2nd... - TROITSKY PETER VASILIEVICH in the Orthodox Encyclopedia Tree:
Open Orthodox Encyclopedia "TREE". Troitsky Peter Vasilyevich (1889 - 1938), psalmist, martyr. Commemorated December 31st and... - SERAPHIM (CHICHAGOV) in the Orthodox Encyclopedia Tree:
Open Orthodox Encyclopedia "TREE". Seraphim (Chichagov) (1856 - 1937), Metropolitan, Hieromartyr. Commemorated on December 11, in ... - RUMPEL IVAN VASILIEVICH in the Orthodox Encyclopedia Tree:
Open Orthodox Encyclopedia "TREE". Rumpel Ivan Vasilyevich (1926 - 2002), reader, regent. Born June 7, 1926 in ... - ROZOV KONSTANTIN VASILIEVICH in the Orthodox Encyclopedia Tree:
Open Orthodox Encyclopedia "TREE". Rozov Konstantin Vasilyevich (1874 - 1923), archdeacon. Born February 10, 1874 in ... - PETROV NIKOLAY VASILIEVICH in the Orthodox Encyclopedia Tree:
Open Orthodox Encyclopedia "TREE". Petrov Nikolai Vasilievich, the name of several persons: Petrov Nikolay Vasilievich (1874 - 1956), archpriest, prof. Petrov ... - PAVEL TAGANROGSKY in the Orthodox Encyclopedia Tree:
Open Orthodox Encyclopedia "TREE". Pavel Taganrogsky (1792 - 1879), blessed. Commemorated March 10th. Blessed Paul (Paul... - PAUL OF PRUSSIA in the Orthodox Encyclopedia Tree:
Open Orthodox Encyclopedia "TREE". Pavel Prussian (1821 - 1895), archimandrite, a well-known figure who wrote against the Old Believer schism. … - PAVEL KOLOMENSKY in the Orthodox Encyclopedia Tree:
Open Orthodox Encyclopedia "TREE". Pavel (+ 1656), b. Bishop of Kolomna and Kashirsky, the only one of the hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church ... - PAVEL (GORSHKOV) in the Orthodox Encyclopedia Tree:
Open Orthodox Encyclopedia "TREE". Pavel (Gorshkov) (1867 - 1950), abbot, abbot of the Pskov-Caves Monastery, organizer of the "First Russian ... - GORYUNOV NIKOLAY VASILIEVICH in the Orthodox Encyclopedia Tree:
Open Orthodox Encyclopedia "TREE". Goryunov Nikolai Vasilievich (1880 - 1938), protodeacon, holy martyr. Commemoration March 9, ... - BOLOTOV VASILY VASILIEVICH in the Orthodox Encyclopedia Tree:
Open Orthodox Encyclopedia "TREE". Bolotov Vasily Vasilyevich (1853 - 1900), Church historian, philologist, corresponding member of the Imperial Academy of Sciences in ... - ANDREEV PAVEL ARKADIEVICH in the Orthodox Encyclopedia Tree:
Open Orthodox Encyclopedia "TREE". Andreev Pavel Arkadyevich (1880 - 1937), archpriest, holy martyr. Commemorated November 3rd... - AKCHURIN SERGEY VASILIEVICH in the Orthodox Encyclopedia Tree:
Open Orthodox Encyclopedia "TREE". Akchurin Sergei Vasilyevich (1722 - 1790), chief prosecutor of the Holy Synod. Born in the family of a secretary ... - CHICHAGOV MIKHAIL NIKOLAEVICH in the Brief Biographical Encyclopedia:
Chichagov (Mikhail Nikolayevich, 1837 - 1889) - an architect, received a general education at a school at the Moscow Reformed Church, and a special education - ... - CHICHAGOV VASILY YAKOVLEVICH in the Brief Biographical Encyclopedia:
Chichagov (Vasily Yakovlevich, 1726 - 1801) - Admiral. After completing his studies in England, Chichagov entered the naval service in 1742 ...
