August 26 Battle of Borodino. Battle of Borodino (1812)

The Patriotic War of 1812 was the greatest test for the Russian people and at the same time a turning point in the spiritual life of the whole country. The enemy's invasion of Russia, the battle of Borodino, the fire of Moscow, the tense struggle against the armies of Napoleon caused a mighty popular upsurge.

Napoleon long and carefully prepared for war with Russia. Two operational plans for possible military operations were prepared. The first provided for the luring of Russian armies beyond the borders of the Russian Empire, into the territory of the Duchy of Warsaw dependent on Napoleon, the encirclement and defeat of Russian troops. The second plan called for a decisive blow to the Russians. The emperor intended to cross the Neman with the forces of a 610,000-strong army and beat the enemy in one pitched battle.

The Russians chose a defensive war plan, and the military command drew up a disposition for the deployment of three Western armies. The 1st Western Army, the largest (commander-in-chief - Minister of War M. B. Barclay de Tolly; more than 120 thousand with 550 guns stood at the crossroads to St. Petersburg and Moscow, between the city of Vilna (Vilnius) and the upper reaches of the Neman River, occupying a defense line of 180-200 km.

The 2nd Western Army of Bagration (about 45 thousand with 180-200 guns) defended a line 100 km south of the 1st Army. It was assumed that she would close the road to Moscow and Kyiv, acting on the flank of Napoleon's army. The 3rd Western Army of A.P. Tormasov (45 thousand with 170 guns) stood much to the south, 200 km from Bagration in the Lutsk region in Volyn. Its main task was to protect Kyiv from a possible invasion by Austrian troops.

On June 11-18, the French "Great Army" crossed the Russian border. On June 13, the city of Kovno was occupied, and on the 16th the French entered Vilna; On June 19, having clarified the situation, Napoleon decided not to allow the Russian armies to join. Against the army of Barclay de Tolly, he led Murat's cavalry, and against the army of Bagration, Napoleon - 3 columns of troops that were subordinate to Marshal Davout. The French emperor expected this maneuver to strike at the flank of the troops of the 2nd army moving north.

Under the circumstances, both Russian armies were forced to start a retreat to join. By June 29, the 1st Army concentrated in the Drissa camp, where it received reinforcements (10 thousand people) and rest.

The actions of the 2nd Army took place in a difficult situation. By 21, having passed 80 km, the army reached Nikolaev and the next day began crossing the Neman. But it soon became known that the enemy was striving to cut off all escape routes for her. Then Bagration decided to fight his way through. July 14 at the village. Saltanovka, Bagration, rushing out of encirclement, dealt a serious blow to Davout's troops, and on 13-14, when Bagration's forces were crossing the Dnieper, the 1st Army fought several heated rearguard battles. On July 13, under Ostrovshchina, General Osterman-Tolstoy ordered his troops to "stand and die", holding back Murat's attacks. The next day there was a fight Kakuvyachyne. The Russians retreated to Vitebsk, where Napoleon approached on July 15.

However, the French failed to impose a general battle here. On July 22, breaking away from the French, the 1st and 2nd Russian armies joined near Smolensk. The initial period of the war is over. The enemy troops withdrew beyond the Western Dvina-Dnepr line. Napoleon achieved a major political success. In his hands were Lithuania, Belarus and most of Courland.

Napoleon had to abandon the attack on Petersburg. Having captured Riga, it was impossible to carry out offensives along the coast; The Kiev direction lost its meaning after Davout refused to oppose Russia. The only option left was an attack on Moscow. Napoleon regrouped his troops, and also rebuilt the rear. The new operating line ran from Warsaw to Minsk, Orsha and further to Smolensk.

For the Russians, Moscow became the main operational direction. It turned out that the Russian army did not have a reserve base behind the line of the Dvina and the Dnieper. The question arose again of basing, of new lines of operations. But it was no longer Barclay de Tolly, not Bagration, but Kutuzov who had to solve them.

The main event of the Patriotic War of 1812 was undoubtedly the famous battle on August 26 (September 7) not far from Mozhaisk, near the village of Borodino.

Pursuing the retreating Russian troops, Napoleon all the time strove for a pitched battle, hoping to destroy the Russian army and end the war with one blow. At the beginning of the campaign, he had a great chance of winning, as he had a significant superiority in strength. Having delved into the vast expanses of Russia for almost 1000 km, Napoleon faced the fact of a gradual alignment of the balance of power. However, before the battle of Borodino, the French army was still numerically superior to the Russian, and, in addition, Napoleon hoped for a qualitative superiority of his troops and command staff. Therefore, he was firmly convinced of his victory and set himself the goal of completely defeating the Russians in a decisive battle and thereby opening his way to Moscow, after the capture of which he would quickly conclude peace. The battle of Borodino clearly showed the failure of Napoleon's strategy.

Kutuzov, having taken command of the army stationed in Tsarevo-Zaimishche on August 17, also considered it necessary to give the French a general battle on the way to Moscow. He knew that Napoleon still had a numerical superiority over the Russian army. He highly appreciated the military talent of Napoleon and his marshals, as well as the combat effectiveness of the French troops. But Kutuzov hoped to compensate for the superiority of the French by the skillful organization of the battle in a pre-selected position. The goal of the battle Kutuzov set was the defeat of the attacking army of Napoleon and the defense of Moscow.

Upon arrival at Tsarevo-Zaimishche, Kutuzov rode around the intended position on horseback and made sure that it was impossible to take the battle on it. The commander-in-chief decided to continue the retreat until a more favorable situation.

On August 22, Kutuzov with the main forces approached the village of Borodino. The commander of the Russian rearguard, General P.P. Konovnitsyn, having endured two heated battles with the French avant-garde: at Gridnev, about 25 km from Borodino, and at the Kolotsky Monastery, about 10 km from Borodino, joined the main forces on the same day.

So, on the morning of August 22, 1812, the main forces of the Russian army began to concentrate in the area of ​​​​the village of Borodino. M. I. Kutuzov carefully examined the area and ordered the construction of fortifications to begin.

The area in the area of ​​Borodino (located 12 km west of Mozhaisk) is heavily hilly and crossed by a significant number of rivers and streams that have formed deep ravines. The eastern part of the Borodino field is more elevated than the western. The river flows through the village. Koloch. It has a high and steep bank, which well covered the right flank of the position of the Russian army. The left flank approached a shallow forest, heavily overgrown with dense shrubs and swampy in places. This forest presented serious difficulties for the movement of significant masses of enemy infantry and cavalry, in the event of an attempt to make a flank bypass. Most of the tributaries of the Kolocha - the river Voina, the streams Semenovsky, Kamenka, Ognik and others, the banks of which were densely overgrown with shrubs, crossed the Borodino field from south to north and therefore could serve as a convenient position for shooters. From west to east through vil. Valuevo passed Bolshaya, or New, Smolenskaya road, which was of great strategic importance. Almost parallel to it, about 4 km south of the village of Borodino, the Old Smolensk road passed. Having taken a position at Borodino, the Russian army had the opportunity to cover both of these roads leading to Moscow. In the depths of the position, the terrain was also wooded. It made it possible to successfully position and camouflage reserves well.

On the right flank, well protected by the high banks of the Kolocha and essentially impregnable to the enemy, as well as in the center, Kutuzov decided to deploy significant forces: three infantry, three cavalry corps and a large Cossack detachment of General M. I. Platov. By deploying his troops in this way, the commander sought to force the French emperor to conduct a frontal offensive with the main forces in a narrow defile between Koloch and Utitsky forest, excluding the possibility of enveloping the flanks of the Russian position. The troops of the right flank, occupying a position near the New Smolensk road, were a strong grouping of infantry and cavalry, which posed a serious threat to the left wing of the Napoleonic army. These troops could also be used as a reserve. Kutuzov ordered the construction of bridges, crossings over ravines and streams so that, if necessary, it would be possible to transfer the troops of the right flank to the left at the moment when the enemy would launch an offensive there with the main forces. The most vulnerable part of the Borodino position was its left flank. Kutuzov understood this well and took measures to strengthen his position with engineering structures. On the left flank, near vil. Semenovskoye, three flushes (earth fortifications) were built, which later received the name "Bagration's", since during the Battle of Borodino they were defended by Bagration's troops. To the west of the flushes there was an advanced fortification - the Shevardino redoubt. On the right flank, near vil. Maslovo, the Russians erected a group of earthen fortifications, redoubts and lunettes. In the center, at the height of Kurgannaya, they built an 18-gun battery, which went down in history as the Raevsky battery.

By the time it approached Borodino, Napoleon's army had suffered very heavy losses (killed, sick, deserters). Significant detachments were assigned to guard the sprawling lines of communication to secure the flanks of the main forces advancing on Moscow. Only about 130 thousand soldiers of the "Great Army" reached Borodino. (Kutuzov M. I. Materials of the anniversary session of the military academies of the Red Army dedicated to the 200th anniversary of the birth of M. I. Kutuzov,-Military Publishing House, 1947. P. 88.) But these were selected soldiers, the most powerful, persistent in battles, confident in their own invincibility, in the outstanding qualities of their generals and officers, the brilliant of the military talent of their leaders. They believed Napoleon, who said that they were facing the last crushing one; according to Russian, after which they will have rich booty in Moscow, a choir of an apartment, generous rewards and a happy return home. Thus set up, well trained and organized, the French army near Borodino was a formidable force. She rushed into battle to overturn the last obstacle - the Russian army, blocking the road to Moscow and to the world. Napoleon Bonaparte brought the best part of his army to the Borodino field: the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 6th corps, reserve cavalry, as well as the elite of the French troops - the Imperial Guard, led by marshals Mortier and Bessières. But no less formidable force opposed the French on the Borodino field. The Russian army, reorganized in the period 1807-1813, was not much inferior to the French. And with courage, boundless readiness to defend the Motherland from the conquerors, the Russians surpassed Napoleon's army.

In the Patriotic War of 1812, the names of Bagration, Dokhturov, Barclay de Tolly, N. N. Raevsky, Konovnitsyn, Miloradovich, Platov and many others were covered with immortal glory. As for the soldiers, although there were many recruits in Kutuzov's army, there were also veteran heroes of the Suvorov and Kutuzov campaigns, especially non-commissioned officers. Many of them had already fought the French in 1799, 1805 and 1807. These veterans, no less than Napoleon's Old Guard, had the right to consider themselves invincible, and the young soldiers of the Russian army were equal to them.

All the memoirs of contemporaries testify to the high patriotic upsurge in the ranks of the Russians on the Borodino field. The army had long been waiting for a decisive battle with the enemy and grumbled, complaining about the constant retreat. When it became clear to everyone that the battle would really be given, that the retreat was over, the Russian troops began to prepare for battle. They decided to die, but not let the French go to Moscow. The officers asked Kutuzov's permission to dress up in battle uniforms. The soldiers cleaned and sharpened weapons, put uniforms and equipment in order. The heroic Russian army was preparing for the last formidable parade. In front of the Russian position was the Shevardinsky redoubt, which had the character of an advanced fortification. Behind him lay the entire left flank of the Russians, where at vil. Semenovskoye fortifications were erected. On August 24, the battle of the troops of General M. D. Gorchakov on the 2nd took place with the main forces of Napoleon for Shevardino. Until the very night, the Russians held back the attacks of the French, thus giving Bagration time to strengthen his positions.

After a tough battle on August 24, the Russians occupied the line of Maslovo, Borodino, Semenovskoye, Utitsa. The French began to deploy for an attack on the front west of Borodino, Aleksinki, Shevardino and south. On August 25, both sides prepared for battle, reconnaissance ended and final orders were given. The French conducted a series of military operations (reconnaissance) north of Borodino and south of Utitsa, which confirmed Napoleon's assessment of the terrain in these directions: it was unsuitable for large masses of troops. Judging by the available data, on August 25, both commanders - Napoleon and Kutuzov - as a result of the battle for the Shevardinsky redoubt and reconnaissance, adopted the following battle plans.

NAPOLEON'S PLAN. With a massive blow of infantry and cavalry, with the support of powerful artillery fire, to break through the Russian combat position in the Semenov flushes sector, the Kurgan battery. Following this, introduce reserves into the breakthrough, direct a strike to the north at the flank of the Russian grouping that covered the New Smolensk road, press it against the Moscow River and destroy it. At the same time, on the flanks against Borodino and Utitsa, carry out auxiliary attacks, of which the attack on Utitsa, which contributed to the breakthrough from the south near the Semenov flushes, was to be of particular importance.

PLAN KUTUZOV. By the evening of August 24, Kutuzov quite accurately determined the direction of the main attack of the French. In this regard, he made a partial regrouping on August 25, strengthening his left flank. In its final form, Kutuzov's plan boiled down to inflicting the greatest possible losses on the enemy in the direction of his main attack by stubborn resistance of limited forces and upsetting him. At the same time, to maintain complete freedom of maneuver of their reserves, placing them during the battle outside the reach of the enemy. Accordingly, Kutuzov deployed a large contingent of troops, reliably covering the New Smolensk road.

On August 26 at 5:30 the sun came out. Napoleon's order was read to the troops. It said: “Warriors! Here is the fight you've been longing for. Victory is up to you. She is necessary for you, she will provide us with everything we need: comfortable apartments and a speedy return to the fatherland. Act as you acted under Austerlitz, Friedland, Vitebsk, Smolensk. May later posterity proudly remember your exploits in this day. Let them say about each of you: he was in the great battle near Moscow! (Rastunov I. I. Patriotic War of 1812. M., 1987. P. 22.)

The dawn broke, the fog dissipated, the first ray of the sun flashed. "This is the sun of Austerlitz!" Napoleon exclaimed. A heavy gun rumbled from the direction of the Russian positions, as it seemed that the French were approaching. But there was no movement yet.

At about six o'clock in the morning an attack began against the right flank of the Russians on the village of Borodino. The soldiers of the Life Guards of the Chasseurs Regiment engaged in a firefight with the enemy, and then in hand-to-hand combat. In his report to Alexander I about the battle of Borodino, Kutuzov writes that the Life Guards of the Chasseurs Regiment stopped the enemy and that for more than an hour, in full view of the entire army, they held back the onslaught of the French.

However, the Russians had to retreat behind the river. Koloch. The French on the shoulders of the retreating broke into their positions. But at that moment, the 1st Jaeger Regiment arrived in time to help the Life Guards Jaeger Regiment. Connecting with the retreating, he rushed to the enemy. With a cry of "Hurrah!", the Russians not only drove the enemy from their positions, but also themselves, having crossed the river. Kolocha, broke into the French positions. However, it was very risky to stay there, and the Russian soldiers moved back, and the last retreating ones set fire to the bridge over the river. During the entire battle of Borodino in this area, the French and Russians limited themselves to skirmishing. The attack on the village of Borodino is over. However, this enemy offensive was demonstrative in nature. The main events unfolded at the Bagration flushes of the 1st battery of Raevsky.

At 6 o'clock the troops of Marshal Davout launched an attack on the flushes. The flashes were defended by the consolidated grenadier division of M. S. Vorontsov and the 27th infantry division of D. N. Neverovsky. Despite the triple superiority of the enemy, the Russians fought courageously and were fearless. They met the attacking columns of the French with powerful artillery fire, and after approaching they rushed at the enemy with hostility. The enemy could not stand it and, leaving piles of dead and wounded, randomly retreated. The first French attack on the fleches bogged down.

At this time, on the extreme left flank, near the village of Utitsa, the French attacked the Russians. Rather, the Poles attacked, since the corps of I. A. Poniatovsky, who was entrusted with this sector of the front, mainly consisted of Poles. Poniatowski managed to capture the village of Utitsa. The commander of the Russian troops in this area, Tuchkov, moved to the Utitsky Kurgan and entrenched himself there.

At 7 o'clock the enemy resumed the attack on the flushes. The goal of heavy losses, he managed to capture the left flush of the Semenov fortifications. By order of Bagration, several battalions counterattacked the enemy on the flank. The taken aback French were thrown back, having suffered new heavy losses in people. The second attack also ended in a bloody French failure. Napoleon was overwhelmed by the stubborn resistance of the Russians. Reinforcing Davout's troops with Ney's corps and Murat's cavalry, he gave the order to resume the onslaught. In turn, Bagration took the necessary measures to strengthen the defense. He moved the 1st Grenadier and 3rd Cuirassier Divisions to the front line from the reserve. Here he also sent 8 battalions from Raevsky's 7th Corps, which defended itself north of the flushes and, in addition, placed the 3rd infantry division of Konovnitsyn near the village of Semenovskoye. Kutuzov, who closely followed the course of the battle, sent large reserves to reinforce Bagration's troops. However, the transfer of these forces could be carried out no earlier than in 1.5-2 hours. It follows that when repulsing the next attack of the French, Bagration had to rely only on his own forces.

At 8 o'clock, after artillery preparation of 160 guns, the enemy launched a third attack. Coming out of the forest, the French lined up in several dense columns and moved to the Bagration flushes. Russian artillerymen, having waited for the enemy at the nearest shot, opened deadly fire on him. At the same time, the infantry fired several volleys. The French fell in dozens. But it is necessary to note the courage of the enemy. Under canister fire, the French imperturbably continued to move towards the flushes, where they managed to break into at the cost of incredible efforts. But at that moment, Count Vorontsov with his grenadier battalions hit with bayonets. A strong onslaught mixed the ranks of the Napoleonic soldiers and forced him to retreat back in confusion. Then the French tried with a dashing attack of the cavalry to capture the flushes that had just been beaten off from them. The French cavalry, which swiftly rushed at the Russians, was met by the Life Guards of the Izmailovsky, Lithuanian and Finnish regiments, which, lining up in a square, bristling with bayonets, were waiting for the enemy. Having let the enemy in on a rifle shot, they opened fire, which forced the enemy to retreat. The retreating French cavalry and the cuirassiers who came to the rescue, turning around, again rushed at the Russians. And again, our soldiers, letting the enemy get closer, opened rifle fire on him. Those who were able to break through to the ranks were stabbed with bayonets.

At this time, Poniatowski tried several times to take the Utitsky barrow. Surrounding the mound on all sides, the enemy attacked the 1st Grenadier Division. In his report, Kutuzov wrote later: “The brave grenadiers, after waiting for the enemy, opened the most severe fire on him and, without any delay, rushed at him with hostility. The enemy could not withstand such a swift attack, left the place of battle with damage and disappeared into the nearby forests. Lieutenant General Tuchkov was wounded by a bullet in the chest, and Lieutenant General Alsufiev took command of him. (Ibid., p. 141.)

Thus, the first stage of the battle ended with minor French successes in the directions of auxiliary attacks and a decisive failure in the direction of the main attack. Both commanders begin to pull up fresh forces here.

By order of Napoleon, at about 9 o'clock, the attacks on Bagration's fleches were resumed.

During the 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th attacks, the area around the Bagration Flushes was littered with the corpses of Russians and Frenchmen. The French attacked Bagration's flushes continuously. The infantry, which the Russians threw back with bayonet strikes, was replaced by cavalry, which was fired upon by a few surviving Russian cannons. At a time when the enemy cavalry and infantry were reorganizing and stocking up on ammunition, French artillery was constantly hitting the Russian positions.

At about 10 o'clock the French launched a large flush attack. This time, against 18,000 soldiers of Bagration and 300 guns on a front of 1.5 km, Napoleon moved 45,000 of his soldiers and 400 guns. The Russians met the enemy with a crushing bayonet strike. A hand-to-hand fight ensued. The Russian officer F.I. Glinka, a participant in the Battle of Borodino, wrote: “... The picture of that part of the Borodino field near the village of Semenovskoye was terrible, where the battle was in full swing, like in a cauldron. Thick smoke and bloody steam eclipsed the midday sun. Some sort of faded, uncertain twilight lay over the field of horrors, over the field of death. Nothing could be seen in this twilight, except formidable columns, advancing and broken, squadrons running ... The distance presents a view of perfect chaos: torn, broken French squadrons collapse, agitate and disappear in smoke, giving way to infantry, marching harmoniously! The orders were given, and our entire left wing, in its entire length, moved from its place and went with a quick step at bayonets. Agreed! .. “There is no language to describe this dump, this knocked down, this lingering crack, this last struggle of a thousand! Everyone grabbed the bowl of fatal scales in order to pull them over to their side ... And the Russians did not give up an inch of their place. ” (Rastunov I. I. Patriotic War of 1812 - Knowledge, 1987. P. 23.)

In this battle, Bagration was wounded, a fragment of a French grenade hit him in the leg. The flashes have been captured. Immediately the corps of Ney and the cavalry of M. -V. -N. Latour-Maubourt and E.-A. -M. The Nansouti rushed into the breach. The Russians, under the onslaught of the enemy, had to withdraw. The command of the Semyonov flushes was temporarily taken over by Konovnitsyn. A very difficult task fell to his lot: until a new general was appointed to the place of the wounded Bagration, while the forces allocated by the command from the reserve were moving to help the 2 Army, he had to keep the enemy rushing forward at all costs.

Dokhturov, who soon arrived on the left flank and was appointed to replace Bagration, found the 2nd Army bleeding, but was ready to fight to the end.

At the same time, in the center of the Russian position, the French stubbornly stormed the Rayevsky battery, approximately in the middle of the 7th French attack on Bagration's flashes, Barclay de Tolly noticed the enemy moving towards the center of the Russian position. To reinforce the center of the Russians, the commander of the 1st Army ordered the 4th Corps to join the right wing of the Preobrazhensky Regiment, which, with the Semenovsky and Finland regiments, remained in reserve. Behind these troops he placed the 2nd and 3rd cavalry corps, behind them were the regiments of the cavalry and horse guards. As soon as the Russians settled in new positions, they were subjected to fierce artillery fire, after which the enemy advanced in dense columns on the Raevsky battery and overturned the 26th division, which could withstand his superior forces. A difficult situation has arisen.

Kutuzov ordered General Yermolov to go to the artillery of the left flank and put it in order. The chief of the main staff of the 2nd Army, Count E.F. Saint-Prix, was wounded, and Yermolov was to take command. Yermolov took with him three companies of horse artillery.

Driving past Raevsky's battery, Yermolov saw that the position was captured by the French, and the Russians were fleeing. Realizing the danger of the situation, the brave general immediately began to act. He rushed to the 6th Corps, the closest to the height, ordered the 9th Battalion of the Ufa Infantry Regiment to move quickly forward and stop the fleeing and retreating 18th, 19th and 40th Chasseurs. The enemy could not use the guns of the captured battery, but, pulling up his light artillery, he began to shower the Russian troops from the flanks. The three cavalry companies that accompanied Yermolov stopped on the left flank of his small position and, diverting fire on themselves, made it possible to capture the lost battery. Yermolov later recalled: “The battery and the slope of the hill to the top were covered with the bodies of the enemy. All those who resisted paid with their lives, only Brigadier General Bonami was taken prisoner, having received twelve wounds with bayonets. All of our lost guns were returned, but the damage from my part in terms of people was terrible ”(Borodino. Documents, letters, memoirs. P. 358.)

At this time, a fierce battle was going on on the Utitsky Kurgan for mastering the height. Poniatowski first occupied this mound, but was soon driven out of there.

Thus, the 3rd stage of the battle ended with a major success for the French in the main direction. The Russian front was broken through, and the breakthrough was only weakly closed east of Semenovsky. It took time for the new reinforcements sent here by Kutuzov to approach. The position of the Russians was difficult. But the French also needed reserves and fresh forces. Napoleon reluctantly agreed to the use of the Young Guard to increase the breakthrough at the Semyonov Fleches.

But here Kutuzov makes a brilliant move. He sends the cavalry of Platov and F. P. Uvarov to the rear of the French. Uvarov's cavalry captured Bezzubovo, but here they were detained by the French (more precisely, by the Italian units of the French army). The Cossacks, breaking into the rear of the French, made a panic there. Napoleon stopped the 3rd attack of the French troops on the Raevsky battery and the movement of the Young Guard, and he himself went to the left flank to clarify the situation. He spent about 2 hours on this, during which Kutuzov completed the regrouping of troops and firmly secured his left flank. Thus, the time for success was lost.

At about 2 p.m., the French attacked Raevsky's battery for the 3rd time. As a result of this attack, by 17 o'clock in the afternoon, the defenders of the battery were almost completely destroyed, and the French took possession of it. The Russians retreated without panic, by order of the command. The French then tried to attack the Russians in their new position, but to no avail. At the end of the day, Poniatowski managed to capture the Utitsky barrow.

By 18 o'clock the Russians were firmly entrenched in the position of Gorka - the Old Smolensk road. Seeing the futility of further attacks, Napoleon ordered them to stop and withdraw troops to the river. Ring for the night. The battle of Borodino is over.

The opponents dispersed, leaving mountains of corpses and wounded on the battlefield. In this battle, the losses of the Russians were no less than the losses of the French. Various sources give completely different casualty figures for both sides. However, it is officially known that after the flight of the Napoleonic army from Russia, 58,520 human corpses and 35,478 horse corpses were found on the Borodino field. No wonder Borodino was called by contemporaries "the grave of the French cavalry." (Levitsky N. War of 1812. M., 1938. S. 26.)

It is also difficult to determine the winner of this bloody battle. You can argue for a long time who won on this terrible day. But, despite the seemingly “indisputable” defeat of the Russians, Napoleon suffered a crushing moral defeat in the Battle of Borodino. After August 26, the combat energy of the French army began to steadily fall. The blow inflicted on her by the Russians near Borodino was ultimately fatal.

The battle of Borodino entered the history of the liberation struggle of the peoples of our country as one of its brightest pages. The legendary feat of the heroes of Borodin was an inspiring example of the patriotic fulfillment of duty to the Motherland for subsequent generations of Russian people.

background

Since the beginning of the invasion of the French army into the territory of the Russian Empire in June, Russian troops have constantly retreated. The rapid advance and overwhelming numerical superiority of the French made it impossible for the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, General Barclay de Tolly, to prepare the troops for battle. The protracted retreat caused public discontent, so Alexander I removed Barclay de Tolly and appointed General of Infantry Kutuzov as commander-in-chief. However, he also had to retreat in order to gain time to gather all his forces.

On August 22 (according to the old style), the Russian army, retreating from Smolensk, settled down near the village of Borodino, 124 km from Moscow, where Kutuzov decided to give a general battle; it was impossible to postpone it further, since Emperor Alexander demanded that Kutuzov stop Napoleon's advance towards Moscow. On August 24 (September 5), the battle took place at the Shevardinsky redoubt, which delayed the French troops and made it possible for the Russians to build fortifications on the main positions.

The alignment of forces at the beginning of the battle

population

The total size of the Russian army is determined by memoirists and historians in a wide range of 110-150 thousand people:

Discrepancies are mainly related to the militia, the number of those participating in the battle is not exactly known. The militias were untrained, most armed only with pikes. They mainly performed auxiliary functions, such as building fortifications and removing the wounded from the battlefield. The discrepancy in the number of regular troops is due to the fact that the problem has not been resolved whether all the recruits brought by Miloradovich and Pavlishchev (about 10 thousand) were included in the regiments before the battle.

The size of the French army is estimated more definitely: 130-150 thousand people and 587 guns:

However, the registration of the militias in the Russian army implies the addition to the regular French army of numerous "non-combatants" who were present in the French camp and corresponded to the Russian militias in combat readiness. In this case, the size of the French army will also increase by 15-20 thousand (up to 150 thousand) people. Like the Russian militias, the French non-combatants performed auxiliary functions - carried out the wounded, carried water, etc.

It is important for military history to distinguish between the total strength of the army on the battlefield and the troops that were committed to battle. However, in terms of the balance of forces that took a direct part in the battle on August 26, the French army also had a numerical superiority. According to the encyclopedia "Patriotic War of 1812", at the end of the battle, Napoleon had 18 thousand in reserve, and Kutuzov had 8-9 thousand regular troops (in particular, the Guards Preobrazhensky and Semyonovsky regiments), that is, the difference in reserves was 9-10 thousand people against a two-three times greater difference in the number of regular troops of the armies at the beginning of the battle. At the same time, Kutuzov said that the Russians brought into battle "everything to the last reserve, even the guards in the evening," "all the reserves are already in action." However, it should be borne in mind that Kutuzov argued this in order to justify the retreat. Meanwhile, it is reliably known that a number of Russian units (for example, the 4th, 30th, 48th chasseur regiments) did not take a direct part in the battle, but only suffered losses from enemy artillery fire.

If we evaluate the qualitative composition of the two armies, then we can refer to the opinion of the Marquis of Chambray, a participant in the events, who noted that the French army had superiority, since its infantry consisted mainly of experienced soldiers, while the Russians had many recruits. In addition, the advantage of the French gave a significant superiority in heavy cavalry.

Starting position

The starting position, chosen by Kutuzov, looked like a straight line running from the Shevardinsky redoubt on the left flank through a large battery, later named the Raevsky battery, the village of Borodino in the center to the village of Maslovo on the right flank. Leaving the Shevardinsky redoubt, the 2nd Army pushed back the left flank beyond the river. Kamenka and the battle order of the army took the form of an obtuse angle. The two flanks of the Russian position occupied 4 km each, but were not equivalent. The right flank was formed by the 1st army of Barclay de Tolly, consisting of 3 infantry. and 3 cav. corps and reserves (76 thousand people, 480 guns), the front of his position was covered by the river Kolocha. The left flank was formed by the smaller 2nd Army of Bagration (34 thousand people, 156 guns). In addition, the left flank did not have strong natural obstacles in front of the front like the right. After the loss of the Shevardinsky redoubt on August 24 (September 5), the position of the left flank became even more vulnerable and relied only on three unfinished flushes.

However, on the eve of the battle, the 3rd Infantry. Tuchkov's corps of the 1st was withdrawn from the ambush behind the left flank by order of the chief of staff Bennigsen without the knowledge of Kutuzov. Bennigsen's actions are justified by his intention to follow a formal battle plan.

Around the same time, Junot's 8th French (Westphalian) Corps made their way through the Utitsky Forest to the rear of the fleches. The situation was saved by the 1st cavalry battery, which at that time was heading to the flush area. Its commander, Captain Zakharov, seeing the threat to the flashes from the rear, hastily deployed guns and opened fire on the enemy, who was building up to attack. Arrived in time 4 infantry. the regiment of the 2nd corps of Baggovut pushed Junot's corps into the Utitsky forest, inflicting significant losses on it. Russian historians claim that during the second offensive, Junot's corps was defeated in a bayonet counterattack, but Westphalian and French sources completely refute this. According to the memoirs of direct participants, the 8th Corps participated in the battle until the evening.

According to Kutuzov's plan, Tuchkov's corps was supposed to suddenly attack from an ambush the flank and rear of the enemy, who was fighting for the Bagration flushes. However, in the early morning, Chief of Staff L. L. Bennigsen pushed Tuchkov's detachment out of the ambush.

Around 9 am, in the midst of the battle for Bagration's fleches, the French launched the first attack on the battery with the forces of the 4th corps of Eugene Beauharnais, as well as the divisions of Morand and Gerard from the 1st corps of Marshal Davout. By influencing the center of the Russian army, Napoleon hoped to hinder the transfer of troops from the right wing of the Russian army to the Bagration fleches and thereby ensure his main forces a quick defeat of the left wing of the Russian army. By the time of the attack, the entire second line of Raevsky's troops, by order of Bagration, was withdrawn to defend the flushes. Despite this, the attack was repulsed by artillery fire.

Almost immediately, Beauharnais re-attacked the mound. Kutuzov at that moment brought into battle for the Raevsky battery the entire horse-artillery reserve in the amount of 60 guns and part of the light artillery of the 1st Army. However, despite heavy artillery fire, the French of the 30th regiment of General Bonami managed to break into the redoubt.

At that moment, the chief of staff of the 1st Army, A.P. Ermolov, and the chief of artillery, A.I. Having led the battalion of the Ufa regiment and having attached the 18th chasseur regiment to it, Yermolov and A.I. Kutaisov hit with bayonets right on the redoubt. At the same time, the regiments of Paskevich and Vasilchikov hit from the flanks. The redoubt was recaptured and Brigadier General Bonami was taken prisoner. Of the entire French regiment under the command of Bonami (4,100 people), only about 300 soldiers remained in the ranks. Major General of Artillery Kutaisov died in the battle for the battery.

Despite the steepness of the sunrise, I ordered the chasseur regiments and the 3rd battalion of the Ufa regiment to attack with bayonets, the favorite weapon of the Russian soldier. The fierce and terrible battle did not last more than half an hour: desperate resistance was met, the elevation was taken away, the guns were returned. Wounded by bayonets, Brigadier General Bonami was spared [captured], there were no prisoners. The damage from our side is very great and is far from commensurate with the number of attacking battalions.

Chief of Staff of the 1st Army A.P. Ermolov

Kutuzov, noticing the complete exhaustion of Raevsky's corps, withdrew his troops to the second line. Barclay de Tolly sends the 24th infantry to the battery to defend the battery. division of Likhachev.

After the fall of the Bagration fleches, Napoleon abandoned the development of an offensive against the left wing of the Russian army. The original plan to break through the defenses on this wing in order to reach the rear of the main forces of the Russian army lost its meaning, since a significant part of these troops failed in the battles for the fleches themselves, while the defense on the left wing, despite the loss of fleches, remained intact. Drawing attention to the fact that the situation in the center of the Russian troops had worsened, Napoleon decided to redirect his forces to the Raevsky battery. However, the next attack was delayed for two hours, since at that time Russian cavalry and Cossacks appeared in the rear of the French.

Taking advantage of the respite, Kutuzov moved the 4th infantry from the right flank to the center. corps of Lieutenant General Osterman-Tolstoy and the 2nd Cavalry. corps of Major General Korf. Napoleon ordered to intensify the fire on the mass of infantry of the 4th Corps. According to the recollections of eyewitnesses, the Russians moved like machines, closing ranks as they went. The path of the corps could be traced on the trail of the bodies of the dead.

General Miloradovich, commander of the center of the Russian troops, ordered adjutant Bibikov to find Eugene of Württemberg and tell him to go to Miloradovich. Bibikov sought out Yevgeny, but no words could be heard because of the roar of the cannonade, and the adjutant waved his hand, indicating the location of Miloradovich. At that moment, a flying cannonball tore off his arm. Bibikov, falling from his horse, again indicated the direction with his other hand.

According to the commander of the 4th Infantry Division,
General Eugene of Württemberg

The troops of Osterman-Tolstoy joined the left flank of the Semyonovsky and Preobrazhensky regiments, located south of the battery. Behind them were the cavalrymen of the 2nd corps and the approaching Cavalier Guard and Cavalry regiments of the guard.

Around 3 p.m., the French opened crossfire from the front and flashes of 150 guns at Raevsky's battery and launched an attack. For the attack against the 24th division, 34 cavalry regiments were concentrated. The first to go on the attack was the 2nd Cavalry. corps under the command of General Auguste Caulaincourt (corps commander General Montbrun had been killed by this time). Caulaincourt broke through the hellish fire, bypassed the Kurgan height on the left and rushed to the Raevsky battery. Met from the front, flanks and rear by stubborn fire from the defenders, the cuirassiers were driven back with huge losses (Raevsky's battery received the nickname "grave of the French cavalry" from the French for these losses). Caulaincourt, like many of his associates, found death on the slopes of the mound.

Meanwhile, the troops of Beauharnais, taking advantage of Caulaincourt's attack, which fettered the actions of the 24th division, broke into the battery from the front and flank. A bloody battle took place on the battery. The wounded General Likhachev was taken prisoner. At 4 o'clock in the afternoon Raevsky's battery fell.

Having received news of the fall of Raevsky's battery, at 17 o'clock Napoleon moved to the center of the Russian army and came to the conclusion that its center, despite the retreat and contrary to the assurances of the retinue, was not shaken. After that, he refused requests to bring the guards into battle. The French attack on the center of the Russian army stopped.

End of the battle

After the battery was occupied by the French troops, the battle began to subside. On the left flank, Poniatowski carried out fruitless attacks against Dokhturov's 2nd Army. In the center and on the right flank, the matter was limited to artillery fire until 7 pm.

At 12 o'clock at night, an order from Kutuzov arrived, canceling preparations for the battle scheduled for the next day. The commander-in-chief of the Russian army decided to withdraw the army beyond Mozhaisk in order to make up for human losses and better prepare for new battles. The organized retreat of Kutuzov is evidenced by the French General Armand Caulaincourt (brother of the deceased General Auguste Caulaincourt), who was during the battle of Napoleon and therefore well-informed.

The emperor repeated many times that he could not understand how the redoubts and positions, which were captured with such courage and which we so stubbornly defended, gave us only a small number of prisoners. He many times asked the officers who arrived with reports where the prisoners were to be taken. He even sent to the appropriate points to make sure that no other prisoners had been taken. These successes without prisoners, without trophies did not satisfy him ...
The enemy carried off the vast majority of his wounded, and we got only those prisoners of which I have already spoken, 12 guns of the redoubt ... and three or four others taken during the first attacks.

Chronology of the battle

Chronology of the battle. Most significant fights

Designations: † - death or mortal wound, / - captivity,% - wound

There is also an alternative point of view on the chronology of the Battle of Borodino. See, for example, .

The result of the battle

Colorized engraving of Sharon. 1st quarter of the 19th century

Russian casualty estimates

The number of losses of the Russian army has been repeatedly revised by historians. Different sources give different numbers:

According to the surviving statements from the RGVIA archive, the Russian army lost 39,300 people killed, wounded and missing (21,766 in the 1st Army, 17,445 in the 2nd Army), but taking into account the fact that these statements are incomplete for various reasons (do not include the loss of the militia and Cossacks), historians increase this number to 45 thousand people.

French casualty estimates

Much of the Grand Army's documentation perished during the retreat, making it extremely difficult to estimate French casualties. The losses of officers and generals have been established, which significantly exceed those in the Russian army (see below). In view of the fact that the Russian troops were saturated with officers no more than the French, these data are not fundamentally linked to the assumptions about the lower overall losses of the French, but indicate the opposite. The question of the total losses of the French army remains open.

The most common in French historiography, the number of losses of the Napoleonic army of 30 thousand is based on the calculations of the French officer Denier, who served as an inspector at the General Staff of Napoleon, who determined the total losses of the French in the three days of the battle of Borodino at 49 generals and 28,000 lower ranks, of which 6,550 were killed and 21,450 were wounded. These figures were classified by order of Marshal Berthier due to a discrepancy with the data of Napoleon's bulletin on losses of 8-10 thousand and were published for the first time in the city. The figure of 30 thousand cited in the literature was obtained by rounding Denier's data.

But later studies have shown that Denier's data are greatly underestimated. So, Denier gives the number of 269 killed officers of the Grand Army. However, in 1899, the French historian Martignen, on the basis of surviving documents, established that at least 460 officers known by surname were killed. Subsequent studies increased this number to 480. Even French historians admit that "since the information given in the statement about the generals and colonels who were out of action under Borodino are not accurate and underestimated, it can be assumed that the rest of Denier's figures are based on incomplete data" . If we assume that the total losses of the French army are underestimated by Denier in the same proportion as the losses of the officers, then an elementary calculation based on Marignen's incomplete data gives a rough estimate of 28,086x460/269=48,003 (48,003 men). For the number 480, the corresponding result is 50,116. This figure refers only to the losses of regular troops and should be correlated with the losses of regular Russian units (about 39,000 people).

The French historian, retired general Segur, determined the losses of the French at Borodino at 40 thousand soldiers and officers. The writer Horace Vernet called the number of French losses "up to 50 thousand" and believed that Napoleon failed to win the Battle of Borodino. This estimate of French casualties is one of the highest given by French historians, although based on data from the Russian side.

In Russian literature, the number of French casualties was often given as 58,478. This number is based on a false report by Alexander Schmidt, a defector who allegedly served in Berthier's office. In the future, this figure was picked up by patriotic researchers, indicated on the Main Monument. However, the proof of the falsity of the data cited by Schmidt does not cancel the historical discussion about the losses of the French in the region of 60 thousand people, based on other sources.

One of the sources capable, in the absence of documentation of the French army, to shed light on the losses of the French, are data on the total number of those buried in the Borodino field. The burial and burning were carried out by the Russians. According to Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, a total of 58,521 bodies of the dead were buried and burned. Russian historians and, in particular, employees of the museum-reserve on the Borodino field estimate the number of people buried on the field at 48-50 thousand people. According to A. Sukhanov, on the Borodino field and in the surrounding villages, without including French burials, 49,887 dead were buried in the Kolotsky Monastery. Based on the losses killed in the Russian army (the maximum estimate is 15 thousand) and adding to them the Russian wounded who later died on the field (there were no more than 8 thousand of them, since out of 30 thousand wounded 22 thousand were taken to Moscow), the number of French buried on the battlefield alone is estimated at 27 thousand people. In the Kolotsk monastery, where the main military hospital of the French army was located, according to the testimony of the captain of the 30th linear regiment, C. Francois, 3/4 of the wounded died in the 10 days following the battle - an indefinite number, measured in thousands. This result brings us back to the estimate of French losses of 20,000 killed and 40,000 wounded indicated on the monument. This estimate is consistent with the conclusions of modern French historians about the strong underestimation of losses of 30,000 people, and is confirmed by the very course of the battle, in which the French troops, who during the attacks outnumbered the Russian troops by 2-3 times, due to some objective reasons, did not have the opportunity to develop success. Among European historians, the figure of 60,000 casualties is not widely accepted.

The losses of the officers of the parties amounted to: Russians - 211 killed and approx. 1180 wounded; French - 480 killed and 1448 wounded.

The losses of the generals of the parties killed and wounded amounted to: Russians - 23 generals; French - 49 generals.

Grand total

After the 1st day of the battle, the Russian army left the battlefield and no longer interfered with Napoleon's advance on Moscow. The Russian army failed to force Napoleon's army to abandon its intentions (to occupy Moscow).

After dark, the French army was in the same positions in which it was before the start of the battle, and Kutuzov, due to heavy losses and small reserves, given that reinforcements had already approached Napoleon - the fresh divisions of Pinault and Delaborde (about 11 thousand people), decided to continue the retreat, thus opening the way to Moscow, but keeping the army and the opportunity to continue the fight. Kutuzov's decision was also influenced by the fact that the size of Napoleon's army before the start of the battle was estimated at 160-180 thousand people (Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky).

Napoleon, who tried to defeat the Russian army in one battle, was able to achieve a partial displacement of the Russian troops from their positions with comparable losses. At the same time, he was sure that it was impossible to achieve more in the battle, since Napoleon did not consider the refusal to bring the guards into battle wrong. " A strike by the guard might not have had consequences. The enemy showed still quite firmness”Napoleon remarked much later. In conversations with private individuals, Napoleon clearly assessed both his capabilities in the Battle of Borodino and the danger of a Russian counterattack against the exhausted French army. After the struggle for flushes, he no longer hoped to defeat the Russian army. Military historian General Jomini quotes him as saying: " As soon as we took the position of the left flank, I was already sure that the enemy would retreat in the course of the night. Why was it voluntary to undergo the dangerous consequences of the new Poltava?».

The official point of view of Napoleon was expressed by him in his memoirs. In 1816 he dictated on Saint Helena:

The battle of Moscow is my greatest battle: it is a battle of giants. The Russians had 170,000 men under arms; they had all the advantages behind them: numerical superiority in infantry, cavalry, artillery, excellent position. They were defeated! Fearless heroes, Ney, Murat, Poniatowski - that's who belonged to the glory of this battle. How many great, how many wonderful historical deeds will be noted in it! She will tell how these brave cuirassiers captured the redoubts, hacking the gunners on their guns; she will tell of the heroic self-sacrifice of Montbrun and Caulaincourt, who found their death in the height of their glory; she will tell how our gunners, open on a level field, fired against more numerous and well-fortified batteries, and about these fearless infantrymen who, at the most critical moment, when the general who commanded them wanted to encourage them, shouted to him: “Calm down, all your soldiers decided to win today, and they will win!”

A year later, in 1817, Napoleon decided to give a new version of the Battle of Borodino:

With an army of 80,000, I rushed at the Russians, who consisted of 250,000, armed to the teeth and defeated them ...

Kutuzov also considered this battle his victory. In his report to Alexander I, he wrote:

The battle of the 26th was the most bloody of all those that are known in modern times. The place of the battle was completely won by us, and the enemy then retreated to the position in which he came to attack us.

Alexander I announced the Battle of Borodino as a victory. Prince Kutuzov was promoted to field marshal with an award of 100 thousand rubles. All the lower ranks who were in the battle were granted five rubles each.

The Battle of Borodino is one of the bloodiest battles of the 19th century. According to the most conservative estimates of cumulative losses, 2,500 people died on the field every hour. Some divisions lost up to 80% of their composition. The French fired 60,000 cannon shots and nearly a million and a half rifle shots. It is no coincidence that Napoleon called the battle of Borodino his greatest battle, although its results are more than modest for a great commander accustomed to victories.

The Russian army retreated, but retained its fighting capacity and soon drove Napoleon out of Russia.

Notes

1. ; The quotation as presented by Mikhnevich was compiled by him from a free translation of Napoleon's oral statements. The primary sources do not convey a similar phrase of Napoleon in this form, but the review in Mikhnevich's edition is widely cited in modern literature.
2. Extract from the notes of General Pele on the Russian war of 1812, "Readings of the Imperial Society for the History of Antiquities", 1872, I, p. 1-121
3. Some of the bloodiest one-day battles in history ("The Economist" Nov 11th 2008) . Retrieved April 30, 2009.
4. M. Bogdanovich, History of the Patriotic War of 1812 according to reliable sources, vol. 2, St. Petersburg, 1859, p. 162.
   Bogdanovich's data are repeated in ESBE.
5. Tarle, "Napoleon's Invasion of Russia", OGIZ, 1943, p. 162
6. Russian united armies at Borodino August 24-26 (September 5-7), 1812 Alexey Vasilyev, Andrey Eliseev
7. Tarle, "Napoleon's Invasion of Russia", OGIZ, 1943, p. 172
8. Zemtsov V.N. Battle of the Moscow River. - M.: 2001.
9. http://www.auditorium.ru/books/2556/gl4.pdf Troitsky N. A. 1812. The Great Year of Russia. M., 1989.
10. Chambray G. Histoire de I'expedition de Russie.P., 1838
11. Clausewitz, Campaign in Russia 1812 “... on the flank where it was necessary to expect an enemy attack. Such, undoubtedly, was the left flank; one of the advantages of the Russian position was that it could be foreseen with complete certainty.
12. Borodino, Tarle E.V.
13. Tarle, "Napoleon's Invasion of Russia", OGIZ, 1943, p. 167
14. http://www.auditorium.ru/books/2556/gl4.pdf Troitsky N. A. 1812. THE GREAT YEAR OF RUSSIA
15. Caulaincourt, "Napoleon's Campaign in Russia", ch.3. Retrieved April 30, 2009.
16. Inscription on the Main Monument. 2nd line: "1838 - Grateful fatherland to those who put their lives on the field of honor - Russians: Generals Killed - 3 Wounded - 12 Warriors Killed - 15,000 Wounded - 30,000"
17. BATTLE AT THE KOLOTSK MONASTERY, SHEVARDIN AND BORODIN ON AUGUST 24 AND 26, 1812 (V) . Retrieved April 30, 2009.
18. The historian Tarle in "Napoleon's Invasion of Russia" repeats these figures of the historians A. I. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky and M. I. Bogdanovich)
19. Mikheev S.P. History of the Russian army. Issue. 3: The era of wars with Napoleon I. - M .: edition of S. Mikheev and A. Kazachkov, 1911. - S. 60
20. On the losses of the Russian army in the battle of Borodino on August 24-26, 1812. article by S. V. Lvov
21. P. Denniee. Itineraire de l'Empereur Napoleon. Paris, 1842
22. Martinien A. Tableaux par corps et par batailles des officiers tues et blesses pendant les guerres de l'Empire (1805-1815). P., 1899;
23. Henri Lashuk. "Napoleon: campaigns and battles 1796-1815"
24. Horace Vernet, History of Napoleon, 1839. In describing the Battle of Borodino, Vernet used the work of Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, as described in the corresponding chapter.

Raevsky's battery is the key point of the Battle of Borodino. Artillerymen of the infantry corps of Lieutenant-General Raevsky showed miracles of courage, courage and martial arts here. The fortifications on Kurgan height, where the battery was located, were called by the French "the grave of the French cavalry."

Grave of the French cavalry

Raevsky's battery was installed at Kurgan height on the night before the Battle of Borodino. The battery was intended for the defense of the center of the battle order of the Russian army.

The firing position of the Raevsky Battery was equipped in the form of a lunette (lunette is a field or long-term defensive structure open from the rear, consisting of 1-2 frontal ramparts (faces) and side ramparts to cover the flanks). The frontal and side parapets of the battery had a height of up to 2.4 m and were protected in front and from the sides by a ditch 3.2 m deep. In front of the ditch at a distance of 100 m in 5-6 rows there were “wolf pits” (disguised recesses-traps for enemy infantry and cavalry).

With Bagration flashes, the battery was the object of repeated attacks by the Napoleonic infantry and cavalry. Several French divisions and almost 200 guns were involved in its assault. All the slopes of the Kurgan Heights were littered with the corpses of the invaders. The French army lost over 3,000 soldiers and 5 generals here.

The actions of the Raevsky Battery in the Battle of Borodino are one of the clearest examples of the heroism and valor of Russian soldiers and officers in the Patriotic War of 1812.

General Raevsky

The legendary Russian commander Nikolai Nikolaevich Raevsky was born in Moscow on September 14, 1771. Nikolai began his military service at the age of 14 in the Preobrazhensky Regiment. He takes part in many military companies: Turkish, Polish, Caucasian. Raevsky proved himself to be a skilled military leader and at the age of 19 he was promoted to lieutenant colonel, and at 21 he became a colonel. After a forced break, he returned to the army in 1807 and actively participated in all major European battles of that period. After the conclusion of the Tilsit peace, he takes part in the war with Sweden, later with Turkey, after which he is promoted to lieutenant general.

Nikolai Nikolaevich Raevsky. Portrait by George Dawe.

Especially brightly the talent of the commander manifested itself during the Patriotic War. Raevsky distinguished himself in the battle of Saltanovka, where he managed to stop the divisions of Marshal Davout, who intended to prevent the unification of Russian troops. At a critical moment, the general personally led the Semyonovsky regiment on the attack. Then there was the heroic defense of Smolensk, when his corps held the city for a day. In the Battle of Borodino, Raevsky's corps successfully defended the Kurgan Height, which the French attacked especially fiercely. The general took part in the Foreign Campaign and the Battle of Nations, after which he was forced to leave the army for health reasons. N. N. Raevsky died in 1829.

Raevsky's battery in 1941

In October 1941, the Rayevsky Battery again became one of the key points of defense on the Borodino field. On its slopes there were positions of anti-tank guns, at the top there was an observation post. After Borodino was liberated and the fortifications of the Mozhaisk line of defense were put in order, the role of a key stronghold was left to the Kurgan height. Several new bunkers were erected on it.

Fortifications on the Rayevsky Battery in 1941 (bottom, center). Fragment of the map of the 36th fortified area of ​​the Mozhaisk line of defense.

Pillbox on the slope of Kurgan height.

This article uses a fragment of the plan of the Raevsky Battery from the wonderful book by N.I. Ivanov "Engineering work on the Borodino Field in 1812". Highly recommended to anyone interested in the history of the Battle of Borodino.

At 5 o'clock in the morning, Napoleon Bonaparte appeared at the command post at the Shevardinsky redoubt. The troops greeted him with a thunderous battle cry "Vive L'empereur!" ("Long live the emperor!") This battle cry very often confused the soldiers on the opposite side of the field. But this time nothing like this happened, as the Russian troops were ready to meet the French.

Battle of Borodino, 1822. Art. Louis Lejeune

First attack: the village of Borodino
Contrary to Kutuzov's assumption, the French swiftly attacked not the left, but the right flank of the Russians. 106th line regiment from the corps Beauharnais broke into the village of Borodino. Here were the guards chasseurs, who were taken by surprise. A stubborn battle ensued, and by 6 o'clock the French captured the village of Borodino, but the 106th regiment suffered heavy losses. Here, at about 5.30 in the morning, the commander of this regiment, General L.-O. Plozon. This was the first French general to die in the Battle of Borodino, and by no means the last. During the retreat, the Russian troops burned the bridge across the river. Koloch. But Napoleon did not plan to develop an offensive on the right flank at that moment. On his orders, Beauharnais placed an artillery battery near Borodin and limited himself to shelling the Russian right flank.

Battle for the Semyonov flushes
Napoleon's main attack
The attack on the village of Borodino was only a red herring. The main blow at half past six in the morning, Napoleon took on the left flank, attacking the Semenov flushes. The corps of the three best marshals of Napoleon were concentrated here: Davout, Nea And Murat. Bagration's troops were supposed to hold back the onslaught of the French from the front and at the same time not expose the left flank, bypassing which Poniatowski had already begun. General's division was the first to attack company from the Davout Corps. It was he who was entrusted with this honor, since he had carried out a successful attack the day before, thanks to which the Shevardinsky redoubt was captured. The enemy's blow was met by the 27th Infantry Division D.P. Neverovsky and 2nd Combined Grenadier Division M.S. Vorontsova. Kompan attacked the flushes from the side of the Utitsky forest, he was supported by the fire of 50 guns, but the attack was repulsed. Then Davout reinforced the Kompan division with a division J.-M. Desse. Kompan again led his troops to the attack, but was seriously wounded. He was replaced by Desse, who continued the attack, but was also badly wounded. In turn, Desse was replaced by Napoleon's adjutant general J. Rapp who met the same fate.

Attack of the 3rd infantry corps of Marshal Ney on the Semenov flushes. Engraving by Koenig after the original by K. Langlois
click to enlarge

The attack was repulsed. The French, seeing that three commanders in a row were put out of action, hesitated. Then the 57th regiment, led personally by Marshal Davout, went on the attack. The French broke into the leftmost flush, but at the decisive moment of this attack, Davout was shell-shocked and fell off his horse. They even managed to convey to Napoleon that Davout had died. Taking advantage of the confusion caused in the French ranks by Davout's shell shock, the Russian troops drove the French out of the left flush.

Counterattacks of Bagration
Bagration still managed to hold flushes thanks to competent tactics of warfare. When the enemy approached the fortifications, Bagration did not wait for the French to break into the lunette, but he himself began a counterattack.

Attack of the Russian cavalry on the French battery in the battle of Borodino. Hood. Mazurovsky V.V.
click to enlarge

This led to the fact that the offensive breakthrough of the French was reduced and almost completely dried up when they got to the fortifications. On the other hand, this led to heavy losses in the ranks of Russian soldiers. But it was an inevitable necessity. Moreover, the losses of the French in the first hours of the battle were much stronger. Thus, by coordinating a passive defense with a series of counterattacks, Bagration was able to repulse a new offensive, launched shortly after Napoleon learned that Davout was alive.

Poniatowski, meanwhile, continued his roundabout maneuver, but due to bad roads he was late. This allowed Bagration to win time and bring reinforcements: 8 battalions from the corps N.N. Rayevsky and division P.P. Konovnitsyn. He also turned to Barclay de Tolly and Kutuzov for help. Now Bagration had 15,000 men on the flashes with 164 guns.

The next attack on the flushes was made by the French around 8 in the morning, with the forces of Davout, Ney and Murat - a total of 30 thousand people, supported by 160 guns. Under heavy fire from Russian guns, the French broke into not only the left, but also the right flush. By this time, the 2nd Combined Grenadier Division already resembled a regiment in terms of numbers, and its commander Vorontsov out of action, having received severe wounds with a bayonet. This was the first Russian general to be out of action in the Battle of Borodino. After some time, he received a concussion and Neverovsky, his 27th division also suffered heavy losses. Bagration personally led the reserve divisions on bayonets and pushed back the French infantry.

Then Napoleon threw into battle the cuirassier division of General Nansouty, which attacked the flushes with the support of the French infantry, but was stopped by grapeshot.

Poniatowski threatens to strike in the rear
At about 9 a.m. Poniatowski took duck and threatened Bagration with a blow to the rear. Napoleon took advantage of this and threw General Friant's division, which was considered exemplary, into an attack on the fleches. This time, the French quickly broke the resistance of the Russians, occupied all three flushes and even broke through to the village of Semenovskoye. The fate of the left flank hung in the balance when Bagration again personally led the counterattack. He lost many soldiers, the prince was seriously wounded A.N. Gorchakov, but the flushes were again beaten off. Attack of Raevsky's battery and assault on flashes
Napoleon had seen all the unsuccessful assaults on the flushes, and now, seeing the huge losses in the infantry, he began to make adjustments to the battle plan. He ordered the troops of Beauharnais to immediately attack Raevsky's battery in order to tie up the right flank of the Russians, while Davout and Ney would again begin to storm the flushes. It happened around 10 am. Again, the flushes fell from the first attack, but the grenadiers P.P. Konovnitsyn stopped the attack. Died in this battle the youngest of the Tuchkovs - Alexander Alekseevich. The French lost here the chief of staff of the 1st Corps, General J.-L. Romef.

At about 10.30, Beauharnais occupied the mound height on the second attempt, but the French failed to achieve success on the flushes - the troops of Davout and Ney could not even break into the flushes. The battle became more and more bloody, Napoleon was already launching attacks on the extreme right flank, where he was Miloradovich, and attacked the center of the Russian position, and then again transferred the brunt of the blow to the left flank.

Wounded Bagration
At 11 am Poniatowski attacked Tuchkova near the Utitsky mound, and Beauharnais was able to finally gain a foothold on the Raevsky battery and begin a flank shelling of the flushes. From the rear, the flushes did not have fortifications, Bagration's losses increased significantly. At this time the French made their eighth attack on the fleches. Ahead were the columns of the 57th regiment. The French were not firing back, afraid to miss a good moment. Looking at the courage of the French grenadiers, Bagration even exclaimed "Bravo!" The attack was stronger than all the previous ones, Bagration again counterattacked the French, and almost knocked them out of the flushes, but at that moment a fragment of a French grenade hit him in the left leg, and he fell off his horse. The troops panicked, the soldiers began to flee. General nearby. P.P. Konovnitsyn was able to take the initiative and take command. Russian troops retreated to the village of Semenovskoye. Here comes the general D.S. Dokhturov, whom Kutuzov appointed commander of the Second Army instead of the wounded Bagration.

Battle for the village of Semyonovskoe
Napoleon was not slow to take advantage of the confusion caused in the Russian ranks by the wound of Bagration, and threw almost all available forces into the attack on the village of Semenovskoye. Cuirassiers attacked from the south nansouty,, Friant's division advanced in the center, and cuirassiers went on the attack to the north of the village Latour-Maubourt. A fierce battle ensued. The cuirassiers of General Nansuty attacked the Lithuanian and Izmailovsky regiments lined up in the square of the Life Guards, but they did not succeed in breaking through their ranks.

About 12 the battle for the village of Semenovskoye was still going on. In order to prevent the final breakthrough of the left flank, Kutuzov decided to divert part of the French reserves to the right flank. He ordered Uvarov's cavalry reserve and Platov's Cossacks to outflank the French left flank. The attack of the Russian cavalry was stopped near the village of Bezzubovo by the troops of General F. Ornano, but this maneuver forced Napoleon to weaken the assault on the village of Semenovskoye. For a brief moment, this minor maneuver was in the spotlight, Napoleon personally came to Bezzubovo to find out what was the matter.

Battle for Kurgan height
Meanwhile Barclay de Tolly was able to carry out a successful attack and dislodge the French from Kurgan Heights. Until about 2 p.m., the situation remained the same, and although stubborn battles were fought for the village of Semenovskoye and the Raevsky battery, the French failed to break the resistance of the Russians. At 14 o'clock Napoleon launched a general assault on the Kurgan Heights, on which Raevsky's battery was located. By this time, he was convinced that the entire Russian army had already been brought into battle, and now he intended to break through the Russian defenses here. Troops A.I. Osterman-Tolstoy, P.G. Likhachev, P.M. Paskevich held off the French advance. The general leadership of the troops here was carried out by Barclay de Tolly, who was able to organize the defense very competently. As a result, the first two assaults were unsuccessful. The third attack was led by General O. Caulaincourt, who was able to knock out the Russians and take possession of the batteries, but was himself killed on the parapet.

Hood. Peter von Hess
click to enlarge

But with the loss of the central defensive position of the Russians, the battle did not end. The Russian infantry retreated from the Raevsky battery behind the Goretsky ravine. Barclay de Tolly stopped about a kilometer from Kurgan Height and brought order among the troops.

By 4 p.m., the French had captured all the key points of the Russian defense from Kurgan height to the village of Semenovskoye, but the battle was still going on. One of the participants in the Battle of Borodino exclaimed in bewilderment: “Will there be, damn it, the end of this battle?” Napoleon himself appeared on Kurgan height at about five o'clock in the afternoon and began to survey the battlefield. Russian troops were pushed back by about 3 kilometers, and took up defensive positions along the Gorki-Psarevo line. On the right flank, the French did not achieve any results at all, the Russian troops, as they stood in the morning behind the Koloch River, so they stood now. He failed to break through the Russian position either on the left flank or in the center, the Russians only retreated from one defensive line to another. In reserve, Napoleon still had an untouched selective reserve - the imperial guard. The marshals asked the French emperor to throw her into battle, but Napoleon did not dare to do so.

The skirmish continued until late in the evening, but the French did not make any more major attacks. Seeing that Napoleon had stopped the attacks, Kutuzov withdrew from his positions late in the evening and continued his retreat towards Moscow.

Fragment of the Borodino panorama, Fr. Roubaud, 1912
click to enlarge

Thus ended August 26 (September 7), one of the bloodiest days of the era of the Napoleonic Wars.

R. Volkov "Portrait of M.I. Kutuzov"

You will not see such battles! ..
Worn banners like shadows
Fire gleamed in the smoke
Damask steel sounded, buckshot screeched,
The hand of the fighters is tired of stabbing,
And prevented the nuclei from flying
A mountain of bloody bodies ... (M.Yu. Lermontov "Borodino")

background

After the invasion of the French army under the command of Napoleon into the territory of the Russian Empire (June 1812), Russian troops regularly retreated. The numerical superiority of the French contributed to the rapid advance into the depths of Russia, this deprived the commander-in-chief of the Russian army, Infantry General Barclay de Tolly, of the opportunity to prepare troops for battle. The long retreat of the troops caused public indignation, in connection with this, Emperor Alexander I appointed General of Infantry Kutuzov as commander-in-chief. However, Kutuzov continued to retreat. Kutuzov's strategy was aimed at 1) exhausting the enemy, 2) waiting for reinforcements for a decisive battle with the Napoleonic army.

On September 5, the battle took place at the Shevardino redoubt, which delayed the French troops and made it possible for the Russians to build fortifications on the main positions.

V.V. Vereshchagin "Napoleon on the Borodino Heights"

The battle of Borodino began on September 7, 1812 at 5:30 and ended at 18:00. Fighting during the day took place in different parts of the position of the Russian troops: from the village of Maloye in the north to the village of Utitsy in the south. The most difficult battles took place for Bagration's flashes and on the Raevsky battery.

On the morning of September 3, 1812, having begun to concentrate in the area of ​​​​the village of Borodina, M.I. Kutuzov carefully examined the surrounding area and ordered the construction of fortifications to begin. concluded that this area was most suitable for a decisive battle - it was impossible to postpone it further, since Alexander I demanded that Kutuzov stop the French advance towards Moscow.

The village of Borodino was located 12 kilometers west of Mozhaisk, the terrain here was hilly and crossed by small rivers and streams that formed deep ravines. The eastern part of the field is elevated more than the western one. The Koloch River, which flowed through the village, had a high steep bank, which was a good cover for the right flank of the Russian army. The left flank, approaching the swampy forest, overgrown with bushes, was poorly accessible to cavalry and infantry. This position of the Russian army made it possible to cover the road to Moscow, and the wooded area made it possible to shelter reserves. It was impossible to find a better place for the decisive battle. Although Kutuzov himself was aware that the left flank was a weak point, he hoped to “correct the situation with art”.

Start of the fight

Kutuzov's idea was that, as a result of the active defense of the Russian troops, the French troops would suffer as many losses as possible in order to change the balance of forces and further defeat the French army. In accordance with this, the battle formation of the Russian troops was built.

In the village of Borodino there was one battalion of Russian guards rangers with four guns. To the west of the village there was a combat outpost of rangers of army regiments. East of Borodino, 30 sailors guarded the bridge over the Kolocha River. After the withdrawal of Russian troops to the eastern coast, they were supposed to destroy it.

The corps under the command of E. Beauharnais, Viceroy of Spain, sent one division from the north and another from the west to the battle near Borodino.

The French imperceptibly, under the cover of the morning fog, approached Borodino at 5 am, and at 5-30 they were noticed by the Russians, who opened artillery fire. The guards moved on the French with bayonets, but the forces were not equal - many of them died on the spot. The rest retreated behind Kolocha, but the French broke through the bridge and approached the village of Gorki, where Kutuzov's command post was.

But Barclay de Tolly, having sent three regiments of chasseurs, drove the French away, the bridge over the Kolocha was dismantled.

The French who survived and retreated to Borodino established an artillery battery here, from which they fired at the Raevsky battery and at the battery near the village of Gorki.

Battle for Bagration's flashes

J.Dow "Portrait of P.I. Bagration"

Bagration had at his disposal about 8,000 soldiers and 50 guns (the 27th infantry division of General Neverovsky and the consolidated grenadier division of General Vorontsov) to protect the flashes.

Napoleon had 43,000 men and more than 200 guns (seven infantry and eight cavalry divisions under the command of marshals Davout, Murat, Ney and General Junot) to strike at the flushes. But even these troops were not enough, additional reinforcements came, as a result, the Napoleonic army fought for the Bagration Flushes, consisting of 50 thousand soldiers and 400 guns. During the battle, the Russians also brought up reinforcements - 30 thousand soldiers and 300 guns made up the number of Russian troops.

For 6 hours of battle, the French made eight attacks: the first two were repulsed, then the French managed to temporarily capture three flushes, but they could not gain a foothold there and were driven back by Bagration. This defeat worried Napoleon and his marshals, as the French were clearly outnumbered. The French troops were losing confidence. And so the eighth attack of the flushes began, which ended with the capture of it by the French, then Bagration put forward all his available forces for a counterattack, but he himself was seriously wounded - Lieutenant General Konovnitsyn took command. He raised the spirit of the army, broken by the wound of Bagration, withdrew the troops from the fleches to the eastern bank of the Semenovsky ravine, quickly installed artillery, built infantry and cavalry, and delayed the further advance of the French.

Semenov position

10 thousand soldiers and artillery were concentrated here. The task of the Russians in this position was to delay the further advance of the French army and block the breakthrough, which was formed after the French occupied the Bagration fleches. This was a difficult task, since the bulk of the Russian troops were those who had already fought for several hours for Bagration's flushes, and only three guards regiments (Moscow, Izmailovsky and Finland) arrived from the reserve. They lined up in a square.

But the French did not have reinforcements, so the Napoleonic marshals decided to attack in such a way as to hit the Russians on both sides in the crossfire of artillery. The French attacked fiercely, but were constantly repulsed, most of them died from Russian bayonets. Nevertheless, the Russians were forced to retreat east of the village of Semenovskoye, but soon Kutuzov gave the order to attack the cavalry of the Cossack regiments of Platov and Uvarov, which diverted part of the French troops from the center. While Napoleon was regrouping his troops on the left wing, Kutuzov gained time and pulled his forces to the center of the position.

Raevsky battery

J. Dow "Portrait of General Raevsky"

The battery of Lieutenant General Raevsky had a strong position: it was located on a hill, where 18 guns were installed, there were 8 infantry battalions and three regiments of chasseurs in reserve. The French tried twice to attack the battery, but failed, but there were heavy losses on both sides. At three o'clock in the afternoon, the French again began to attack Raevsky's battery and two regiments managed to go around it from the north side and break in. A fierce hand-to-hand fight began, Raevsky's battery was finally taken by the French. Russian troops retreated in battle and organized defenses 1-1.5 kilometers east of the Raevsky battery.

Fights on the Old Smolensk road

After a long break, the battle began again on the Old Smolensk road. The regiments of the 17th division, the Vilmanstrad and Minsk regiments of the 4th division and 500 people of the Moscow militia participated in it. The French could not withstand the attacking actions of the Russian troops and retreated, but then Poniatowski's infantry and cavalry forces struck from the left flank and from the rear. Russian troops at first successfully resisted, but then retreated along the Old Smolensk road and settled east of the Utitsky mound, in the upper reaches of the Semenovsky stream, adjoining the left flank of the 2nd Army.

End of the Battle of Borodino

V.V. Vereshchagin "The End of the Battle of Borodino"

For 15 hours the French army fought with the Russian forces, but could not achieve success. Its physical and moral resources were undermined, and with the onset of darkness, the Napoleonic troops withdrew to their starting line, leaving Bagration's flashes and Raevsky's battery, for which there was a stubborn struggle. Only the forward detachments of the French remained on the right bank of the Kolocha, while the main forces retreated to the left bank of the river.

The Russian army firmly occupied positions. Despite significant losses, her morale did not drop. The soldiers were eager to fight and burned with the desire to finally defeat the enemy. Kutuzov was also preparing for the upcoming battle, but the information collected at night showed that half of the Russian army was defeated - it was impossible to continue the battle. And he decides to retreat and surrender Moscow to the French.

The meaning of the battle of Borodino

Under Borodino, the Russian army under the command of Kutuzov dealt a severe blow to the French army. Its losses were enormous: 58 thousand soldiers, 1600 officers and 47 generals. Napoleon called the battle of Borodino the most bloody and terrible of all the battles he had given (a total of 50). His troops, which won brilliant victories in Europe, were forced to retreat under the pressure of Russian soldiers. The French officer Laugier wrote in his diary: “What a sad sight the battlefield presented. No disaster, no lost battle can equal the horrors of the Borodino field. . . Everyone is shocked and crushed."

The Russian army also suffered heavy losses: 38 thousand soldiers, 1500 officers and 29 generals.

The battle of Borodino is an example of the military genius of M.I. Kutuzov. He took everything into account: he successfully chose positions, skillfully deployed troops, provided strong reserves, which gave him the opportunity to maneuver. The French army, on the other hand, conducted a mainly frontal offensive with limited maneuvers. In addition, Kutuzov always relied on the courage and stamina of Russian soldiers, soldiers and officers.

The battle of Borodino was a turning point in the Patriotic War of 1812, it was of great international importance, which influenced the fate of European countries. Defeated near Borodino, Napoleon was never able to recover from the defeat in Russia, and later he was defeated in Europe.

V.V. Vereshchagin "On the high road - the retreat of the French"

Other assessments of the Battle of Borodino

Emperor Alexander I announced the battle of Borodino as victory.

A number of Russian historians insist that the outcome of the Battle of Borodino was indefinite, but the Russian army won a "moral victory" in it.

F. Roubaud "Borodino. Attack on the Raevsky Battery"

Foreign historians, as well as a number of Russian ones, consider Borodino as an undoubted Napoleon's victory.

However, everyone agrees that Napoleon failed crush the Russian army. French failed destroy the Russian army, force Russia to capitulate and dictate peace terms.

Russian troops inflicted significant damage on Napoleon's army and were able to save forces for future battles in Europe.