People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs in the 20s. People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs
Trotsky (Bronstein) L. D. (1879-1940) - People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs in the first composition of the Council of People's Commissars. On his instructions, the NKID began publishing secret documents of the tsarist and Provisional governments. He tried to establish contacts with the governments of the Entente countries and the United States, and sent them notes with proposals for peace. But the ambassadors refused to accept these documents. Trotsky was the leader of the Soviet delegation at the 2nd stage of negotiations with Germany and its allies in Brest-Litovsk, where, on Lenin’s instructions, he adopted the tactic of delaying negotiations. On January 28, 1918, he spoke at a meeting of delegations with the statement “No peace, no war, but disband the army.” This declaration by Trotsky was approved at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on February 14. Nevertheless, on February 22, Trotsky resigned from the post of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.
Chicherin G.V.(1872-1936) - Soviet statesman and diplomat. From May 30, 1918 - People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs. Participated in the second series of negotiations in Brest-Litovsk. He was an active participant in the negotiations and signed the Soviet-Turkish, Soviet-Iranian and Soviet-Afghan treaties of 1920. He headed the Soviet delegation at conferences in Genoa (1922) and Lausanne (1922-1923). During the Genoa Conference, he signed the Treaty of Rapallo with Germany. At the Lausanne Conference, in a number of speeches, he substantiated the interest of the RSFSR in the independence of Turkey and the Straits regime, which ensures the security of Soviet ports on the Black Sea. Signed non-aggression and neutrality treaties with Turkey (1925) and Iran (1927). In 1930 he resigned due to health reasons.
Litvinov M. M. (Max Ballakh) (1876-1951) - member of the Bolshevik Party since 1898. Iskra agent. Since 1918, member of the board of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. In 1918 - plenipotentiary representative in England. In 1920 - plenipotentiary representative in Estonia. Since 1921 - Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. He was a participant in the Genoa Conference in 1922. He was the chairman of the Soviet delegation at the Hague Conference in 1922. In December of the same year, he chaired the Moscow Disarmament Conference, which was attended by Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland along with the RSFSR. In 1927-1930 made numerous efforts to conclude a disarmament agreement. In 1930 he was appointed People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. With his arrival at the NKID, a gradual reorientation of USSR foreign policy began from Germany to Western democracies. Negotiated with the United States on the resumption of diplomatic relations (which were restored in 1933). He was a consistent fighter for the implementation of the idea of creating a system of collective security in Europe. In 1934-1938 represented the USSR in the Council of the League of Nations. In 1936, he was the head of the Soviet delegation at the conference in Montreux, which ended with the signing of an agreement on the regime of the Black Sea Straits. In May 1939, in connection with the emerging new change in the foreign policy orientation of the USSR (this time towards Germany), he was dismissed. With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War and the formation of the anti-Hitler coalition, he was appointed Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs and Ambassador of the USSR to the USA. He made a great contribution to the development of inter-allied relations during the Second World War.
Molotov (Scriabin) V. M.(1890-1986) - in 1921-1930. - Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. In 1930-1941 - Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. From May 3, 1939 - People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. His replacement in this post by M. M. Litvinov was caused by the search for an agreement with Germany, which culminated in the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact on August 23 of the same year. At the same time, an additional secret protocol was signed, delimiting the spheres of influence between Germany and the USSR in Eastern Europe. After the entry of Soviet troops into the western voivodeships of Poland in September 1939, Molotov and Ribbentrop signed on September 29 the Treaty of Friendship and Border between Germany and the USSR and a package of new secret agreements to it. In the period from the autumn of 1939 to the summer of 1940, Molotov managed to achieve the conclusion of mutual assistance agreements with the Baltic states. Following this, Soviet troops were introduced into their territory in accordance with the treaties and a change of governments occurred. In the summer of 1940 they were incorporated into the USSR. Similar pressure on Finland did not produce positive results, which led to the Soviet-Finnish war in November 1939 - March 1940. In November 1940, Molotov negotiated in Berlin on the possible accession of the USSR to the Tripartite Pact of Germany, Italy and Japan. On June 22, 1941, on behalf of the Soviet leadership, he spoke on the radio announcing the start of the war. During the Second World War, on behalf of Stalin, he undertook numerous negotiations with the allies on a joint struggle against Germany and its satellites. He was a participant in almost all international conferences of this period at the highest level. In the post-war years, he made active efforts aimed at expanding the political and military presence of the USSR in various regions of the world. For his intransigence and toughness, he was nicknamed “Mr. NO” by his Western negotiating partners. March 5, 1949 was removed from the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, remaining Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. On March 5, 1953, after the death of Stalin, he was again appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs and First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. He held this position until 1956. Since 1957 - Ambassador to Mongolia. In 1960-1962 - Representative of the USSR to the IAEA. Since 1962 - retired.
Vyshinsky A. Ya.(1883-1954) - in 1935-1939. - Prosecutor of the USSR. Since 1939 - Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. In 1940-1946. - First Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. Participated in the Yalta and Berlin conferences. As a representative of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, he participated in the signing ceremony
that about the unconditional surrender of Germany on May 8, 1945. In 1949-1953. was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. After Molotov returned to this post in 1953, he was appointed plenipotentiary representative of the USSR to the UN.
Shepilov D. T.(1905-1995) - Soviet party and statesman. Editor of the newspaper "Pravda". At the 20th Congress of the CPSU he was elected Secretary of the Central Committee and a candidate member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. On June 2, 1956, during a visit to Moscow, I. B. Tito was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs instead of V. M. Molotov. This was a gesture of goodwill on the part of N.S. Khrushchev, since it was Molotov who took a tough position towards Yugoslavia since the late 40s. On June 20, during this visit, Soviet-Yugoslav documents were signed, indicating the full restoration of previously interrupted relations: a Joint Statement of Governments and a Declaration on Relations between the CPSU and the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia. In October of the same year, D. Shepilov, together with other members of the Soviet leadership, tried to find a way out of crisis situations in Poland and Hungary. On October 30, the Soviet leadership made a statement about the revision of relations with the people's democracies, about the desire to build them on the principles of complete equality. On November 5, the USSR speaks in the Security Council condemning the Franco-British invasion of Suez. On December 17, the USSR proposes to conclude a non-aggression pact between the blocs - NATO and the Warsaw Pact. On February 15, 1957, D. T. Shepilov was replaced as Minister of Foreign Affairs by A. A. Gromyko. In the summer of the same year, at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee, he joined the “anti-party group” of Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich and advocated the resignation of Khrushchev. After this, at the Plenum of the Central Committee, he was deprived of the posts of Secretary of the Central Committee and a candidate member of the Presidium and appointed director of the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences of the Kirghiz SSR in Frunze. He was soon moved from there and worked in the Main Archive Directorate under the Council of Ministers of the USSR until his retirement.
Gromyko A. A.(1909-1989) - headed the department of American countries at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1939). Since the fall of 1939 - Advisor to the USSR Embassy in the USA. In 1943-1946. - Ambassador of the USSR to the USA and at the same time envoy to the Republic of Cuba. Head of the USSR delegation at the conference in Dumbarton Oaks in 1944 on the creation of the UN. Participant of the Crimean and Berlin conferences in 1945. Member of the USSR delegation at the United Nations conference in San Francisco in 1945. Since 1946 - permanent representative of the USSR in the UN Security Council and at the same time deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR. Later - USSR Ambassador to Great Britain and Deputy, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. Since February 15, 1957 - Minister of Foreign Affairs. A. A. Gromyko - a whole era in Soviet foreign policy from the mid-50s to the mid-80s, author and active participant in many international projects, conferences, etc., one of the foreign ministers - record holders for the longest stay in positions (continuously - 28 years).
Shevardnadze E. A.(b. 1928) - Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR in 1985-1991. The closest ally of M. S. Gorbachev in implementing the policy of “new political thinking”. Participant in the negotiation process on nuclear disarmament in 1985-1991, relieving tension in East-West relations. Supporter of unblocking regional conflicts. These changes were based on a new foreign policy concept developed by M. Gorbachev and E. Shevardnadze, which included: rejection of the conclusion that the modern world is split into two warring socio-political systems; recognition of the world as integral and indivisible; declaration of the impossibility of solving international problems by force; declaring as a universal way to resolve international issues not the balance of power of the two systems, but the balance of their interests; rejection of the principle of proletarian internationalism, recognition of the priority of universal human values over class, national, ideological, religious and others. In December 1990, E. Shevardnadze resigned in protest against the “impending dictatorship.”
Bessmertnykh A. A.(b. 1933) - Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR in January-August 1991. Passed all stages of his diplomatic career; was an assistant, senior assistant, attaché of the press department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, employee of the UN Secretariat in New York, second and first secretary of the secretariat of the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, first secretary, adviser, minister-counselor of the USSR Embassy in the USA, member of the board of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, head of the US Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs THE USSR. In 1986-1988 - Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. In 1988-
1990 - First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. In 1990-1991 - Ambassador of the USSR to the USA. During his short tenure as Minister of Bessmertnykh, he took part in M. Gorbachev’s negotiations with Japanese and South Korean leaders in April, took part in the final meeting of the CMEA (June, Budapest), the liquidation of the Warsaw Pact (July, Prague), the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation USSR and Spain (July), preparation and implementation of M. Gorbachev's visit to London for the G7 meeting (July), preparation and signing of the Soviet-American Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (July 31).
Pankin B. D. (b. 1931) - during the days of the August 1991 events in Moscow, he refused to recognize the State Emergency Committee. After returning to Moscow, M. Gorbachev was appointed to the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, in which he remained for one hundred days - until November 19, 1991. During this time, in addition to numerous meetings with foreign representatives, the main event that the Minister of Foreign Affairs prepared and participated in was affairs, there was a Madrid summit on the Arab-Israeli settlement. On November 19, 1991, B. Pankin was appointed Ambassador of the USSR to Great Britain, and E. Shevardnadze again became minister.
Kozyrev A.V.(b. 1951) - statesman of Russia. He went through all the steps of the career ladder of a diplomat: from assistant to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia (appointed in October 1990). The period of his activity in this post (until January 1996) saw a radical restructuring of Russian foreign policy. At the same time, the opposition constantly accused Kozyrev of lacking a coherent concept of the country’s foreign policy. Contrasting him with Molotov (“Mr. NO”), representatives of the opposition often called Kozyrev “Mr. YES.” The main accusation brought against him was the secondary importance in Russian foreign policy of such an important area as the development of relations with the CIS countries. At the same time, during his work as minister, the threat of confrontation with the West practically receded. Russia joined the Council of Europe, joined the NATO Partnership for Peace program, joined the International Monetary Fund and a number of other international organizations, announced the redirection of its missiles from the territory of Western countries to uninhabited areas of the Earth, etc. All these measures in the opinion of the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Russia, were necessary for the country’s return to the European and world community as a full participant and partner. In January 1996, in connection with his election as a deputy of the State Duma, A. Kozyrev resigned from the post of minister.
Primakov E. M.(b. 1929) - since January 1996 - Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia. Since September 1998, Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation.
On September 15, Mr. Hodgson handed over to the People's Commissioner for Foreign Affairs a lengthy document, printed in the form of a note from the British Foreign Secretary, without an address and without a signature, dated September 7, which, according to Mr. Hodgson's explanation, was not intended for publication, but was received in the meantime , received wide publicity and was the subject of discussion in the press.
The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs had only to take a cursory glance at the document received to declare to Mr. Hodgson that the accusations contained therein were either without any foundation, or were based on false information and forged documents. However, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs did not consider it necessary to follow the example set by the British Foreign Office, which was too hasty in returning notes containing, in its opinion, accusations that were, at first glance, unfounded, and, striving to eliminate any reasons for misunderstandings between the Russian and the British Government, examined with the greatest care all the charges brought against him and all the facts that could become the basis for the said charges.
Accusing the Russian Government of violating the obligations it assumed on the basis of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of March 16 *, the English note refers to the activities of the Russian Government and its representatives in the countries of the East, allegedly directed against the interests of England. In substantiating its accusations, the note implicates the Third Communist International in the case, citing several reports allegedly made to its “Central Committee” by members and officials of the Russian Government, such as Messrs. Stalin, Eliava, Karakhan and Nuorteva, as well as citing a speech allegedly delivered on June 8 by Lenin at the Congress of the Third International. Indeed, the above quotations from reports and speeches form the background for the remaining accusations and should serve as proof that the policy deliberately pursued by the Russian Government is an attempt to undermine the influence of the British Government in the East and to arouse a revolutionary movement in the colonies and in countries dependent on Great Britain and that the Russian representatives in their activities they only implement this policy of the Third International, which, as the note states, is supposedly identical with the Russian Government.
The Russian Government wishes to take this opportunity to emphasize again, as it has done many times before, that the very fact that the Third International, for obvious reasons, has chosen Russia as the seat of its Executive Committee as the only country that provides complete freedom for the spread of communist ideas and personal freedom for communists, and also the fact that some members of the Russian Government as individuals belong to the Executive Committee, gives no more grounds for identifying the Third International with the Russian Government than identifying with the Belgian and British Government of the Second International, permanently resident in Brussels and having among its members Executive Committee of the Belgian Minister Mr. Vandervelde and member of the British Cabinet of Ministers Mr. Henderson. In addition, the Executive Committee of the Third International consists of 31 members, of which only 5 are Russians, and three of these latter do not belong to the Russian Government.
However, the Russian Government is able not only to formally reject the accusations based on its identification with the Third International, but also to refute these accusations on the merits. So, for example, Mr. Stalin, who, according to the English note, allegedly made various reports to the “Central Committee” on behalf of the “Eastern Department of the Third International” in June 1921 on the issues of this department, never had any connection with the Third International, to any of his departments and therefore did not have the opportunity to make the reports attributed to him and never did. Indeed, the Eastern Department ceased to exist in the autumn of 1920. Likewise, the quotation attributed to M. Eliave, who also never worked for or in connection with the Third International and never submitted any reports to the “Central Committee,” is false. Also, Mr. Karakhan never made any reports “On the situation in the Middle East” or on any other issues. Even less substantiated is the reference to a report allegedly made on June 20 by Mr. Nuorteva, whom the English note calls “the head of the Propaganda Department of the Third International.” Mr. Nuorteva also never performed any functions for the Third International, and there was no “Propaganda Department” at that time. Moreover, Mr. Nuorteva could not make the said report or any other similar reports in June 1921 for the simple reason that he had been in prison since March. As for the speech attributed to Mr. Lenin, allegedly delivered on June 8 at the Congress of the Third International, the British Government, if it wished to get acquainted with the Moscow newspapers, in which reports of the meetings of the congress were published daily, could be convinced that Mr. Lenin on June 8 did not make a speech and that in the few speeches he delivered at different times, the phrases attributed to him were completely absent, since they had nothing to do with the subject of his speeches.
It is quite clear that all the reports, speeches and statements listed in the English note are fictitious, fabricated and forged for some purpose. They appeared some time ago in various counter-revolutionary Russian newspapers, which also cited many other documents, circulars and letters allegedly emanating from the Third International, various Soviet institutions or Messrs. Lenin, Trotsky, Chicherin, Litvinov, Preobrazhensky or other Russians related to the Soviet Government. Trying to trace the origin of these forged documents back to their very sources, the Russian Government discovered a "Bulletin", published in Germany under the name "Ost-Information" by an anonymous group of detectives and delivered mainly to counter-revolutionary newspapers and secret agents of various governments who are seeking to obtain secret documents concerning Soviet Russia. Despite the “highly secret” mark, the newsletter not only does not hide, but directly prints the address of the printing house (A. Vinsar, Wilhelmstrasse 11, Berlin, S.W. 48), and in one of the numbers the name and address of its bank are indicated (Westerhagen and Co. 0 , Potsdamerstrasse 127, Berlin; Appendix I)*, where subscription money should be sent. Mr. Hodgson was shown at the Foreign Affairs Commissariat the original numbers of this bulletin, and photographs of some of the pages of the bulletin are enclosed with this note. It is in this very bulletin that most of the forged sensational documents are published, such as instructions, circulars, private letters, confessions, etc. of Soviet leaders. It was probably from this source that the false information about Soviet Russia and Soviet leaders that appeared in the official report of the Parliamentary Committee headed by Lord Emmott was gleaned. It is particularly deplorable that such fictitious reports and speeches should have found their way into an official note from the British Foreign Office as the basis for accusations against the Government of a friendly country. It is quite obvious that it is not a mere coincidence that most of the apocryphal reports and speeches of Stalin, Eliava, Nuorteva, Karahan and Lenin are published in the bulletin of German detectives practically in the same terms in which they are quoted in the British note, such as reports attributed to Eliava (Appendix II), Nuorteva, Karakhan (Appendix III), or a speech allegedly delivered by Lenin (Appendix IV).
The Soviet Government is clearly aware that the British Foreign Office has been misled by a gang of professional falsifiers and swindlers, and that if it had known from what dubious sources its information actually came, the note of September 7 would never have been written.
The Russian Government has not yet had the opportunity to discover the source of the equally false information of the British Government regarding the remaining charges which are mentioned in the note of September 7th under the heading "India", "Persia", "Turkestan", "Angora" and "Afghanistan" and which also in are largely based on the above non-existent reports and speeches. But it wishes to state in the most categorical manner that since the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Agreement it has had no relations, either direct or indirect, with Mr. Chattopadhyay or with any other revolutionaries of India; that there is no propaganda school in Tashkent for the purpose of training emissaries for India; that it has never had any relationship with Dr. Gafiz and knows nothing about his smokeless powder factory. However, it is true that one Indian who proposed to the Soviet Government to organize an arms trade in Kabul was arrested as an agent provocateur and is still in prison. The Soviet Government most definitely declines all responsibility for the actions in Kabul of Jemal Pasha, to whom no assistance was provided. The crossing of the Russian border on the way to Afghanistan by natives of India or persons belonging to another nationality is no more a violation of the Anglo-Russian Treaty than the hospitality and freedom of movement granted in England to a significant number of counter-revolutionary conspirators.
Further, the Soviet Government would like to point out that the statement contained in the British note that it tried to prevent the agreement of the Angora government with the British Government is without any basis, as well as the statement that the Soviet Government allegedly concentrated significant forces on the borders of Anatolia. This accusation is all the more unfounded since the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs only recently provided significant assistance to the meeting of the British official agent with the Turkish ambassador in Moscow, giving them the opportunity to discuss the differences between their governments.
If the British Foreign Office had had more accurate information and had had genuine Russian documents in hand, it would have known about the strict instructions given by the Russian Government after the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Agreement to its representatives in the East**, which ordered the latter to refrain from all anti-British propaganda and to adapt its activities to the new relations created between the Russian and British Governments after the signing of the Agreement. The Russian Government has no reason to believe that its representatives are not acting in accordance with instructions and that they are not limited to protecting Russian interests without violating the interests of Great Britain. True to its principle of the right of all peoples to self-determination, the Soviet Government and its representatives treat with the greatest respect the independence of the states of the East, refusing all advantages and concessions forced from them by the tsarist government, and providing even small material and monetary assistance, thereby correcting injustices caused to them by pre-revolutionary Russia. The Russian Government does not understand how assistance provided to Afghanistan quite openly, on the basis of the Treaty, about which the British Government was notified by Mr. Krasin, can be interpreted as an act unfriendly towards Great Britain. The accusations made in this case by the British Government are either vague and unsubstantial, or are based on completely fictitious facts, such as the report of Mr. Rothstein's formation of a revolutionary committee in Tehran or his attempts to obtain the resignation of Afghan representatives who, in fact, , he is highly valued and enjoys his personal friendship.
It can be assumed that in some cases representatives of the Russian Government may have unknowingly violated British interests without knowing exactly what they were. It should be remembered that during the negotiations for the Anglo-Russian Agreement it was the Russian Government that more than once demanded a full discussion of these issues and a precise definition of mutual obligations and that it did this with the sole purpose, as was stated in all its notes, to eliminate for the future any misunderstandings arising from the uncertainty of their obligations, and that it was the British Government that insisted on concluding an agreement by exchanging radio telegrams and reducing mutual obligations to an indefinite formula. Nevertheless, the Russian Government did everything in its power to accurately fulfill all the obligations it assumed and sought to avoid any causes of friction and misunderstanding; but it, of course, could not prevent the attackers from forging documents and thus misleading the British Government. It could not expect that the British Foreign Office would find it possible to use such documents in order to discredit the Russian Government and call into question the loyal fulfillment of its obligations.
The Russian Government, for its part, considers itself forced to note that the position taken by the British Government towards Russia in recent times has not been of a friendly nature. The arrest by the British authorities in Constantinople of a number of Russian trade representatives and their expulsion from there without bringing any charges against them, joint activities with the French government in the so-called “Russian question”, constant support for French plans aimed at preventing all attempts by various countries and international organizations to provide relief to the starving population of Russia, and, finally, the very presentation of the British note of September 7 with its serious accusations, based solely on fictitious facts and unverified information received from dubious sources, at a time when France was encouraging Poland and Romania to declare war Russia, are not facts of the kind that would lead the Russian Government to believe in the sincere desire of the British Government to cultivate friendly relations between the peoples and Governments of both countries.
The British Government are well aware of the readiness of the Russian Government to discuss in a friendly manner the best ways and means to remove all obstacles to the establishment of normal relations, and when the British Government, instead of resorting to unfounded accusations designed to impugn the integrity of the Russian Government and to discourage other nations from entering into agreement with Russia, for its part, will show the same readiness to resolve differences in a business way, it will see on the part of the Russian Government the same readiness to meet it halfway.
Deputy People's Commissar
for Foreign Affairs
Maxim Litvinov
Print. according to architect Published in gas. "News"
*Attachments are not printed.
Years with quality People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and was one of the first people's commissariats formed in accordance with the decree "On the establishment of the Council of People's Commissars."
On December 30, 1922, the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR adopted the Treaty on the Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The second session of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR approved the Constitution of the USSR on July 6, 1923, according to articles 49 and 51 of which the NKID USSR.
On November 12, 1923, the 4th session of the USSR Central Executive Committee approved a new regulation on the NKID of the USSR. The People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the Union republics and their representative offices abroad were liquidated. At the same time, Offices of Commissioners of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR were created in the union republics.
In 1923-1925, the head of the Office of the Commissioner of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR under the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR was Viktor Leontyevich Kopp, and in 1925-1927 - Semyon Ivanovich Aralov.
In 1944, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR was recreated. In 1944-1946, Anatoly Iosifovich Lavrentyev was the people's commissar. In 1946 it was reformed into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR.
In the early 30s, the second period of recognition of the USSR began, when diplomatic relations were established with Spain, the USA, Bulgaria, Hungary, Albania, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Colombia.
In December 1936, in accordance with the newly adopted Constitution of 1936, the NKID changed its name. He began to be called People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, but not for foreign affairs, as it was before.
People's Commissars for Foreign Affairs
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- Moscow-Washington. Kremlin politics and diplomacy, 1921–1941. In 3 volumes. Volume 1. 1921-1928, . The collection contains documents from the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation on the history of Soviet-American relations in the interwar period. Many unknown materials are being introduced into scientific circulation, covering issues...
About the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War V.M. Molotov
Paying a well-deserved tribute to the outstanding Soviet military leaders of the Great Patriotic War, we often forget that Victory was forged not only on the battlefield. A competent foreign policy was important for the country. Extraordinary skill has always been required from diplomats, and especially from Soviet diplomats, especially in the context of World War II. On the eve of Victory Day, it is appropriate to remember and pay tribute to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR in those difficult years - V.M. Molotov.
He was not specially prepared to lead foreign policy. Despite this, major Western politicians unanimously ranked him among the greatest diplomats of all times. He was not fluent in any foreign language. True, over the course of my life I gradually learned to read and understand texts in French, German and English. But over the course of (a total of) thirteen years, he many times had to conduct difficult negotiations with foreign leaders and diplomats on behalf of the Soviet state.
Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Scriabin was born on March 9 (NS) 1890 in the settlement of Kukarka, Vyatka province (now the city of Sovetsk). In Kazan, Scriabin entered a real school. There, in 1906, he joined the Bolshevik Party. He graduated from the real school as an external student upon returning from Vologda exile only in 1911. Judging by the not very distant place of exile, young Scriabin had not yet managed to accomplish high-profile deeds in the revolutionary field at that time. In 1912, Scriabin entered the Faculty of Economics of the St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, but studied there for only two years. His main occupation again became the revolutionary struggle.
Scriabin participated in the creation of the Bolshevik newspaper Pravda and was the editorial secretary. And in 1915 he was exiled a second time, this time far away - to the Irkutsk province. In the same year, he took the party pseudonym Molotov.
Shortly before the February Revolution, Molotov escaped from exile and again found himself in St. Petersburg, where he was co-opted into the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RSDLP(b). Old encyclopedias reported that at the time of the February Revolution, Molotov headed the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee. In any case, by the time of the overthrow of the autocracy, Molotov, despite his youth, was already one of the most authoritative members of the party among those who were free in Russia.
Immediately after the February Revolution, the return of prominent party figures from exile and emigration relegated Molotov to secondary roles. He became a more prominent figure after the end of the civil war. At the Tenth Congress of the RCP(b) in March 1921, he was elected a member of the Central Committee, and at the plenum held at the same time - the de facto first secretary of the Central Committee. In 1922, with the establishment of the post of General Secretary, to which I.V. was elected. Stalin, Molotov moved to a second role in the Secretariat.
In 1930, Molotov headed the Council of People's Commissars (SNK) of the USSR instead of A.I. Rykov, accused of “right deviation.”
Then, in the early 30s, Molotov hardly thought that he would have to directly conduct Soviet foreign policy for a long time. The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs was the long-time deputy G.V. Chicherina - M.M. Litvinov. True, when leaving his position in 1930, Chicherin named Molotov as one of his possible successors, and not Litvinov, with whom he was “at loggerheads.” But Litvinov led Soviet foreign policy quite confidently throughout almost the entire 30s. The undoubted successes of his diplomacy were: recognition of the USSR by the United States (1933), admission of the USSR to the League of Nations (1934) and the conclusion of a mutual assistance treaty with France (1935). In those years, the Soviet Union positioned itself as the vanguard of forces fighting against a new world war.
In 1938, when World War II became inevitable, the need arose for a particularly skillful policy of maneuvering between the camps of the imperialist powers, which would allow the USSR to remain out of the global fray for as long as possible.
The old rhetoric and the old methods were no longer suitable for this. After Munich, convinced of the desire of the Western powers to condone Hitler’s aggression in the East, Stalin began to think about seizing the initiative, reaching an agreement with Germany himself, redirecting the vector of its expansion, at least temporarily, to the West. Litvinov, who defended the idea of a new Entente with all his might, was not suitable for this. In May 1939, he was dismissed from his post as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. Molotov combined both posts - chairman of the government and head of the foreign policy department.
Enough has already been written about the non-aggression pact with Germany. Those who recognize its positive significance for the state interests of the USSR invariably highly appreciate Molotov’s merit in achieving this agreement. 
Many historians argue that Molotov did not have his own position: his foreign policy line was entirely Stalin’s line, he only carried out the leader’s instructions. It should be noted that the actual head of state, like Stalin in those years in the USSR, always and everywhere determines the main directions of foreign policy.
Let us at least recall the corresponding definition of the powers of the President of the Russian Federation in this area, given by the Constitution of the Russian Federation. But the implementation of these directions - a difficult and responsible task - falls entirely on the shoulders and head of the immediate head of the diplomatic department. The Stalin-Molotov tandem led Soviet foreign policy together during the most difficult 10 years of World War II and the Cold War. All these years, there was no doubt about Molotov’s competence as Minister (until 1946, People’s Commissar) of Foreign Affairs.
For an objective assessment of Molotov, let's turn to the opinions of foreign politicians about him, especially those who were hostile to our country.
US Secretary of State 1953-1959 John F. Dulles considered Molotov the greatest diplomat in the world since the early twentieth century. Winston Churchill gave a detailed description of Molotov:
“...I have never seen a human being who better fits the modern idea of an automaton. And yet, at the same time, he was obviously a reasonable and carefully polished diplomat... The way he behaved towards the Japanese ambassador for three years, when, as a result of the Tehran Conference, Stalin promised to attack Japan after the defeat of the German army, one can imagine from records of their conversations. One after another, ticklish, probing and difficult meetings were conducted with complete composure, with impenetrable secrecy and polite official correctness. The curtain was not lifted even for a moment... Correspondence with him on controversial issues was always useless and, if persisted in, ended in lies and insults... There is no doubt that in Molotov the Soviet machine found a capable and in many respects typical representative - always a loyal member of the party and follower of communism. Having lived to old age, I am glad that I did not have to endure the stress to which he was subjected - I would have preferred not to have been born at all. As for the leadership of foreign policy, Sully [the first minister of King Henry IV of France], Talleyrand and Metternich will gladly accept him into their company, if only there is such an afterlife where the Bolsheviks allow themselves access.”
If we discard in the characterization given by Churchill the epithets caused by the rejection of the Soviet system and annoyance at Molotov’s intransigence to the demands of the West, then the leader of Soviet foreign policy appears as one of the most skillful diplomats of all times.
The highest value that Vyacheslav Mikhailovich invariably guided in his diplomatic career was the state interests of the USSR. He always defended them with all his strength and conviction. He did not strive to be a “convenient partner” for the West. Hence the undisguised irritation with which his Western contemporaries wrote about him.
Each statesman has a kind of “finest hour”. In our opinion, Molotov had three such moments in a short time. These three moments determined a lot in the destinies of our country.
The first was Molotov’s visit to Berlin at the invitation of Hitler in November 1940. This trip and the negotiations that took place during it finally clarified for the Soviet leadership the intentions of the Nazi dictator towards the USSR, hidden under the guise of an “invitation” of the USSR to the Tripartite Pact. Immediately after Molotov’s return, following the results of his visit, Stalin said on November 18, 1940 at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks: “History has not yet known such figures as Hitler... Hitler constantly talks about his love of peace, but the main principle of his policy is treachery ... Hitler is preparing the same fate for the treaty with us ... We must always remember this and intensively prepare to repel fascist aggression.” 
Joachim von Ribentrop, J. Stalin, V. Molotov
The next moment was the signing of a neutrality treaty with Japan in Moscow on April 13, 1941. On the eve of the inevitable war with Germany, the USSR significantly reduced (as it turned out later, completely eliminated) the threat of war on two fronts at once. The achievement of an agreement was preceded by a long and persistent treatment by Molotov of the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Y. Matsuoka. He agreed to sign the agreement only on the way back to Japan from Europe through Russia. This was a major success for Soviet diplomacy.
Finally, the apotheosis of Molotov’s diplomatic service to the Fatherland can be considered his unprecedented flight from Moscow to England across the front line over occupied Europe in May 1942.
The Pe-8 long-range bomber, piloted by pilot Endel Pusep (Estonian by nationality), delivered the People's Commissar to Great Britain, and from there through Iceland to the USA. During this visit, Molotov concluded a treaty on the military alliance of the USSR with Great Britain and an agreement between the USSR and the USA on the principles of mutual assistance applicable in the war against aggression. This unprecedented dangerous flight of a statesman shocked Western leaders. One of the reasons why Molotov chose such a risky route was the intention to confuse the enemy: it was assumed that the Germans, knowing about the flight of the Soviet People's Commissar and trying to track down and destroy him, would not think that he would dare to fly over the territory they occupied.
As in the assessment of all Soviet figures of the Stalin era, without exception, in the assessment of Molotov, a large role is given to his participation in unjustified repressions. There will probably always remain a lot of ambiguous things here. But one thing is indisputable: those who loudestly exposed the “cult of personality” and its perpetrators in the mid-50s were themselves one of the main organizers of the repressions. Despite the fact that N.S. Khrushchev destroyed everything he could, the “execution” documents that bore his signature; after many decades, the truth still came out.
In 1949, the leader’s shadow of suspicion fell on Molotov: Molotov’s wife was involved in the so-called “case of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee”, arrested and exiled. Molotov was removed from the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs (he was replaced by A.Ya. Vyshinsky), although he remained one of the deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers (that is, Stalin). Historians put forward various versions of who from Stalin’s entourage sought at that time to “overthrow” Molotov as one of the leader’s likely successors. But it is clear that Stalin did not put “Mr. No” (as Molotov was nicknamed in the West for his intransigence) into disgrace forever. In October 1952, Molotov was elected to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee (as the party's highest governing body was now called).
In the last years of Stalin's rule, a number of miscalculations were made in Soviet foreign policy. There is a great temptation to assume that if Molotov had remained at the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in those years, he would not have allowed such a development of the situation in Korea, and would also have signed a peace treaty with Japan in San Francisco in 1951, according to which Tokyo would have abandoned the Kuril Islands .
After Stalin's death, Molotov was clearly the most honored member of the Presidium of the Central Committee. It would seem that fate destined him to be Stalin's successor. If this had happened, he could have been in the leadership of the Soviet state until 1986!
But Molotov clearly did not seek sole power. And in the ensuing struggle for power at the top of the party, he could not even hold on to his far from first place. Molotov was a competent leader of foreign policy and defended his own point of view in its matters. But his fellow rivals Malenkov and Khrushchev saw this only as an undermining of their positions and competition. Molotov did not approve of the early withdrawal of Soviet troops from Austria undertaken by Malenkov. He also condemned Khrushchev’s flirting with the pro-Western leadership of Yugoslavia. All this was used by the ruling group to remove Molotov from leadership of foreign policy.
On June 1, 1956, he was dismissed as Foreign Minister. But he retained the position of first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and a place on the Presidium of the Central Committee. Immediately after Molotov's resignation, major failures in Soviet foreign policy began. The situation in Poland and Hungary worsened, reaching a major political crisis in Poland and revolution in Hungary in the fall. The USSR behaved chaotically during the Suez crisis, which ended not because of Khrushchev’s threats to strike Tel Aviv and London with missiles, but because the United States did not support its allies (to Khrushchev’s threat, the United States immediately responded that then they would immediately attack THE USSR). In the fall of the same year, Bulganin (Malenkov had already been removed from the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers by that time) signed an agreement with Japan on the transfer to it in the future of the islands of Shikotan and Habomai, the “fruits” of which we are reaping in our time.
Molotov sharply criticized Khrushchev for losing control over the situation in Hungary, for concluding an ill-conceived agreement with Japan, and generally for underestimating the “threat of world imperialism.”
There is little doubt that one of the main motives for Molotov’s discontent was Khrushchev’s unfounded, in his opinion, criticism of Stalin at the 20th Congress of the CPSU.
At the top of the party there was growing dissatisfaction with Khrushchev's dictatorial leadership style. The opposition began to group around Molotov, even those who had previously intrigued against him - Kaganovich and Malenkov. In June 1957, they attempted to remove Khrushchev from the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee. They managed to temporarily win over the majority of the Presidium members. But Khrushchev’s supporters managed to hold out with the final decision until the convening of the plenum of the Central Committee. The balance of forces has changed. And the planned removal of Khrushchev (they were supposed to leave him the post of Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers) turned into a “comradely” trial of “the anti-party group of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Shepilov, who joined them.” It is curious that the resolution of the Central Committee “On the Anti-Party Group” was adopted unanimously, not excluding the “tearfully repentant” oppositionists themselves, with only one abstention. It turned out to be Molotov.
Appointed to the post of ambassador to Mongolia, and later the representative of the USSR to the IAEA, Molotov did not stop political activities. His last act was a detailed criticism of the draft new CPSU Program (1961), which he sent in the form of a note to the Central Committee. In response, Molotov was not only recalled to the USSR, but expelled from the party and sent into retirement. He was reinstated into the CPSU only two years before his death, in 1984.
Molotov's vast experience and supreme competence in the diplomatic struggle were an important asset of the human capital of the Soviet state.
It remains to be regretted that his knowledge and talents were not in demand since the mid-50s. Preserving the Victory Diplomat at the leadership of Soviet foreign policy would undoubtedly allow the USSR to avoid the gross foreign policy miscalculations made under Khrushchev, who did not take into account the advice of experts in anything and sought to single-handedly lead everything.
Merits of V.M. Molootov's service to the Motherland during the war years was undoubtedly high. Meanwhile, the memory of the Victory Diplomat is not marked anywhere.
As if the decision to condemn the “anti-party group” with his participation still plays some invisible role in this! A collection of his speeches and diplomatic correspondence is still awaiting its publisher. We can only hope that in the near future the name of Molotov will still take in the minds of our compatriots the place he deserves among the creators of Victory on the diplomatic front.
Yaroslav Butakov.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Secret diplomacy of the Kremlin Mlechin Leonid Mikhailovich
People's Commissar and His Deputies
People's Commissar and His Deputies
Not only the People's Commissar himself, but also the board of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, consisting of five people, was approved by the Politburo, heads of departments - the organizational bureau of the Central Committee. The NKID board consisted of the People's Commissar himself, his first deputy Nikolai Krestinsky (former secretary of the Central Committee, who retired from party affairs due to his proximity to Trotsky), second deputy Lev Karakhan, a handsome and affable man who married a famous ballerina, and Boris Stomonyakov, a longtime friend Litvinov.
Chicherin considered Karakhan “a very subtle, brilliant, talented politician,” and did not like Stomonyakov: “a dry formalist, without flexibility, without political flair, pugnacious, unpleasant, spoiling relationships.” Litvinov, on the contrary, distinguished Stomonyakov, but could not stand Karakhan. They wanted to send Stomonyakov to Berlin, but he refused and eventually became deputy people's commissar. The position of the fifth member of the NKID board remained unfilled.
Litvinov, having become the People's Commissar, continued to oversee the 3rd department - the Anglo-Saxon and Romanesque countries close to him. The 2nd Western Department - Central Europe and Scandinavia - was headed by Krestinsky. The People's Commissar was dry and harsh, perhaps imitating Stalin's style. But one could argue with Litvinov. Discussions in the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs stopped only with the arrival of Molotov.
Krestinsky remained accessible and simple. Nikolai Nikolaevich worked at the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs until the spring of 1937, when he was suddenly transferred to the People's Commissariat of Justice and almost immediately arrested. He was made one of the main defendants in the trial of the “anti-Soviet right-wing Trotskyist bloc” in March 1938.
In May 1933, Grigory Yakovlevich Sokolnikov was appointed deputy people's commissar for the Far Eastern countries (Japan, China, Mongolia), who played an important role in the Civil War, then became people's commissar of finance and a candidate member of the Politburo. He was also considered a person close to Trotsky, and in 1929 he was sent as plenipotentiary envoy to England. In the fall of 1932, Sokolnikov asked to go home. He was appointed to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. He dealt with relations with Mongolia for some time, and then became deputy people's commissar, but not for long. His relationship with Litvinov did not work out; in 1934, the number of deputies in the People's Commissariat was reduced, and Sokolnikov was transferred to the first deputy in the People's Commissariat of the Timber Industry. In 1936 he was arrested and sentenced to ten years in prison. He was killed in prison.
Lev Mikhailovich Karakhan remained Deputy People's Commissar for Middle Eastern countries (Afghanistan, Persia, Turkey, Arabian countries). Karakhan, close to the previous People's Commissar Chicherin, did not have a good relationship with Litvinov. Maxim Maksimovich did not like his deputy, so under him Karakhan stopped replacing the head of the department during the People's Commissar's business trips.
In May 1934, from the post of second deputy people's commissar, Lev Mikhailovich was sent as ambassador to Turkey. Karahan was bored in Ankara and asked for more active work. On December 31, 1936, he wrote to People’s Commissar of Defense Voroshilov, with whom he was on first terms, complaining that he was depressed by his current position, that he had no prospects in the NKID line and would have left for another job: “My thoughts keep returning to the NKVD. I could be useful there. There is a lot of work going on there on foreign affairs, and I could be a good assistant to Yezhov.”
It is amazing that even the highest officials then had such a poor understanding of what was happening. The NKVD really became interested in Karakhan. But for a different purpose. He was recalled to Moscow only to be arrested and shot...
In 1934, the collegiums in all people's commissariats, including the NKID, were liquidated. Under Chicherin, real disputes took place at meetings; members of the board, Litvinov for example, allowed themselves to disagree with the People’s Commissar and write to the Central Committee, defending their position. But Stalin decided that the boards were an administrative excess. The Politburo decided: “In the interests of completing the principle of unity of command in the management of the People’s Commissariats, it is considered advisable to liquidate the boards of the People’s Commissariats, leaving the People’s Commissar and no more than two deputies at the head of the People’s Commissariats.”
Instead of four deputies, Litvinov was left with two - Krestinsky (first deputy) and Stomonyakov (second). This strengthened his power within the People's Commissariat. Moreover, at the beginning of 1934, Litvinov was elected a member of the Central Committee.
Stomoniakov headed the 1st Western Department (relations with Poland and the Baltic states). This was the main department, because relations with Poland remained decisive for the then Soviet leadership, and the People's Commissar trusted Boris Stomoniakov more than others. When mass repressions began in the People's Commissariat, Litvinov made efforts to save Stomonyakov, who at the time of his arrest tried to shoot himself and ended up in a prison hospital. Litvinov asked to see Stalin. Realizing what he was risking, he said firmly:
I vouch for Stomonyakov.
Stalin replied:
Comrade Litvinov, you can only vouch for yourself.
Stomoniakov was destroyed. Of the entire leadership of the People's Commissariat, only Maxim Maksimovich himself survived...
At first, the staff of the plenipotentiary missions was small - the plenipotentiary himself, the adviser, the first secretary, the military attache, and the consul general. Next came the technical staff - consulate secretaries, supply manager, cryptographer, security from the OGPU (then NKVD).
Moscow ensured that Soviet diplomats lived modestly. In 1926, in the minutes of a Politburo meeting they wrote:
"1. Plenipotentiary representatives and trade representatives in Germany, Latvia and Estonia are severely reprimanded for their excesses and revelry on the day of the 9th anniversary of the revolution, which compromise our Republic in the eyes of the workers.
2. Instruct the NK RKI to collect comprehensive material on this case and present draft measures to strictly regulate the expenses of all embassies and trade missions, based on the need to reduce them by half.”
Muza Vasilyevna Kanivez, the wife of Fyodor Raskolnikov, who was plenipotentiary envoy to Afghanistan, Estonia, Denmark, and Bulgaria, left memories of her ambassadorial life. When she and her husband came to Moscow on vacation and sincerely said that they were tired of living away from their homeland, one of their colleagues answered in a whisper:
Don’t rush, Muzochka, to return from abroad. It's a hell of a life here.
Even then, employees of embassies tried to publicly criticize the host country and life abroad in general. They knew that among the listeners there would definitely be a secret state security officer who was vigilantly monitoring the morale of the embassy staff. If a Soviet diplomat liked bourgeois reality and did not know how to hide it, he was quickly returned to his homeland. And many people already wanted to work abroad - there was hunger and poverty in their homeland.
Some diplomats chose not to return at all. In just one year, from the autumn of 1928 to the autumn of 1929, seventy-two employees of the foreign apparatus refused to return to the Soviet Union. The selection for foreign work became even more stringent - those who were found to have relatives abroad, “non-proletarian origin” or deviations from the party line were not allowed in.
In 1929, the problem was discussed at a meeting of the Politburo. “The unrest revealed in the Soviet foreign missions” was reported by the old Bolshevik Boris Anisimovich Roizenman, a member of the presidium of the Central Control Commission and a member of the board of the People's Commissariat of Workers' and Peasants' Control. He was involved in foreign personnel and checking the work of foreign institutions.
Resolved:
“a) Instruct the People's Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate to submit concrete proposals to the Politburo on all issues arising from the report of Comrade. Roizenman (list of recalled persons, staff reductions, etc.), as well as on the following issues that arose in connection with his report:
1) destruction of secret funds in all foreign embassies,
2) maximum reduction of existing representative offices of various organizations,
3) preventing the formation of new representative offices without special permission and their registration in the Tax Code of the RKI.
b) Create a commission to study the reasons causing the disintegration of our workers abroad and the refusal to return to the USSR.”
In the twenties, the diplomatic corps consisted of old Bolsheviks, educated people who had been abroad and knew languages. In the thirties, they began to send “promotes” abroad, as they said then, that is, party members mobilized for diplomatic work, completely unprepared and not “spoiled” by knowledge of foreign languages. Only diplomats were allowed to communicate with foreigners. The rest - that is, the technical and administrative apparatus of the embassy - had to stew in their own juice. This gave rise to conflicts in a small team that were worse than in a cramped communal apartment. They quarreled, wrote denunciations against each other to the plenipotentiary and directly to Moscow. All those who went abroad handed over party cards, but meetings of the party cell were held at the plenipotentiary office, and they could criticize the plenipotentiary representative, reporting their opinion to the Central Committee apparatus.
We tried not to let anyone go abroad unless absolutely necessary. In 1930, the Politburo decided:
"1. Temporarily, until a special resolution of the Central Committee: ban business trips abroad for theaters, sports teams, delegates to exhibitions, writers, musicians, etc., as well as, as a rule, delegates to scientific congresses. Exceptions are allowed only in each individual case according to a special resolution of the Central Committee.
2. Reduce the plans of departments for foreign business trips, with the exception of business trips for study, especially strictly cut down on business trips for operations that can be carried out by the staff of trade missions.
3. In order to reduce the duration of business trips, it is necessary to recognize the issuance of foreign passports for limited periods (3–6 months).
4. In order to increase the responsibility of departments, prohibit the Central Committee commission on travel from considering business trips not approved by the People's Commissar (in industry - personally approved by the chairmen of associations and the authorized deputy chairman of the Supreme Economic Council). At the same time, responsibility for the personal selection of secondees should be assigned to one of the members of the board, subject to approval by the Central Committee.
5. The Commission of the Central Committee on travel, together with the currency department of the People's Commissariat of Finance, develop and within ten days submit for approval to the Central Committee a subsistence minimum for each country where business trips are given, as well as the cost (the currency part of it) of travel. The amount of currency issued for each trip should be approved by the travel commission. Categorically prohibit both departments and trade missions, under pain of criminal liability, from making any additional issuances of currency to business travelers.
6. In case of early completion of assignments or discreditable behavior of secondees, representatives of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate report this to the plenipotentiary and trade representatives regarding secondment to the Soviet Union.
7. Grant the right to plenipotentiary envoys, at the proposal of representatives of the RKI, to send persons on business trips abroad to Moscow within 24 hours.”
The plenipotentiaries themselves allowed themselves to object to the People's Commissar and challenge his instructions. In general, they behaved quite independently. The People's Commissariat imposed discipline with the help of Politburo resolutions. Let's say in 1926 they made the following decision:
“On the absence of employees of embassies
b) In view of the statement of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs that at the Paris embassy at the same time (without the permission of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs) comrades went on vacation. Rakovsky and Davtyan, propose to the NKID to immediately take measures to ensure that the plenipotentiary representative (or adviser) is summoned to his place of work in Paris.
c) Oblige the NKID to take measures to ensure that henceforth questions about absences (vacations, trips to Moscow, etc.) of the main employees of embassies are carried out with the permission of the NKID, and in necessary cases, the Central Committee.
d) Send this resolution to all plenipotentiaries..."
Before the start of mass repressions, the diplomatic service, like all life in the country, had not yet settled down. Much was decided by personal relationships and connections in the central apparatus. In the twenties (very widely) and back in the early thirties, some plenipotentiary representatives - former major party workers - directly addressed members of the Politburo with whom they had personal relationships, and even Stalin himself. Litvinov's party status was higher than Chicherin's, but he did not belong to the top, so recent party workers did not feel like his subordinates. Although Litvinov, like his successors, demanded that all appeals to the top go through the People's Commissariat.
Plenipotentiary Representative in Czechoslovakia Alexander Yakovlevich Arosev complained to Stalin: “The department does not want the Plenipotentiary Representative to have the opportunity to communicate directly with the Politburo or its members. The department wants its officials to occupy all positions.” Arosev did not miss the opportunity to note that Litvinov was close to the right, and Deputy People's Commissar Krestinsky was a Trotskyist. Litvinov could not do anything, because Arosev once studied with Molotov, and served exile with Voroshilov.
Stalin did not object when the plenipotentiary representatives addressed him directly. He hosted Soviet representatives in the largest countries in the Kremlin. This made it possible to obtain additional information, including about relationships within the People’s Commissariat, although the Secretary General did not allow diplomats to engage in any initiative. The main thing in Stalin's diplomacy was conscious self-restraint: everyone must do what he was entrusted with, accurately and literally follow the instructions of the leadership.
The ambassador to Sweden, Alexandra Mikhailovna Kollontai, wrote in her diary in 1933 after a meeting with Stalin: “In our work there is no need to be proactive. We need to “carry out tasks.”
On December 22, 1933, Litvinov complained to Stalin regarding personnel appointments at the plenipotentiary mission in the United States, because of which he disagreed with the plenipotentiary representative Alexander Troyanovsky: “You have repeatedly (and just the other day) reproached me for not using my authority as People’s Commissar in my relations with plenipotentiaries. You will probably agree that the People’s Commissar cannot have this authority when, during his conflict with the plenipotentiary on a matter in which the plenipotentiary cannot understand anything, the Central Committee completely resolves the issue in his favor ... "
Having become People's Commissar, Litvinov updated the composition of ambassadors; former politicians were replaced by the first professional diplomats. The selection of diplomatic personnel was carried out by the organizational and distribution department of the Central Committee, which had a foreign sector. People were transferred from party jobs to diplomatic work and people were taken from production. They often lacked basic training. In 1934, the Politburo approved a draft resolution of the Council of People's Commissars on the transfer from the reserve fund to the disposal of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the funds necessary for the organization of the Institute of Diplomatic and Consular Officers. By decision of the Politburo, his listeners were also granted a deferment from conscription into the army and were exempted from military training for the duration of their studies.
The diplomats were directly dealt with by a commission to verify comrades who had returned to the USSR from work abroad. It existed within the apparatus of the party inquisition - the Central Control Commission.
On August 11, 1937, Georgy Maximilianovich Malenkov, a rising party star, head of the department of leading party organs of the Central Committee, reported to Stalin: “On your instructions, fifty workers have been selected for the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. All these workers were checked by the Organizational and Distribution Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, as well as through the NKVD. I received each of the selected comrades, after which Comrade became acquainted with them. Litvinov."
In 1938, a new rule was introduced: all those working abroad must come home on vacation so that the security officers could take a closer look at them.
The Politburo decision stated:
"1. Establish that employees of foreign institutions of the USSR are obliged to spend their holidays in the Soviet Union.
2. Offer the People’s Commissariats to pay for the travel of employees of foreign institutions of the USSR who come on vacation to the Soviet Union.”
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From the book Stalin and the Conspirators of '41. Search for truth author Meshcheryakov Vladimir PorfirievichPart 2. People's Commissar of the Navy Kuznetsov remembers... We have already addressed the memoirs of Admiral Kuznetsov set out in his book “The Course to Victory”, and also cited his interview given to the historian Kumanev. But he also has a book “On the Eve”. She also represents a certain
author Lobanov Mikhail Petrovich From the book Special Services of the First Years of the USSR. 1923–1939: Towards the Great Terror author Simbirtsev IgorThe First People's Commissar of the NKVD Yagoda clearly took Stalin's appointment as head of the NKVD on July 10, 1934 for granted, not suspecting that his path to the scaffold had begun. In the meantime, at the peak of his greatness, he became a member of the party’s Central Committee, and soon the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs with the rank of General Commissar
From the book 1937: The Red Army Elite at Golgotha author Cherushev Nikolay SemenovichPeople's Commissar of the Navy Gamarnik's shot was fired on May 31 - and the post of head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army became vacant. In reality, first of all, Army Commissar 2nd Rank Gayk Osepyan, the current deputy of Yan Borisovich and former
From the book History of Russian Investigation author Koshel Pyotr AgeevichPeople's Commissar Yezhov becomes a writer
From the book Stalin in the memoirs of contemporaries and documents of the era author Lobanov Mikhail PetrovichPeople's Commissar of Ammunition B. Vannikov “Delivered from Prison” In early June 1941, two and a half weeks before the start of the Great Patriotic War, I was removed from the post of People's Commissar of Armaments of the USSR and arrested. And less than a month after the attack by Nazi Germany
From the book Stalin by Beladi LaszloPeople's Commissar for Nationalities' Affairs The project circulating among some comrades for the restoration of the old provinces (Tiflis, Baku, Erivan) with a single Transcaucasian government at the head is, in my opinion, a utopia, moreover, a reactionary utopia, because such
